A Great Migration to the Great White North? How Canada’s Immigration Policies Reinforce the Hong Kong Identity and Ramifications for China

Yau Ma Tei, a residential district in Hong Kong. Photo courtesy of Stephen Chow.

In 1842, China ceded Hong Kong to Britain as part of the Treaty of Nanking, and thereafter, a Hong Kong identity was formed––one that was not quite Chinese nor British. Even after the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, the Hong Kong identity persisted despite the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to integrate the city back into the country. Hong Kong residents hold a passport distinct from that of mainland China, one with stronger passport power than China’s. Additionally, a “one country, two systems” principle protects Hong Kong’s economic and political lifestyle from mainland China’s socialism. 

As a response to China gradually dissolving the city’s distinct identity, some Commonwealth countries have established immigration policies to preserve the Hong Kong identity overseas. Over the last three years, Britain, Australia, and Canada have introduced new immigration pathways for Hong Kongers. Canada’s policies have seen the warmest reception, primarily because they target Hong Kongers who recently graduated from Canadian universities and those who already have Canadian work experience. Canada’s immigration policies specifically targeting Hong Kong residents instead of Chinese citizens reinforce the Hong Kong identity as a whole vis-a-vis foreign immigration laws, and the implications are reminiscent of the emigration situation leading up to the 1997 handover of Hong Kong. The outcomes of the situation are already presenting social and economic repercussions for Hong Kong, a contrast to the typically economically unwavering China. 

Recent surveys show that the number of Hong Kong residents that exclusively view themselves as Chinese has hit a record low after being on a steady decline since 2006. In fact, the younger the respondent, the more negative their feelings are toward China. In an effort to combat the growing rift between identities, Beijing may have done more harm than good. Attempts include a national education campaign and a national security law, both of which have been met with fervent protest. The national security law criminalized secession and specified that Hong Kongers could be extradited to mainland China. In fact, it was so unfavorable that the law unleashed the 2019 Hong Kong protests from which many foreign immigration policies are emerging. The Chinese Communist Party is attempting to dismantle the “one country, two systems” model since it sees the existence of Hong Kong as a slap in the face to its authority. The tighter the Communist Party holds onto Hong Kong, the more the city seems to revolt. The continued separation voluntarily established by Hong Kongers and their access to valuable civil amenities means that there are high costs to being reintegrated with China, which many people are not willing to endure. 

For Hong Kong residents who are worried about China’s overreach, immigration is seen as a lifeline. One particularly appealing option is offered by Canada. From June 2021 to August 2026, Canada will allow Hong Kong residents to apply for permanent residency through two pathways: Stream A and Stream B. Stream A stipulates that Hong Kong residents can be granted residency if they have graduated from a Canadian post-secondary institution in the last three years. Stream B offers permanent residency to Hong Kong residents who have at least one year of work experience in Canada and a degree from a Canadian or foreign university in the last five years. Canada began these immigration policies in response to the territory’s “deteriorating human rights” during the 2019 Hong Kong protests. Canada’s tone in offering these immigration pathways to only Hong Kong residents suggests that they are refugees in China, separating them from mainland Chinese people. Articles published in 2022 by The Guardian and The New York Times profiling school teachers, business owners, and activists who have emigrated from Hong Kong only add to this narrative. Similarly, after China introduced its national security law, a move that Chris Patten, Hong Kong’s last governor under British rule, called “Orwellian” in 2020, the United Kingdom also began to offer unique immigration opportunities to residents who hold British National Overseas passports. Those qualified may apply for limited leave to work or study in Britain with the potential for permanent residency. However, in 2022, Huang Liuquan, Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing, was quoted as saying, “Hong Kong’s population drop is caused by various factors and there is no way to suggest that it is a result of an emigration wave.” He maintained that the national security law was a step toward upholding the “one country, two systems” governing principle. 

As a Commonwealth country, the Canadian immigration policies also highlight the cultural divide in Hong Kong where heavy British influence still remains. For instance, Hong Kong is the only city in the country that practices the English common law system, a stark contrast to mainland China’s judiciary system which is controlled by the Communist Party. Canada’s change in immigration policy could spark a situation similar to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration that saw droves of Hong Kongers leave the city for countries like Australia, the U.K., and Canada before the 1997 handover. Canada is already seeing a record number of applications with over 20,000 in 2021 compared to about 4,700 in 2019. While this may not seem that significant, a mass exodus from Hong Kong will have substantial social and economic implications for future China-Hong Kong relations, as foreshadowed by the outcomes of Hong Kong’s emigration after the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

When the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, a vast number of Hong Kongers were wary of life under Beijing’s rule. Hong Kong residents chose to primarily emigrate to countries part of the Commonwealth like Australia and Canada hoping that they would be able to gain citizenship through their British ties. There are no official numbers, but estimates suggest that hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers left the city between 1990 and 1997, causing a brain drain throughout the city. For example, surveys from that period recorded that 63 percent of government doctors, 98 percent of pharmacists, and 79.8 percent of accountants planned on leaving Hong Kong before 1997. Today, just 37.3 percent of Hong Kong emigrants hold undergraduate degrees and 32.2 percent hold master’s degrees. Canada hopes to replenish its own exhausted labor force with a migration target of 500,000 immigrants just this year. Additionally, just Hong Kong’s finance and insurance sectors have seen a 31.9 percent and 19.1 percent increase in job vacancies, respectively, from January 2022 to September 2022. Such a large number of emigrants would cause insurmountable damage to the economy. There will be lower demand for goods and services, and since Hong Kong is an international business hub, businesses from around the world may be disincentivized from investing in the city. After the 1997 handover, large banks and businesses began seriously diversifying their investments, and some moved their legal residences to other countries, fearful of the Communist Party’s reach. 

Hong Kong’s emigration may also lead to a demographic shift since mainland Chinese residents are the most probable people to fill job vacancies left behind considering that mainland China’s youth unemployment rate is as high as 20 percent. A mass influx of mainland Chinese residents into Hong Kong could also further breed conflict between the two groups and anti-immigrant sentiments. For instance, an influx of immigrants can apply downward pressure on wages for low-skill jobs, primarily affecting Hong Kongers who cannot afford to emigrate. Since many Hong Kong residents already feel their unique identity eroding, a mass migration of mainland Chinese residents who speak another primary language and have their own customs may further expedite that feeling.   

Hong Kong has always been in a unique position, both in terms of its geographical location and its cultural identity. Now, that distinct identity is under attack, and other countries have adjusted their immigration policies as a response. Canada, in particular, is inviting Hong Kongers into the country with target numbers that could deplete the city’s labor force and have a severe economic impact. The implications of the outward emigration left behind social and economic consequences, ones that still have an impact on Hong Kong today. Hong Kong’s identity is slowly being ripped apart and scattered around the world as each emigrant takes a piece of the city with them. Beijing should be mindful of its response to the current migrant crisis lest history repeats itself, and they have to pay the price for breaking its 26-year-old promise to Hong Kong.

Kristy Wang is a Staff Writer for the Columbia Political Review and a junior in Columbia College studying political science and biology. Kristy can be reached at kw2933@columbia.edu.