Turkey’s Long Game in Somalia Goes Naval

Turkish and Somali officials at the 2017 opening of the Turkish base in Mogadishu, the largest overseas Turkish military presence. Photo courtesy of Voice of America.

On February 22, 2024, Somalia’s legislature overwhelmingly approved a 10-year defense and economic cooperation agreement with Turkey, the result of a meeting between the two countries’ defense ministers earlier that month. Despite minimal public attention, the deal significantly strengthens the two countries’ bilateral relations and intertwines their respective security interests. For Turkey, Somalia represents a foreign policy entrance into Africa, as well as a source of maritime ports it hopes to leverage for future economic benefits. Somalia, on the other hand, stands to gain much by developing its international partnerships, especially in the midst of its decades-long security crisis. With the strengthening of Turkish-Somali relations, Ankara should actively consider adopting more long-term and multifaceted strategies to obtain stronger alliances in its foreign policy goals.

Although the full text of the deal has not been made publicly available, its central aim is to strengthen Somalia’s naval defense against festering illegal threats such as piracy, unlawful fishing, and attacks on sovereignty. To realize such goals, Turkey will train Somalia’s navy by providing the coastal nation with powerful defensive weaponry through its growing defense industry, which means that Turkish warships could soon be patrolling Somalian waters. In exchange, Turkey will receive 30% of revenue generated by Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, the Blue Water Economic Zone, to fund its own maritime defense. 

Historically, Turkey has taken an interest in improving long-term security, development, and humanitarianism in Somalia. In 2011, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Mogadishu, making him the first non-regional leader to tour the country in twenty years. Since then, diplomatic relations between the two countries have strengthened significantly. At the time, Somalia was experiencing a famine and desperately needed humanitarian aid. Turkey’s aid model, unlike other Western donors, combined short-term support with direct development assistance to the government, mainly through unconditional funds. Turkish firms started running the city’s airport and seaports in 2014 and invested in construction and infrastructure projects. Aside from developmental aid, Turkey has maintained a rather large military presence in Somalia throughout the years. The two countries signed their first military cooperation agreement in 2010, rooted in training Somalian soldiers in Turkey. In 2017, Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. Its security contingents also regularly provide training to Somalia’s military and police forces. 

As Turkey already aids Somalia’s land and aerial defense, Turkish naval expansion should not have been a surprise so much as an affirmation of historical trends. Why, then, did Somalia’s parliament reject a similar military deal with the UAE in 2021 but accept Turkish influence? 

Somalia’s current geopolitical context is a significant factor to consider in explaining such a decision. Al-Shabbab, an al-Qaeda-allied terrorist organization opposed to the Somalian government, has resumed attacking and hijacking ships in the Gulf of Aden. Turkey has used this prominent threat to justify increased spending in Somalia, specifically for defense. 

More importantly, Somalia has experienced growing tensions with Ethiopia over its contested territories. Somaliland, located along the Gulf of Aden in the north of Somalia and bordering Ethiopia, declared its independence  in 1991. To date, it has not been internationally recognized as a state and Somalia continues to claim sovereignty over the region. But in January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland that would recognize Somaliland’s independence and give landlocked Ethiopia access to the Gulf of Aden through a land-lease agreement. 

For Somalia, this development is a direct threat to its national sovereignty that will require an improvement in its maritime defense should it escalate. Somali officials’ emphasis in their rapidly increasing defense capabilities is effectively a signal to Ethiopia and Somaliland that it will not tolerate perceived threats over the territory. It is also important that the deal was signed only one month after Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding. Such timing reveals rising tensions between the countries that, if escalated to conflict, could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

Another factor in Turkey’s success with the deal is its long-term interest in Somalia. Turkey’s on-the-ground and multifaceted humanitarian aid in the early 2010s garnered public support for the country’s involvement in Somalia. Additionally, Turkey has been appealing to the countries’ similar cultural and religious heritages. In doing so, Erdogan has outlined the “brotherhood” between the two Muslim-majority countries to augment the public image of their relations.

It remains too early to tell whether the agreement will prove effective in minimizing terrorist threats and securing Somalia’s waters. Two key geopolitical areas of concern could threaten the effectiveness of Turkey using its defense relations with Somalia to bolster its presence in Africa. However, Turkey’s unique relations with Ethiopia and the UAE could theoretically minimize any further escalation.

Firstly, the potential for direct engagement with Ethiopia is dangerous for all parties involved. With Turkey now dedicated to Somalia’s naval defense, the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia has become increasingly relevant to Turkish interests. Turkey has maintained generally positive relations with Ethiopia and Somaliland. During the 2020-2022 Ethiopian civil war between the government and the Tigray population near the Eritrean border, the Turkish government supported Ethiopia. Turkey also began unofficial relations with Somaliland after its efforts to broker peace with Somalia in 2013. If Ankara can maintain these strategic ties, it could deter the risk of direct escalation between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Secondly, the UAE rivals Turkey in the amount of aid it dispatches to Somalia. Like Turkey, the UAE has also supplied fundamental training to Somali soldiers and conducted drone strikes. These developments aim to combat al-Shabab militants. After the collapse of its own defense deal, Abu Dhabi halted $5 million in defense aid to five Somalian brigades outside the capital. Following the success of the Turkish-Somali deal, Emirati funds for Somali military efforts have continued to decrease despite the UAE’s insistence that its dedication to regional security and minimizing the terrorist threat is intact.

Turkey’s success in establishing a maritime deal, coupled with a rupture in Emirati-Somali relations could deteriorate Ankara and Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic ties. Although Turkey and the Emirates were on opposite sides of regional conflicts in the 2010s, namely in the context of the Arab Spring revolts, the two have resumed economic relations since 2020. This includes an estimated $50 billion in Emirati investments in Turkey that came after a series of negotiations with Erdogan in 2023. The UAE is markedly against the Turkish-Somali defense deal because it decreased their strategic claim to Somalia. For its part, it probably views Somalia’s acquiescence to Turkish courting as a signal that its money is better spent elsewhere. 

Ankara must balance its need for economic support from UAE, a key regional player, with the dividends it receives from this deal with Somalia. Despite these pronounced regional risks, Turkey’s sustained political relations with Ethiopia and the UAE gives Ankara an opportunity to expand its regional influence while strengthening Somalia’s control. For Somalia, the defense deal greatly increases its defense capabilities and has been hailed as a vital development for security forces. 

As for Turkey, its interest in this “brotherhood” is rooted in achieving its long-term foreign policy goal––access to the Horn of Africa––and this deal has only demonstrated that forward-looking, comprehensive foreign policy has been and will continue to be successful for Ankara. Whereas Turkish investment in the entire African subcontinent was $2 billion in 2005, it increased to $22 billion by 2017. This is largely because, since 1998, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has explored an entrance into African relations to increase Turkey’s position as a regional power. Entering African organizations as an honorary member, Turkey combined economic aid with cultural and political ties. Somalia was the most receptive to Turkish aid and thus received the most attention in crafting a long-term foreign policy relationship. And that brings us here.

Sustained relations with Somalia will certainly prove economically and geopolitically profitable for Turkey. For starters, it provides access to the Gulf of Aden, an important step in the naval trade route from the Suez Canal. Ten percent of the global oil and gas trade travels through the Red Sea, but piracy and terrorist attacks on the Gulf, a direct pathway to the sea, make the important trade route unstable. Additionally, Turkey signed a 14-year contract with Somalia in 2020 to rebuild its largest port. With Turkey’s economic gains from the maritime agreement and port contract, it is interested in securing Somalia’s waters.

Turkey is also considering the potential for oil exportation from Somalia. Erdogan expressed interest in the topic in 2020, but port security has become even increasingly important for Turkey’s long-term economic interests. Not even one month after the maritime deal, Turkey and Somalia signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement. This will allow Turkey to play a more dominant role in energy extraction, an industry it has hoped to enter for years to gain energy independence.

With this agreement, Turkey has demonstrated not only that its sponsorship of less powerful nations can work to its benefit, but that clever geopolitical positioning will. By simultaneously balancing its relations with Ethiopia and the UAE, a stronger presence in Somalia enables Turkey to enjoy access to significant economic opportunity and all of the reputational benefits of humanitarian action. This deal with Somalia represents the best potential outcome from diplomatic maneuvering, combining humanitarian development aid with defense amplification. It will be key to realizing Ankara’s ambitions in the region for years to come. Turkey’s long game might just work.

This piece is the second of a column on Turkish foreign policy in which Ada Baser unpacks a recent maritime defense deal between Turkey and Somalia as an inversion of Ankara’s fumbling of other partnerships in its geopolitical neighborhood. Between this cunning long game and a controversial soccer match, Ada brings the budding ambitions and potential blunders of this regional power into focus. Her first piece can be found here.

Ada Baser (GS ’24) is a columnist for CPR studying political science. Her main interests include U.S.-Middle Eastern relations, water governance, and transitional justice.