Reform or Bottleneck? Evaluating the Impact of Virginia’s Redistricting Commission
On January 25, 2012, Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell signed House Bill 251 into law, reconfiguring the state’s congressional boundaries with the stroke of a pen. In almost any other state, this action would have marked the end of the decennial redistricting cycle. However, in 2013, the United States Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, a case which gutted the Voting Rights Act, engendering greater scrutiny of the mapmaking process. Under this legal backdrop, a federal court voided Virginia’s new lines the following year, finding that they racially discriminated against African Americans by diluting their voting power. Although remedial boundaries were adopted shortly afterward, the saga highlighted the increasingly potent nature of gerrymandering, cementing its status as a political weapon.
Such partisan exploitation of the redistricting process is not unique to Virginia. Over the last few years, dozens of states have faced lawsuits because of their congressional maps. However, in addition to legal efforts, growing voter frustration over gerrymandering has prompted activists to develop a novel solution: independent redistricting bodies. Within the last decade alone, over half a dozen states enacted reforms to curtail political influence in the mapmaking process.
New data from the 2022 midterms and 2023 legislative elections in Virginia presents a unique opportunity to analyze the efficacy of the state’s redistricting reform. While the process ultimately benefited citizens by ensuring proportional partisan and racial representation, this success occurred in spite of the commission’s considerable deficiencies.
Drawing the Lines
In 2020, Virginia became the latest state to strip its lawmakers of redistricting powers, with voters approving a constitutional amendment by a 2-1 margin. Under the measure, eight legislators and eight civilians are tasked with completing the process every decade, a structure ostensibly designed to diminish incumbency biases. Moreover, the initiative attempted to eliminate partisan divisions by mandating equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans on the commission. In this manner, the amendment was designed to avert a repeat of the commonwealth’s previous disastrous mapmaking cycle.
Despite its clear-cut ambitions, the reform was immediately met with challenges. After selecting the requisite citizens and legislators, the commission failed to advance a single map as members retreated into their partisan corners. The stalemate dragged on for months until commissioners finally agreed on a single motion: recessing indefinitely. Following this adjournment, the Supreme Court of Virginia took matters into its own hands, appointing a bipartisan panel of two special masters to craft the state’s boundaries. After a brief public comment period, the redistricting cycle finally concluded in December 2021 as the justices approved a series of proposals that are still in effect today.
Putting the Congressional Lines to the Test
The 2022 midterms occurred less than a year after the court’s final order, presenting an immediate test to the congressional map. According to the Virginia Department of Elections, over three million citizens voted for candidates across the state’s districts. Notably, two of the eleven seats were decided by a margin of less than five points. As a proportion, this figure is over double the national rate of such tight races, underscoring how the newly enacted lines deliberately seek to promote electoral competition. By extension, because politicians are more likely to address broader concerns in politically divided regions, the districts were conducive to voter engagement. Such an outcome was unfathomable for the independent commission due to the inclusion of several incumbent legislators, demonstrating how the special masters were solely responsible for this success. On a similar note, approximately 51.5 percent of Virginians voted for Democratic candidates, a number nearly identical to the roughly 55 percent of seats won by the party. Ostensibly, the new lines appear to accommodate voter preferences by accurately matching the state’s partisan lean. As such, while independent commissioners were unable to compromise due to vested political interests, the proportionate map was directly attributable to the state Supreme Court.
As evidenced by the 2014 federal court ruling, which nullified a prior map, racial implications are also crucial in evaluating Virginia’s boundaries. According to the results, voters elected African Americans to the third and fourth congressional districts, constituting roughly 18 percent of the state’s congressional delegation. This figure mirrors the 19 percent of citizens who identify as Black, highlighting how the new boundaries enhance minority voting power and closely reflect statewide demographics. Additionally, both of these seats are located in Virginia’s southeastern Tidewater region, which has a high concentration of African Americans, emphasizing how the lines were tailored to benefit specific underprivileged communities. This idea becomes even more evident when contrasting this decade’s lines with the 2012 ones. Whereas the previous iteration of the third congressional district straddled nine non-contiguous counties, the current boundaries incorporate five bordering counties. Moreover, while the older district selectively included disparate African American communities from Richmond to Norfolk, the new seat is composed entirely within the Virginia Beach metropolitan area. In this manner, the state Supreme Court’s redistricting process ultimately aided citizens in securing localized racial representation.
Evaluating the State Legislative Maps
As one of just four states that does not hold elections for the state legislature in even-numbered years, Virginia’s other boundaries were not tested until 2023. Over 2.3 million citizens cast their ballots earlier this November for 40 State Senate seats and 100 House of Delegates seats. In the upper chamber, Democratic candidates garnered a narrow plurality, winning over 49.8 percent of voters and 53 percent of districts (21 seats). Likewise, in the lower chamber, Democrats won 49.5 percent of votes, corresponding to 51 percent of all districts. The absence of a significant partisan skew between these figures illustrates how the map drawers avoided gerrymandering the lines. Evidently, the state Supreme Court reflected individual partisan inclinations at a statewide level, an unattainable outcome for the commission due to its political composition.
This year’s elections also saw a record number of victories for minority candidates. For instance, 32 African Americans were elected to both chambers, over 22 percent of all incoming legislators. This figure exceeds the proportion of Black residents statewide, demonstrating how the current districts empower minority communities and respect their collective preferences. This narrative is even more apparent when juxtaposing the maps with the ones from the previous decade. For example, the new State Senate lines keep the majority-Black city of Hampton intact, while previous boundaries divided it across three districts. Similarly, although cities like Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Richmond are each bisected under existing lines, they were all split three times under the older map. Given these stark contrasts, the special masters appear to have successfully eliminated racial gerrymandering by keeping heavily African American cities intact. The record number of other elected minorities reinforces this idea, with Asian Americans notably garnering eight victories out of 140 total legislative seats. This percentage (6%) roughly corresponds with Virginia’s demographic figures and emphasizes how smaller minority populations are also protected under the new lines. As such, by granting all diverse communities sufficient representation, the court-mandated redistricting process helped citizens.
Under nearly any metric, Virginia’s new congressional and legislative lines collectively benefit citizens by facilitating proportional partisan and racial representation. However, despite this success, it is important to acknowledge that this outcome occurred in spite of the commissioners, who were constantly embroiled in controversy. Fundamentally, the presence of incumbent politicians and strict partisan quotas sabotaged the commission’s work by incentivizing members to pursue personal political interests. As such, the reform’s main strength was its ability to delegate responsibilities to the judiciary, which was explicitly granted power to craft a map in the case of a deadlock.
Although these results may appear discouraging for citizens who voted to overhaul the state’s redistricting process, there are numerous ways to make the commission more effective. For instance, while seeking insight from legislators was understandable, allowing them to sit on the commission only inflamed tensions. Removing these members and replacing them with more civilians would limit individual political concerns and simultaneously promote collective goals. Similarly, while achieving partisan parity on the commission was an admirable aspiration, it also promoted factionalism. By expanding the number of commissioners to include a certain number of non-affiliated voters, both sides would be motivated to compromise and produce fairer proposals. This idea has proven to induce greater productivity, as demonstrated by its success in Michigan. Finally, the commission’s call for an even number of members makes it prone to tied votes. Changing this rule and having an odd number of commissioners would resolve this issue by ensuring all votes would yield an outcome and facilitate progress. Collectively, these suggestions emphasize how Virginia’s independent redistricting commission can be revamped by eliminating existing onerous requirements.
If the past is prologue, advocates will continue utilizing ballot measures to implement independent mapmaking commissions throughout the United States. Although these initiatives may ultimately yield fairer districts, Virginia’s experience underscores how these reforms risk dysfunction without further minimizing the role of political actors. As another contentious struggle for redistricting power looms in 2030, citizens have the potential to eliminate gerrymandering at all levels of government, but only if they learn from Virginia.
Yusuf Arifin (CC ’27) is a Staff Writer at CPR studying political science. Originally from Portland, his main interests include American elections and civil rights.