Policy 360: The Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Editors’ Note: This set of articles was last edited on March 29, 2022, and the time of completion for each of the articles has been further specified in the following sections. Any further updates on the Russia-Ukraine conflict from the days following this date may not be reflected in this roundtable. 

On February 24, 2022, after weeks of military exercises, Russia officially began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin had begun showing signs of aggression towards Ukraine in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. But, the situation escalated in late 2021 when Russia began to gather military equipment and troops at the Ukrainian border. At the same time, Russia pressured Ukraine, its allies, and NATO to prevent Ukraine from gaining military support and from joining NATO. The invasion has displaced 2.8 million people and countries around the world have experienced repercussions. 

This roundtable focuses on the roles of five countries—Russia, Ukraine, the United States, Moldova, and Germany—in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the interests determining their actions and international consequences. Russia believes that its interests are threatened by the international community's support for Ukraine. Ukraine struggles as it faces Russia without NATO's support since it is not a member nation. The United States is hesitating to establish a no-fly zone despite Ukraine’s pleas. Germany is walking a fine line as it balances its economic and political interests: it is dependent on Russia for oil and involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2. Finally, in Moldova, the neutrality or partiality of local actors may affect the outcome of the Russian-Ukraine conflict. 

The goal of this roundtable is to understand the reasons behind each country’s decisions and to discuss the balance between the interests of individual nations and international stability. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine will continue to evolve in the months to come as leaders attempt to come to a peaceful solution. Yet each day the conflict is prolonged, millions of lives are at stake. 

Russia: Putin’s Opposition to NATO Expansion

By Ariana Eftimiu, Barnard College ‘25

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has been a long time coming due to debates over the annexation of Crimea and an altered relationship with NATO, which has placed a strain on a relationship that has been tumultuous since Ukraine’s independence. Ukraine joining NATO would threaten Russian territory, particularly since Russian President Vladimir Putin is focused on maintaining power and not yielding to the West. Russia initially stated that it would pull back troops from the Ukrainian border but the opposite has occurred, and current potential “peace talks” between Russia and Ukraine are being met with skepticism. Clearly, Russia has had no real intention to retreat from placing pressure on Ukraine, and it would be naive to believe so. 

Times have changed since Putin’s declaration in July 2021 that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole.” Historically, this stems from Russia imposing its culture on Ukrainians, with pressure to practice Russian Orthodox faith as well as “Russification.” Part of Russia’s bellicose actions towards Ukraine echoes long-standing nationalism. This has led to division, with eastern Ukraine leaning towards assimilation and western Ukraine favoring Western-leaning politicians and Catholicism. 

In turn, the majority of Ukrainian citizens see joining NATO as favorable; Russia sees this union as nothing but a threat to its sovereignty. Ukraine becoming a part of NATO would injure Russia in the arenas of strategic influence and land borders. Founded in 1949, NATO’s main aim was to “protect against Soviet aggression.” Ukraine’s aligning with this mission is a betrayal to Russia. Under NATO rules, all member nations come to the defense of one another; given this, Ukraine’s alliance with NATO is akin to crossing a red line for Putin. Thus, Russia’s aggression stems from the urge to provide legal guarantees to ensure that NATO would cease moving eastward, and that there would not be deployment of weapons “in close vicinity to Russian territory.”

Moscow, as a result, continues to act in ways that confuse the rest of the international community; this situation is not atypical, however, as Putin has previously acted like a snake in the grass before launching offensive tactics. Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has been met with Western sanctions on its economy, causing Ukrainian citizens to flee to various countries, including Poland and Romania. Putin has justified the invasion both as self-defense against NATO expansion and in defense of a supposed ethnic Russian genocide in eastern Ukraine. Faced with a UN Security Council resolution drafted by the United States that has called upon Moscow to withdraw its troops in Ukraine, Russia—a permanent Security Council member—predictably vetoed the resolution. However, China—which previously shared a “no limits” partnership against the West with Russia—abstained from the vote, highlighting the rest of the global community’s move to begin isolating Russia. 

All of this raises the question of whether Russia will fold or escalate under international pressure. The end of this new war might not be around the corner just yet.

Ukraine as the Lone Fighter: A Case for Expedited Inclusion into NATO

By Sofia Rivera, Columbia College ‘24

In late 2021, Russia began to assemble the largest concentrated amount of firepower since the Cold War along its border with Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, President Vladimir Putin officially ordered Russian troops to attack. The lead-up to this event saw escalated diplomatic tensions and calls to free the country. Now, United Nations refugee agencies estimate there will be over 5 million Ukrainian refugees in the coming months. While NATO allies have inflicted sanctions on Russia in the past, the current situation proves that economic consequences are not effective deterrents against Russian aggression. Rather, an expedited adoption of Ukraine into NATO would send a clear message and ensure safety for neighboring countries going forward.

Although Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it maintains a significant ethnic Russian population of 17.3%. Over the past few years, however, Ukrainans have shown an increased interest in joining Western organizations, with 69% of the population in favor of joining the European Union and 57% for NATO. Despite Ukraine’s push, the West has remained cautious: Ukraine has not received the coveted Membership Action Plan, which guarantees political and economic guidance toward NATO membership. While the country is part of European programs like the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, the direct military intervention that NATO could provide would go far beyond protections covered by trade agreements. 

In the current situation, many Western countries are hesitant to get directly involved, citing fears of initiating a European War. As a result, the Ukrainian army of 196,000 members is forced to confront Russia’s 900,000 active military personnel without direct assistance from the West. Ukraine’s strategy so far has been to resist Russian troops and to urge Western leaders to implement strategies such as a no-fly zone. Despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s pleas, however, NATO leaders refute these demands, fearing that an armed confrontation with Moscow would stretch beyond Ukraine. Effectively, the future of the largest country in Europe is at the mercy of NATO allies. 

Despite the economic and cultural support it has received thus far, Ukrainians alone are left to deal with Russian aggression, demonstrating their tangible exclusion from the West. Germany and the United States, for example, are sending arms to Ukraine, but are still hesitant to take this any further. In addition, the international community seems content to pursue a strategy of cultural exclusion, with the cancellation of the Russian Grand Prix and the relocation of the Champions League final to Paris. However, if Ukraine’s autonomy is as important as Western leaders say it is, then the country should receive more concrete protections vis-à-vis NATO inclusion.

Thus, Ukraine is physically and politically trapped between two temporal axes: that of its potential future, NATO, and its tumultuous past, Russia. While it hopes to move closer towards Western allied forces, there is still no established timeline regarding Ukraine’s NATO integration, leaving it to battle a global superpower without concrete or sufficient support. It is crucial that NATO countries expedite the integration of Ukraine to demonstrate a commitment to liberal ideals and anti-Russian aggression in the region going forward. 

The United States: A Delicate Dance with Unpredictable Outcomes

By Jeremy Zhang, General Studies ‘23

Throughout his election campaign, President Joe Biden declared that it was “past time to end the forever wars” and made a point to emphasize diplomacy, placing it at the core of his administration’s foreign policy strategy. However, a little over a year into his presidency, one of the most significant armed conflicts since World War II is taking place and putting Biden’s willpower to the test. Despite the world’s best efforts, diplomacy has not been successful in preventing Russia from invading Ukraine; this has forced Biden, and the rest of the West, to find a balance when it comes to supporting Ukraine while minimizing escalation with Russia. 

Biden has walked a tightrope by implementing the strongest economic sanctions ever imposed on an economy the size of Russia’s, as well as providing a substantial but balanced supply of arms and intelligence to Ukrainian forces. This has resulted in tenuous success, largely thanks to the Ukrainian’s ability to weather the initial onslaught of the Russian attack and reaching a “stalemate” that has left Russia without “the manpower or the equipment to seize Kyiv…or other major cities like Kharkiv and Odessa.” The hope now should be that continued arms shipments and hands-off military support from the West will allow Ukraine to maintain this draw and eventually outlast the Russians. Recent peace talks with Russia promising to “scale back  military activity around Kyiv” are a sign that this may be possible. Meanwhile, Biden aims to impose economic sanctions on Russia's rich and powerful oligarchs, many of whom have President Vladimir Putin's ear, to disrupt their relationships. Sanctions have also ground the economy to a halt, bolstered by the shutdowns of multinational companies in the country. This has had negative effects on manufacturing, the stock market, and goods and services in Russia, tightening like a vice around Putin. 

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine is pleading with the West to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine to mitigate the bombing of civilians. However, Biden and the rest of the West have been extremely hesitant, fearing that it would give Putin a pretext to ramp up attacks in Ukraine and potentially attack neighboring NATO countries such as Poland. If that were to happen, US military involvement would be all but certain. While escalation is a substantial fear for the West, continuing to provide military supplies to Ukraine and sustaining sanctions may result in Russian escalation to claim an outright victory. Is there a chance that Putin could back down by granting Zelenskyy’s wishes? Perhaps, but it is more likely that Putin will need to be given an off-ramp with the hopes that he is willing to accept a compromise.

Nevertheless, the success of Biden’s approach to the Ukrainian-Russian war depends largely on Putin’s unpredictable actions, rendering conclusive evaluation inherently difficult at the present moment. However, Biden has thus far been effective at leveraging the power of economic sanctions, arms supplies, and military intelligence in order to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and remind Putin of the strength of the West.

A New Foreign Policy: Germany Asserts Itself in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

By Ashwin Marathe, Columbia College ‘25

In early February 2022, Germany announced it would contribute a meager 5,000 helmets to aid Ukraine, earning strong criticism from its European allies of its reticence. Three weeks later, it canceled a major Russian pipeline project, approved damaging sanctions, and reversed a historic arms control policy. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has shifted Germany from a cautious, ambiguous actor to one that is eager to defend Ukrainian sovereignty and the broader European security alliance. 

Once an ambivalent actor in the conflict, Germany has positioned itself clearly on the Ukrainian side. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared in a press conference that the conflict has been a “turning point” for Germany’s foreign policy. Indeed, Germany has agreed to reverse its once strict arms control policy by exporting 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger missiles to Ukraine. It is also lifting a ban on other countries exporting German arms, allowing the Netherlands to transfer 400 rocket-propelled grenades to Ukraine. Moreover, it is considering investing in a new missile defense system to protect against Russian attacks.

Apart from a historic shift in foreign policy, Germany has significantly altered its economic relationship with Russia. Once opposed to excluding Russia from SWIFT—a messaging service used by banks around the world for communication—Germany approved sanctions that would cut Russia off, isolating it from the financial world. Germany’s decision to shut down the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was a significant one, as it had received about two-thirds of its natural gas from Russia. The pipeline, which would have transported natural gas across the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, would have decreased both natural gas prices and Germany’s reliance on the more expensive liquid natural gas. 

However, it is clear that the pipeline serves more than an economic interest to Germany—it is a geopolitical leverage that it can use against Russia. Chancellor Scholz initially described the project as “purely commercial,” but after Russia’s invasion, stated that “the situation today is fundamentally different,” thus displaying Germany's new strategic move. The fact that Germany is willing to suffer the economic costs of forgoing Nord Stream 2 signals its commitment to halting Russian aggression. 

Given Germany’s recent show of commitment to Ukraine, what lies ahead? Germany must navigate the bureaucratic struggles of the 300,000 Ukrainians it has admitted and its commitment to lend humanitarian support to Poland as the latter prepares for an influx of potentially one to five million refugees. More importantly, it will have to navigate its new foreign policy, one that deviates significantly from its historically cautious approach following WWII.

Germany’s emergence from the shadows further cements its status as a powerful force in Europe. The challenge for Chancellor Sholz will not only be balancing this new foreign policy with Germany’s historically strong economic ties to Russia, but also deciding whether Germany will remain committed to having an active military presence in the future. It remains to be seen whether this change in course of German leadership is permanent. 

Left Bank of the Dniester: The Moldovan Question

By Juan Solbes Gochicoa, Columbia College ‘24

Between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border, hundreds of miles away from the separatists in Donbas lies a small breakaway state where the hammer and sickle still fly on the national flag. Transnistria, legally a region of Moldova, is an unrecognized entity established in the early 1990s, after a war where support from Moscow secured its de facto independence. Now, the 1,600-square-mile sliver of land acts as a toehold for incursion, with over 1,500 Russian soldiers stationed over a massive arms depot within the region. Russia holds a tight grip over Transnistria with crackdowns on dissent and ongoing attempts at official Russification. 

Moldova occupies a complicated position in foreign affairs. Much like Ukraine, it has been forced to strike a delicate balance between European integration and pro-Russian separatism. Neutrality is enshrined in the Moldovan constitution, but its position as the knot in a tug of war between East and West makes that stance increasingly tenuous. Moldovan President Maia Sandu strives for pragmatic solutions involving all parties. However, the more pressing Russia-Ukraine conflict that is beyond Moldova’s control is now drawing focus. Meanwhile, the government in Chisinau is boosting cultural and economic ties with Romania amid a growing push to European integration and fears of an imminent Russian invasion of Moldova. In fact, Russian military presence in Transnistria showed increased activity, where it has engaged in combat drills.  

Russia seemed to be following the Moldovan path of de facto recognition in breakaway republics in Ukraine, but its ongoing invasion of Ukraine has emphasized a stark difference. Both states elected pro-Russian leadership that has triggered instability, and Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky is now pushing for renewed, multilateral accords to settle the region’s status. With Transnistria being analogous to Donbas given their statuses as breakaway regions, Russia’s attempts to force Kiev to follow Moldova’s lead have arguably failed. However, even constitutional neutrality has not saved Chisinau from Russian coercion and interference. Now, Moscow’s attempts to surround Ukraine with instability have succeeded, and based on the Moldovian example, the possibility of neutrality shows little promise.

Inside Moldova, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has reached a fever pitch. Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu fears increased activity in Transnistria, where the over 20,000 tons of military equipment held by Russian forces could pose a growing threat to Moldovan sovereignty. The Moldovan government maintains its official stance of neutrality, with the population fragmented over potential membership in one of both the EU or NATO membership. Within Transnistria, there are mixed feelings as well: residents are divided over a stronger union with Russia versus a Western-oriented future. Moreover, there are fears in Transnistria’s capital Tiraspol that any solution to the conflict in Ukraine would mean the end of Russian troops maintaining Transnistria’s sovereignty.

As war explodes in their next-door neighbor, Moldova faces a crossroads. Nonalignment as a form of appeasement to Russia is currently the law of the land. However, there is already a significant threat to Moldovan sovereignty with the Russian-backed secessionist movement in Tiraspol. If Moldovian President Sandu and her government wish to hold onto any shred of self-rule, expanded economic and military cooperation with the West must be a priority.