Policy 360: A Crisis in West Africa: The Malian Insurgency
The country of Mali presently faces a seemingly interminable crisis: after multiple chaotic coup d’etats, violent assaults from jihadist groups, and strained relationships with its international partners, its people have long suffered from political instability and economic devastation. Mali’s internal conflicts have been brewing since 2012, when a separatist rebellion from the northern part of the country first initiated a military coup. However, they have been most recently ignited by several forceful turnovers of the state’s new civilian government. These tumultuous episodes led by military leaders who seek to maintain control over the country have created the perfect ground for Islamic jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda to coerce and recruit vulnerable citizens to serve as soldiers; in fact, they have succeeded in doing so by exploiting pre-exisitng conflicts and terrorizing communities throughout the country. As a result, countless Malians have been displaced, thrown into poverty, and many even killed.
Not only has this political insurgency affected the citizens and state of Mali, but it has also spread to neighboring states, such as Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. Each of these countries has been affected by and has dealt with the Malian crisis in different ways, which this roundtable seeks to explore. While Niger faces a dilemma between accepting international aid from European powers to help fight its own political crises and maintaining a positive relationship with regional partners, the government of Burkina Faso has openly criticized Mali for its handling of the insurgency and the subsequent conflict it has spread throughout the West Africa region. Mauritania has turned to hiring private mercenary organizations to protect its institutions and promote peace, a move that carried both national and international complications.
By analyzing the Malian crisis from the perspectives of these four countries – Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania – this piece provides readers with a multifaceted understanding of the current political climate of this part of West Africa, from the struggles each country is facing individually to the ways in which these states interact with one another and European powers in attempts to resolve this violent crisis.
Mali’s Unattainable Democracy: Government Takeovers, Terrorism, and Disengagement of Western Powers
By Hanna Zarrinnegar, Columbia College ‘24
Mali currently finds itself in a political and economic crisis, facing a myriad of challenges from government takeovers to economic restrictions. The Malian government has been prone to instability and hijacking, particularly as the nation has experienced a rise in violence, civilian abuse, and setbacks in democratic development. In September 2020, Mali’s military, which has long held political power, agreed on an 18-month transition to a government of civilian rule. However, the execution of this transition has been at the discretion and exploitation of military leaders, especially Colonel Assimi Goïta. Thus far, Goïta has orchestrated two coups – most recently in May 2021, after a contested cabinet shuffle. Both times, he detained the incumbent presidents, forced them out of office, and proclaimed himself the interim president. At the same time, Goïta has vowed to act in protection of democracy; he justified his depositions by claiming that both presidents were failing in their duties and sabotaging the governmental transition. As part of the 18-month plan, Mali was set to hold its first democratic elections in February 2022. However, this past December, Goïta announced his intention to remain in power for up to five years, thereby postponing the elections. To make matters worse, in the past decade, Mali has been experiencing a rapidly growing Islamist insurgency, with multiple organizations terrorizing civilians. Just in 2021, armed groups carried out more than 800 deadly attacks, killing thousands of individuals and displacing millions. Approximately 13 million people in the region currently require humanitarian assistance.
Mali’s failed transition to democratic power and rampant terrorism have contributed to regional estrangement. Following the delay of elections, leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) closed Mali’s borders, imposed a trade embargo, and froze the country’s assets held at the Central Bank of West African States. The ECOWAS had intentions of publicly expressing disapproval towards the “illegitimate military transition government,” but its sanctions have inadvertently threatened individuals who rely on the flow of goods to make a livelihood. Such individuals are often at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy, such as truck drivers who find themselves out of work due to the closed borders.
Amid this brewing conflict, many European powers have disengaged from Mali. Notably, France is neglecting its legacy as a military interventionist in Mali. French troops first entered Mali in 2013, when the former French President Francois Hollande initiated a counterterrorism military intervention. After nearly a decade of fighting, in February 2022, French President Macron announced his nation’s intention to withdraw all its troops from Mali, stating that the nation’s conflict should be confined to West Africa. However, as France abandons the operations against terrorism, the West African state has found a potential ally in Russia: emerged reports show that Mali is recruiting mercenaries from the Wagner Group, a notorious Russian private military company. Although both parties deny the alleged agreement, the European Union adopted sanctions against both Wagner due to its ongoing human rights abuses, as well as Mali’s coup leaders due to their undemocratic political transition. By simultaneously alienating Mali and Wagner and making them circumstantial allies, the EU’s sanctions serve to protect civilians, but may exacerbate the current crisis.
Due to these circumstances, the Malian government is unstable and weak, hindering the state’s ability to rein in democracy and eliminate insurgencies. As an added layer, the economic sanctions directed on behalf of both the ECOWAS and EU trouble vulnerable populations that rely on the flow of goods to sustain their livelihood. With such a series of systemic problems, it is clear that Mali has a long path ahead if it seeks to achieve peace and stability.
Can Niger Weather the Storm?
By Carsten Barnes, School of General Studies ’23
In the early morning of March 31, 2021, the sound of heavy weapons jolted awake the residents of Niamey, the capital of the Republic of Niger. Some members of the Nigerien army were attempting a coup d’etat, stopped only after hours of fighting between the army and the presidential guard. The incident served as a warning sign to a Nigerian government which – despite the failure of the coup – remains in an extremely precarious position, facing multiple and growing crises, a discontented public, and the specter of a military takeover.
Niger faces both a military insurgency and the growing threat of a military takeover as a direct result of the ongoing crisis in neighboring Mali. An Islamic insurgency led by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which began in Mali in 2012, has spread across the porous border of the two states and is now deeply affecting Niger’s security. Jihadists are now utilizing the tactics learned from their Malian attacks in Niger, such as the exploitation of communal and ethnic conflicts as well as the encouragement of tensions between pastoralist and agricultural communities, to recruit soldiers and engender a general breakdown in society.
In addition to the security crisis, recent coups d’état in Mali have put enormous pressure on Niger’s government by increasing the possibility of a coup d’etat in the country, as the recent attempt in 2021 illustrates. The 2020 Malian coup d’état that ousted the democratically elected government was buoyed by popular support, and militaries across the region have taken notice. Subsequent coups in Guinea and Burkina Faso were also warmly welcomed by the local populace, indicating to many observers that the conditions enabling the successful coup in Mali are present across the West African region.
With weak security apparatus and government institutions, Niger has responded to these crises by relying heavily on international support, as the country simply does not have the resources or the infrastructure to defeat the Islamic insurgency alone. Niger has welcomed French forces into the country and may host even more as French president Macron indicated Niger could receive more troops after the withdrawal of French troops from Mali. Niger also hosts a U.S. drone base, and has thrown its diplomatic weight behind regional initiatives like the G5 Sahel to form a regional fighting force to combat insecurity in the country.
However, the 2020 and 2021 coups in Mali have complicated Niger’s strategy to work closely with regional partners while relying heavily on French military support because of the strident anti-French and pro-Russian position of the new Malian government. Niger must now navigate between maintaining good relations with Mali and its international military partners, as the Nigerien military is at the moment too weak, corrupt, and underfunded to fight the jihadists on its own.
Niger’s leadership is confronting a political and military landscape that is filled with risks, yet it is one that offers significant opportunities. As one of the last countries affected by the Sahel crisis to not be under military rule, the country stands to receive the bulk of international military and economic aid to the West African region. As jihadists expand forces in the country and the threat of military takeover grows, whether Niger can continue to rely so heavily on international support remains to be seen.
Burkina Faso: The Reach of the Malian Crisis
By Marla Rinck, General Studies ‘23
Since 2012, Mali has been plagued with extremist violence and instability. The conflict has not only crossed porous borders into neighboring countries like Burkina Faso, but has also taken root in these countries themselves. Although Mali has been coined the birthplace of the conflict, the casualties in Burkina Faso have largely surpassed those in Mali. The conflict in Burkina Faso also exhibits “strong local dynamics,” and fuels pre-existing inter-communal tensions. Affected by both political turmoil and human rights violations, Burkina Faso is now facing an egregious food crisis, mass displacement, and structural weaknesses.
The initial breakdown of the security system in Burkina Faso traces back to the resignation of President Blaise Compaoré in 2014 and the dissolution of the Presidential Guard Regiment in 2015. An attack that took place in the nation’s capital, Ouagadougou, in 2016 further exacerbated the breakdown; both violence and insecurity have escalated in the region since. The group Ansarul Islam, which is responsible for most of the violence, has ties to Jihasist groups in the Sahel, and continues to challenge the prevailing social order in northern Burkina Faso by aiming to promote equality amongst social classes and question the authority of traditional religious chiefs. In January 2022, merely three weeks after a coup overthrew President Roch Kaboré, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba was inaugurated as president. While Damiba promised to counter the Jihadst insurgency and reorganize the regional security forces to enforce connections between intelligence and field operations to fight corruption, his presidency so far has not fulfilled any of these promises. Contrarily, the political instability and conflict that has ensued has left 1 in 4 people requiring humanitarian assistance and approximately 1.7 million people displaced in the country. To make matters worse, non-state actors like the World Health Organization and the United Nations may be reducing funding as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the need to support operations in the latter, risking further exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis in Burkina Faso.
While both regional and international intervention are necessary to reduce threats posed to the region, Burkina Faso’s troubled relations with both international actors and its neighbors, Mali and Niger, prevent it from finding feasible solutions to this crisis. On an international scale, according to a security source in a crisis group interview, Burkina Faso does not want French assistance and would rather “sort things out themselves.” Due to an estranged colonial past and France’s unintentional exacerbation of terrorism in the region, Burkina Faso has diversified its international partnerships to include the United States, Germany, and Russia. On the regional level, cooperation can be tricky. While Burkina Faso has joined a coalition with neighboring Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger in a group called G5, cooperation with Mali is stagnant, and officials in Burkina Faso blamed Mali for their ineffective fight against regional armed groups as well as for the ensuing conflict.
The difficult relations between Burkina Faso and Mali stemmed from the Compaoré era and have contributed to issues regarding shared borders and territories. Burkina Faso’s military is also skeptical about the effectiveness of the United Nation’s mission to target “terrorist groups” and “other organised criminal groups” in Mali, as the ambiguity of the joint force’s mandate further complicates the issue. Ultimately, the unstable government, lack of coordination on international and regional fronts, and lack of humanitarian assistance are not only contributing to heightened insecurity in Burkina Faso, but also continue to threaten relations with both international and regional actors. Given this, it is difficult to see how the internal conflict within Burkina Faso will end as long as the Malian insurgency continues to affect West Africa.
Mauritania’s Gamble: Private Mercenaries vs. International Associations
By Moya Linsey, Barnard College ‘25
In mid-March of 2022, the Mauritanian government accused the Malian government of committing “criminal acts” against Mauritian citizens. This bold accusation is representative of the broader trend of heightening tensions between Mali and Mauritania in the aftermath of Mali’s recent coup d’etat in May 2021. Since 2012, political and military leaders in Mali have been vying for government control. This chaos has spilled over into neighboring Mauritania, endangering the peace in a country that has shown signs of pro-democracy shifts. Additionally, as a member of the G5 Sahel – which refers to a group of five countries in Northwest Africa that includes Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania – Mauritania has seen a large military burden due to the violence within Mali. In previous years, despite security threats and its military commitments to aid the situation in Mali, Mauritania’s primary goal was to maintain its own internal security. However, since the conflict has been reinflamed by the 2021 Malian coup, Mauritania once again faces the question of how to establish internal security while also fulfilling its duty as a member of the G5 Sahel amid the renewed threat of terrorist attacks. Thus, while Mauritania is a member of established military coalitions, it is unclear if its membership is sufficient to maintain intracountry security.
It seems that Mauritania’s solution to this conundrum has been to employ private security firms that aim to limit violence and protect institutions. In the capital Nouakchott, there has been a proliferation of private military officers and surveillance guards at prominent institutions and buildings. However, the presence of private military groups could also cause the further militarization of terrorist organizations; in fact, Interpol has emphasized that these terrorist organizations have “repeatedly target communities and national institutions through coordinated attacks.” Moreover, private military groups have been said to “escape the accountability and responsibilities that typically apply to a country’s armed forces” and also do not “fall specifically and easily within the ambit of international criminal procedures.” Yet despite the apparent issues associated with the employment of private mercenaries, it was a gamble Mauritania was willing to take.
Has the gamble paid off? It has in some ways. Before the most recent coup, there had not been a terrorist attack in Mauritania since 2011, and 2019 saw relatively democratic elections and a peaceful transfer of power. However, since the Malian coup, Mauritania has experienced a reemergence of violence as its borders remain porous with Mali. Videos on social media, while unconfirmed, have shown the Malian army slaughtering Mauritanian citizens. In many senses, Mali and Mauritania are allies: Mauritania has opposed the strict sanctions placed on Mali by the Economic Community of West African States, and without Mauritania’s friendly borders, Mali would be almost entirely removed from the economy of the Sahel region. Now, Mauritania faces an even more complex situation in which Mali has become increasingly hostile despite its allegiance to Mauritania, resulting in heightened violence within Mauritania itself. Hence, the question turns into one of whether Mauritania’s reliance on private mercenary organizations will impact the delicate balance of power in the region. While these independent military groups have achieved positive outcomes in the past and in the fallout of the 2021 coup, only time will tell if Mauritania’s mercenary industry will actually leave the nation more vulnerable to violence.
Conclusion
In the context of shifting alliances and evolving internal political dynamics within the states whose policies this piece analyzes, shared borders come to symbolize a consequential factor accounting for the spread of political unrest across various populations. Although foreign presences contextualize state policy in the context of transnational violence or economic opportunity, regional foreign policy has proven to increasingly direct the behavior of intervening forces, such as France’s foreign policy. The presence of privatized military intervention and non-state actors also appears to occupy an increasing role in perpetuating conflict throughout West Africa.
The roles of Malians, Nigerians, Burkinabé, and Mauritanians in determining the future of their states’ domestic and international policy is ultimately constrained by uncertainty about internal stability and the legitimacy of governance. Nevertheless, these seemingly similar challenges to security and democratic governance are shaped by varying realities within the borders of each state featured in this piece.