Central Asia and the Unexpected Possibility of Democratic Reform
The democratization of Central Asia faces unique challenges as states within the region continue to maintain deep political relationships with Russia and struggle with rampant corruption. Although Central Asia has seen a steady rise of authoritarianism and a continuing economic dependence on Russia since Soviet times, the region now faces a unique potential for democratic revival: the war in Ukraine. One of the clearest forms of dependence can be seen in the seasonal migration pattern of migrants going from Central Asia to Russia to find work with competitive wages, meaning that large portions of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s GDPs continue to come from remittances from Russia. However, the war in Ukraine shows that change is brewing in the region. As Russia, or the “sheriff of Eurasia,” fails to provide the political and economic security that granted it political influence in the region, Central Asian states are beginning to turn from Russia and are actively seeking opportunities for partnership with countries outside of the former Soviet bloc. Investing in alliances with democratic states is one of the most promising ways to strengthen democracy in regions where it is threatened. This situation opens up a unique opportunity for Central Asian states to strengthen their independence and democratization through greater international collaboration with democratic states.
Wedged between Russia, China, and countries on the northern borders of the Middle East, Central Asia is a region that has long been overlooked despite its geopolitical significance. Due to their history of being part of the Soviet Union, Central Asian states have deep economic, social, and political ties to Russia that are foundational to their formal and informal politics. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this relationship has had economic impacts: increasing Western sanctions on Russia have contributed to an economic downturn in Central Asia. As the ruble’s value drowns against the dollar’s, all Central Asian currencies have begun to lose value; concurrently, global inflation has continued to rise, resulting in difficulties in maintaining their previous standard of living for people living in these states with deep intertwinement with Russia. Countries such as Kazakhstan have made efforts to increase the use of dollars in their domestic markets in an attempt to protect against the losses of the depreciation of their own currencies. The pattern of currency depreciation looks similar for the rest of the Central Asian states, particularly for those that cannot afford to buy dollars.
Beyond the depreciation of domestic currencies, tight sanctions are preventing Central Asian states from relying on the high levels of remittances from migrant workers that would normally have arrived from Russia. For states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 31.3% and 11.6% of their GDP come from these remittances, respectively. Contrary to traditional migration flows of Central Asian migrants into Russia, largely for employment purposes, the status quo is producing the opposite situation where many Russians have begun migrating into Central Asia. Although nearly 70% of Russians do not have passports that allow for international travel, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union allows these Russian migrants to legally work and live in these countries. Areas such as northern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s major cities such as Astana and Bishkek, respectively, have become crucial destination points for over 200,000 Russian migrants since Russia began drafting young men for the war in Ukraine. While this change in migration flows has negatively impacted Central Asian economies by cutting off the supply of remittances, the resulting decrease in Russia’s economic influence is politically significant: Russia has consistently used Central Asian’s states’ economic reliance as a political tool to maintain regional hegemony. Contemporary politics show that while economic dependency on Russia is real for most Central Asian states, these countries are beginning to seriously reconsider their historically loyal allegiance.
Signs of blind political allegiance are also no longer a reality: no Central Asian state has outwardly supported Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, and states have permitted anti-war protests until Moscow’s pressure to suppress them, revealing the government’s balance of permitting anti-war sentiments while appeasing their major economic partner. Similar signs of Central Asian discontent with the invasion of Ukraine can be seen on the international political arena as well. No Central Asian state sided with Moscow during the UN General Assembly, and none have recognized the independence of Donetsk or Luhansk. Part of this hesitance might be explained by Central Asia’s own fears that legitimizing Russian expansionism could threaten their own territories. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in September of 2022, Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev famously greeted China’s President Xi JinPing instead of Russia’s President Putin—Uzbekistan’s prime minister instead greeted the latter. These political shifts indicate a general international realignment away from Russia as Central Asian states question their own security interests in the post-Soviet bloc.
Although these actions show signs of moving away from Russia, it is important to emphasize that Russia’s influence in Central Asia will not dissipate overnight. Central Asian leaders will continue to be cautious and refrain from bold statements because the region is still deeply interconnected with Russia’s economy and reliant on Russian security guarantees. Yet, Russia’s limited resources during the war in Ukraine has reduced this dependence. Thus, there is finally a unique opportunity for democratic states to strengthen economic sovereignty and increase Central Asian political accountability, hopefully to reverse rising authoritarianism in the region. Central Asian countries are beginning to look for deeper economic relations beyond their neighbors such as Iran, Turkey, and India. This new situation opens up a future where Central Asian states can partner with democratic countries such as South Korea. The U.S., whose interests in the region have traditionally been focused on rooting out radicalized Islam, is showing renewed interest in the region by investing $25 million to expand trade routes and open access to new economic partners. Central Asian leaders are reacting in ways that show that they are interested in strengthening their economic resilience outside of Russia, such as President Uzbekistan’s turn to include a human rights framework in domestic policy. European NATO allies also have an incentive to explore stronger relations through energy diplomacy: Kazakhstan has the tenth largest oil reserve in the world, and given Europe’s risky dependency on Russia’s gas company, Gazprom, Central Asia could be a key regional supplier.
While Russia’s war in Ukraine causes it to slowly lose its grip on Central Asia, there is a ripe opportunity for increased cooperation between Central Asia and other democratic nations. Agreements on alliances have long been considered as one of the best ways to ensure accountability measures as a basis for participation. Given Central Asia’s growing interest in moving away from Russia and towards other states, democratic nations should fill the vacuum as a way to strengthen Central Asia’s economic and political sovereignty and in order to encourage the democratic norms.
Irene Jang is a junior at Barnard, studying political science and Russian. When she’s not writing for CPR, she can be found doing yoga, going to bazaars and farmer’s markets, or watching a film.