A Pact of Power: El Salvador and Haiti’s State of Emergency Under Corruption’s Shadow

Aerial shot of a neighborhood in Haiti. Photo courtesy of Kelly Lacy.

Since March 2024, Haiti has been under a state of emergency due to an outbreak of gang-related violence. In early October, Haitian Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) Gandy Thomas met with Ambassador Wendy Jeannette of El Salvador to the OAS to sign the “Agreement on the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti.” This agreement initiated exterior militarized help from the state of El Salvador to resolve the ongoing crisis in Haiti. In the agreement, El Salvador stated that it would provide aerial surveillance, medical assistance, and street patrols to Haiti. The partnership responds to the escalating gang-related violence in Haiti, with 4,000 gang-related deaths recorded in 2024 alone. El Salvador offers a possible remedy to this crisis, as evidenced by President Nayib Bukele’s success with reducing homicides in some areas by up to 60% through military action. 

Rather than investigating the underlying reasons for conflict, global discussion of gang activity mostly focuses on dissent and violence perpetrated by insurgents. Governments grappling with intense gang violence, like El Salvador, can portray themselves as saviors to the global community, diverting attention from the underlying issues of government corruption and state violence. In his 2024 UN General Assembly address, Bukele said of his country’s situation that “some say that we have imprisoned thousands, but the reality is that we have freed millions.” Although the crime rate has plummeted during Bukele’s presidency, international human rights groups have raised concerns about the methods for this decrease. Therefore, this partnership could reinforce a dangerous cycle of punitive practices that further entrench internal corruption by diverting resources meant for public safety into violent militarization, creating a culture of impunity. Instead of addressing the root causes of gang violence, the partnership exacerbates state corruption by suppressing dissent and consolidating state power, leaving Haitians vulnerable to further gang and state violence. To solve this problem, El Salvador must rescind its military agreement with Haiti to combat gang violence and restore state security. 

The most important and visible way the governments of El Salvador and Haiti foster iniquity is through suppressing dissent. In March 2022, Bukele declared a state of emergency in El Salvador to address large-scale gang violence. Since then, it has been extended eight times, creating draconian violations of democratic rights. Bukele’s policy has resulted in over 66,000 detentions involving arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and due process violations. This pattern of repression is not unique to El Salvador. In Haiti’s ongoing state of emergency, demonstrations have faced violent crackdowns, and there has been political polarization across the board, leading to a climate of fear and insecurity among activists and citizens. This stems partly from the hardships Haiti faced as the first independent nation founded by an enslaved population, compounded by the burdens of reparations and the interference of foreign-backed dictatorships. This history has shaped Haiti’s present-day crisis, where corrupt elites, foreign powers, and systemic inequality continue to undermine efforts for meaningful governance and development. By partnering with El Salvador in law enforcement efforts, Haiti invites further iniquity into its borders. The use of Salvadoran officials to police and incarcerate Haitian citizens along with increased surveillance through aerial technology will make it increasingly harder for citizens to feel safe or have access to democratic rights like privacy or freedom of expression.

In addition to suppressing dissent, El Salvador’s state of emergency exacerbates corruption by consolidating government power. Under Bukele’s decree, a period of legal exceptions was created, granting the executive branch and state security forces extraordinary powers to suspend constitutional guarantees by bypassing legal checks on public spending and limiting access to public information, thus undermining transparency and accountability. This policy abuses information classification related to government management, making it easier for government officials to label documents or actions as confidential or classified to embezzle public funds. If a similar approach is adopted in El Salvador’s partnership with Haiti, it could lead to the same erosion of checks and balances, with the potential for increased government misconduct, consolidating power through legal exceptions that perpetuate state corruption.

Altogether, the partnership’s potential to further suppress dissent and consolidate state power will only leave Haitians more vulnerable to gang violence and repression. Under Bukele’s presidency, El Salvador has imprisoned thousands of people without arrest warrants and kept them in highly inhumane prison conditions. While Bukele boasts a 91% approval rating in El Salvador, much of this support stems from the public’s frustration with crime, overlooking the significant human rights abuses that come with his methods. The visible decline in crime statistics masks the deeper societal harm caused by mass incarcerations, extrajudicial killings, and state-sanctioned violence. While many citizens have deemed short-term security gains necessary, the heavy-handed approach further alienates marginalized communities and perpetuates a cycle of repression. While the agreement between El Salvador and Haiti outlines that El Salvador will provide aerial surveillance, medical assistance, and street patrols, the introduction of foreign military forces trained under Bukele’s model of aggressive state control could still carry risks of reinforcing repressive measures. The precedent set by El Salvador’s current security policies focused on militarized suppression could lead to similar tactics in Haiti, further destabilizing vulnerable communities and deepening the cycle of violence and repression.

Accordingly, both governments must rescind this destructive agreement and transform their partnership into something more comprehensive. One possible solution to the ongoing insecurity in both countries would be to create joint programs aimed at addressing the systemic root causes of gang violence, such as poverty. This might include creating youth mentorship programs and expanding vocational training in sectors with high job demand such as tech, construction, and renewable energy. A key component of these programs would be fostering local partnerships with NGOs and community leaders to ensure that interventions are community-driven and culturally sensitive. Another crucial improvement is engaging with international organizations like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank to provide humanitarian aid and technical expertise in democratic governance reforms. This could involve creating anti-corruption initiatives in key government sectors and supporting local civil society organizations to hold governments accountable. These programs would focus on long-term stability through systemic change, rather than short-term fixes that exacerbate authoritarianism or militarization. 

The partnership between Haiti and El Salvador fuels their reliance on military intervention and reflects a preference for quick fixes to complex problems. Militarization worsens state corruption and human rights abuses, rather than enacting meaningful change. Such an approach suggests a willingness to sacrifice democratic rights for perceived short-term security gains, further entrenching a culture of repression. This perspective fails to recognize that sustainable solutions require holistic approaches encompassing governance, economic stability, and social justice. To confront issues of gang violence, we must center the root causes of violent insurrection and start imagining ways in which we can bring peace without further violence.

Graysen Kirk (CC ’27) is a human rights major with a minor in political science and is the Peace and Conflict representative for Columbia Academics on Foreign Affairs (CAFA), focusing on how gender, socioeconomics, and race play into global politics. She can be reached at gik2109@columbia.edu.