A New Arctic: Kirkenes, Russia, and NATO Statecraft

The Kirkenes Harbour in Norway. Photo courtesy of Mathis Heibert.

It was late December 2022. Nearly a year had passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The small Norwegian town of Kirkenes, just six miles from the Russian border, was in the midst of the darkest months of a Scandinavian winter.

In the darkness, what remained clearly visible was a Russian fish-processing vessel, Arka-33, which had docked in Kirkenes weeks earlier and had not left. According to a report by the New Yorker, Arka-33 was likely an electronic intelligence collection ship, disguised as a fishing vessel, owned by a Russian crab-fishing company with ties to two private security firms and a Russian parliament member listed on various international sanctions.

Ever since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has used the area as a testing ground for its espionage and war-preparation efforts in Europe. In response, Norwegian authorities restricted in July 2024 Russian fishing boats from entering Kirkenes, except in occasions of emergency ship repair. With the Kirkenes fjords opening into the Barents Sea, near where the Russian Northern Fleet has conducted espionage and nuclear exercises since the early days of the Cold War, Norway and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) likely saw little room for alternative options.

However, the restrictions backfired by damaging Kirkenes’ economy, which had—until recently—been dependent on cross-border trade with Russia. After sanctions prevented work on Russian trawlers, townspeople in Kirkenes suffered from layoffs from a ship-repair factory, portside bars, restaurants, and shops, which were some of the biggest employers in town.

Collateral damage, however, is not limited to Kirkenes. The story of the town reflects how aggressive NATO economic responses against Russia cause greater geopolitical problems. Although many have questioned the Kremlin’s strategic capabilities since their unsuccessful invasion of Ukraine, Russian influence in the Arctic can still significantly impact the political and economic security of NATO nations. Therefore, NATO must remain cautious with how they treat Russia in the Arctic. This caution entails working toward three major objectives: resuming diplomatic relations with Russia, prioritizing economic security in the region, and developing NATO’s military capabilities in the backdrop.

The Arctic’s rich resources and strategic value have long been treasured by Soviet and Russian leaders, particularly since Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk Initiative in 1987 that recognized significant geoeconomic potential in the region. Today, Vladimir Putin views the Arctic Strategy a pillar of Russia’s return to great power. Since 2005, Russia has reopened over 50 Soviet-era military bases in its northwestern territory of the Kola Peninsula, which hosts the country’s second strike nuclear arsenal and the Northern Fleet headquarters. Russia has increasingly modernized its Northern Fleet with more submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), new hypersonic missiles to evade NATO defenses, and the world’s largest icebreaker fleet.

Following the Arctic Council’s joint statement suspending all cooperation with Russia in 2022, Russia has tightened its control over the Northern Sea Route—a 5,600-kilometer Arctic trade corridor stretching from the Bering Strait to the Kara Gate. In fact, the Kremlin granted Rosatom, its nuclear agency, bureaucratic authority over the route, restricting access to foreign vessels.

Climate change is another critical factor in this maritime passage conflict. Over the past 40 years, global summer sea ice has declined by nearly 13% per decade, with the Arctic summer ice potentially disappearing by 2040. As ice coverage diminishes, the Northern Sea Route is anticipated to grow into a year-round passage. In response, Putin has committed to more than doubling cargo traffic along the transpolar route, while also strengthening partnerships with Beijing.

This move draws China into the Arctic equation, despite its northernmost point lying nearly 1,500 kilometers south of the Arctic Circle. After cooperation in the Arctic Council came to a halt, Russia approached China with plans of a viable shipping route through the Arctic from Asia to Europe, especially with hopes of increased trade revenue—something crucial for its ongoing war effort and struggling domestic economy.

With rapid Russian developments in the Arctic, Mathieu Boulègue, a researcher at the Chatham House, writes, “Moscow feels that it has a position of relative strength in the Arctic, which means that it is clearly seeking to obtain dividends from its perceived military superiority.” NATO nations need time to match Russia’s military capabilities in the region, and the alliance still lacks a concrete plan to counter Russia. The United States refreshed its Arctic strategy in July 2024 to deploy additional tactical assets in Alaska and Scandinavia and increase investments in Arctic infrastructure, but the lack of communication between Washington and Moscow limited the strategy’s success. As of now, NATO would be at a tremendous disadvantage if the conflict in Ukraine were to expand into the Arctic.

The present suspension of diplomacy with Russia leaves the Western Arctic powers without a major formal mechanism in which to discuss Arctic matters, placing four million Arctic inhabitants in economic and political jeopardy. To mitigate these concerns, NATO and its Arctic partners should make the restoration of Arctic diplomacy a top priority. NATO will keep its hawkish stance on the Russia-Ukraine border, but it could choose to decrease sanctions against Russia in distant places like Kirkenes, providing ground for the Kremlin to respond to the West’s call for diplomacy. NATO must further enhance its situational awareness in the region, especially by providing meaningful economic support to local communities to foster resilience and cooperation. These measures would enable NATO to earn time against Russia’s rapid military buildup in the Arctic and signal its commitment to regional stability.

For many years, the Arctic was a region of relative peace and cooperation between Russia and the West. Locals in Kirkenes and politicians in both Oslo and Moscow generally believed there was something surprisingly peaceful about Arctic regional cooperation. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shattered this peace, transforming the region into one of the world’s most sensitive geopolitical zones. Every Arctic nation other than Russia is now a member of NATO, providing Russia with the claim to defend its borders in this important territory. 

Indeed, NATO faces a multifaceted Arctic challenge: it must somehow find a balance between diplomatic engagement, economic stability, and military buildup. A short-sighted focus on a single objective will only trigger Russia to cause a greater security dilemma in the region. It must carefully deliberate its response against Russian expansion in the Arctic, with a long-term vision of peace in mind.

Yongjae Kim (CC ’27) is a staff writer at CPR and a sophomore studying political science and philosophy.