Lāhainā’s Infernos of Inefficiency
Photographed above is the historic town of Lāhainā, Mau’i after the devastating 2023 wildfires. Photo courtesy of State Farm.
The deadliest American wildfire in over a century devastated Lāhainā, Mau’i in August 2023. Over a year later, the West Mau’i town is still in the early stages of rebuilding. While multiple fatal errors were made on the day of the fires, the severity of the damage can be attributed to various structural deficiencies that long predate it. Residents had voiced concerns about inadequate infrastructure in a similar situation years prior but were routinely disregarded by local and state officials. Both the state and Mau’i County failed to address substantial, long-standing matters and swept them under the rug for the sake of simplicity—a learned pattern from state institutions. Thorough and disciplined leadership is needed to institute proactive legislation to update infrastructure and properly enforce wildfire safety regulations to ensure that Lāhainā, and the rest of Hawai’i, is appropriately equipped for future disasters.
The August 2023 report released by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) details the origin, cause, timeline, and damage wrought by the 2023 wildfires. A small brush fire on the morning of August 8, 2023, reignited in the afternoon and escalated to become the deadly blaze that later ravaged Lāhainā. The estimated damage totals $5.52 billion, with 2,173 structures destroyed, 6,721 acres burned, 102 lives lost, and numerous short and long-term injuries sustained. Furthermore, severe psychological and emotional trauma has driven many out of Lāhainā, or out of the state entirely. It’s clear that this tragedy has rattled the Lāhainā, and the greater Hawai’i, community to its core.
On August 24, 2018, Lāhainā experienced a similar, smaller-scale blaze caused by Hurricane Lane. No lives were lost, but residents critiqued the shortcomings of the emergency alert systems, evacuation routes, departmental communication problems, and inefficient water systems that all played a significant role in the 2023 disaster. Many of the officials involved in the emergency response were surveyed for the After Action Report and Improvement Plan and declared their belief that the state’s relevant departments were prepared and responded effectively, despite their admissions of inadequacies in training, interdepartmental communication, and overall disorganization––not to mention the loud and clear criticisms coming from the affected community. Considering Hawaii’s vulnerability to hurricanes and wildfires, the subpar plan is a clear example of how multiple Mau’i departments shirked their duties and failed to anticipate the implications of these pervasive flaws during a wildfire emergency.
Lāhainā’s old and outdated infrastructure significantly impacted the number of wildfire casualties. As a historic town, its water and transportation infrastructure lacks the efficiency and reliability of modern structures in other areas. Lāhainā was mostly preserved in its antiquity due to its significance in Hawaiian culture, but the severe lack of collaboration between the relevant state and local departments led to the neglect of the necessary improvement of its infrastructure and, consequently, the well-being of Lāhainā residents.
Prior to the August 2023 disaster, there were known congestion points at intersections along major roadways, including Route 30, Front Street, Kuhua Street, and Lahainaluna Road. To maximize the ease of evacuation, Mau’i County should have lobbied the state more intensely for the Kuhua Road Extension project that would’ve allowed for an additional evacuation route with turn lanes at all major intersections. The need for this two-mile extension was identified in 2005, but after its final environmental assessment in 2015, the project stalled. Officials continually decline to respond to inquiries about the failure, but whether the project was brought down by bureaucratic politics or was simply a casualty of bureaucratic inertia, it underscores the County’s mismanagement and unreliability on issues of critical importance for thousands of people. If officials had seriously committed to productive actions when these problems were flagged, overall traffic would be reduced and more evacuation options would be available. Dozens might still be alive. In the October 2024 Lāhainā Long-Term Recovery Plan (LTRP), local officials reintroduced the project. This long overdue extension should have been enacted previously as a safeguard––not as a reaction––to the heavy traffic that impeded people’s flight to safety during the wildfires.
One consideration for transportation enhancements is Honolulu’s failing rail system. Hasty and negligent oversight of various external factors that could impact the rail’s construction has led to the project going $7 million over budget and being delayed by over a decade. Such cases highlight how Hawaii’s systemic inefficiencies can derail essential projects, leaving communities vulnerable in times of need. It is vital that Mau’i County strengthen its transportation routes but remain cautious not to fall into old, negligent habits that have triggered sweeping breakdowns on the same scale as the Honolulu rail.
Adding to the devastation, Lāhainā’s water system failed while firefighters were actively battling the fire, which put residents and first responders in unnecessary danger and allowed the rapid spread of flames propelled by Hurricane Dora’s turbulent winds. In a report following the August 2023 disaster, firefighters reported faulty pressure in the water pumps throughout Lāhainā that caused water flow to cease during firefighting attempts. The LTRP proposed a project that improves “pipeline and facility deficiencies to meet current hydraulic criteria to address low fire flow residual pressures in the water system.” The existing water storage capacity and pipe systems are insufficient to meet the everyday demands of the community, let alone fight natural disasters, making this long-awaited investment imperative. Mau’i County knew of Lāhainā’s drought risk, low water supply, and increasing population before both the 2018 and 2023 wildfires. The failures of the Department of Water Supply and associated agencies to supply Lāhainā with sufficient quantities of water resulted in the community being unable to protect itself from this wildfire.
Furthermore, Maui’s emergency management system exhibited glaring defects when it unsuccessfully attempted to alert residents to evacuate, worsening the traffic buildup in Lāhainā and costing many lives. The Mau’i Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) delivered evacuation warnings via cell phone, which failed to reach many residents due to the collapsed electrical and cell towers. The department’s inattention to these conditions and lack of effort when issuing alternative alerts resulted in a chaotic evacuation scene as the fire intensified. Although some cell towers have emergency generators, this backup option was not as reliable in a wildfire situation as, for example, the solar-powered satellite system Hawaii's tsunami sirens use. Had Lāhainā officials utilized the emergency sirens activated by the more reliable satellite system, they would have quickly reached a greater audience, thus saving more lives.
In the 2018 wildfire, residents encountered the same failure of MEMA’s cellular alerts. This further demonstrates Hawaii’s pattern of subpar training for emergency management alert officials. Hawai’i’s false missile alert crisis on January 13, 2018, represents its faulty crisis response system. An alert was issued via the Hawai’i Emergency Alert System to all resident cell phones at 8:07 am with the text, “BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL.” Residents were notified 38 minutes later of the message’s error. Hawaii’s disorganized and cluttered programs caused great lags in response time, showing the poor example of crisis intervention that state departments are setting for the counties. Even the federal government agreed that Hawaii’s Emergency Management Agencies need updated technology and more rigorous training protocols.
Furthermore, a resident stated that she didn’t believe the missile alert was real because “if it was, they’d also sound the tsunami-alert sirens.” While officials deemed this an unreasonable last resort to warn of Lāhainā’s wildfires—as they claimed people would be confused or unable to hear the sirens—many who experienced the false missile alert and the Lāhainā fires questioned why the sirens remained inactive. Rather than continually dodging this question, Hawai’i government officials should rework their mobile notification system and expand the usage of the tsunami sirens to maximize the effectiveness of their crisis intervention operations.
Lāhainā’s numerous fire-prone buildings and unruly vegetation also aided the fire’s spread. The LTRP confirms connective fuels—vegetation and manmade objects—created the perfect environment for an uncontrolled spread. Coupled with Lāhainā’s history of droughts, the overrun plant life in Mau’i was identified as a significant wildfire risk when Hurricane Lane hit Lāhainā in 2018. Mau’i County recognized West Maui’s 90% chance of annual wildfires in its 2020 hazard mitigation plan, with the report designating Lāhainā as one of two areas of highest concern. Despite repeated warnings, Mau’i County didn’t effectively enforce the necessary wildfire codes in critical areas. The failure of Mau’i Fire Department’s Fire Prevention Bureau to uphold wildfire code compliance and execute solutions sooner reflects the state’s larger-scale neglect to invest in wildfire prevention.
Fire departments across the state are also understaffed and underfunded, thus incentivizing the prioritization of cheaper or easier initiatives like educational events and enforcing structural regulations. Enforcement of the actual wildfire code is not fire officials’ primary focus. The Hawai’i State Fire Code is based on the national code, with an entire section dedicated to all aspects of wildfire prevention. It is essential for the protection of all residents for Hawai’i to prioritize wildfire safety. Some realistic solutions include decreasing property density, building with fire-resistant materials, and using fire-resistant hardscape. Many surviving homes in Lāhainā were built with fire-resistant materials and had less flammable vegetation on their property, which should serve as a blueprint during rebuilding. These standards don’t guarantee immunity against fires, but they are highly preventative, can significantly reduce damages, and increase residents’ chances of survival. The community must comply with these statutes to protect Lāhainā and the rest of the state from potential wildfires. Ultimately, these efforts won’t be possible without increased financial allocation and a genuine commitment from Hawai’i government officials and fire departments to hold themselves and the greater community accountable.
The Hawai’i government’s history of bureaucratic delay, misplaced prioritization, and overall inefficiency culminated in the 2023 tragedy. It’s evident in these failures that proactive policies weren’t initiated or were delayed and only took precedence after the wildfires wreaked havoc on Lāhainā. While these changes are happening in Mau’i, the rest of the state should heed this warning: if preemptive action isn’t taken to address Hawaii’s fundamental shortcomings on the issue of fire safety, there will be severe consequences down the line. It took the death of over 100 Hawai’i residents and the tragic loss of a treasured Hawai’i town to spark intentional reform from state and local government. Still, Lāhainā’s catastrophe must serve as a wake-up call that Hawai’i and other wildfire-prone states need to allocate the necessary funds and resources to rectify the deeply rooted issues of faulty infrastructure, emergency response, and wildfire prevention before further destruction befalls the island chain.
Jasmine Lianalyn Rocha (CC ‘27) is a staff writer at CPR studying economics-political science and history. She can be reached at jar2383@columbia.edu.