From Foes to Friends with the Help of a Mutual Ally

Biden’s meeting in Israel with former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in March 2016. Photo by the U.S Embassy in Tel Aviv. 

Since 1948, the United States has experimented with different approaches to managing the Middle East conflict, especially the clash between Egypt and Israel. America has tried to enforce neutrality, implement arms embargoes, supply weapons to one side, and supply weapons to both sides, but it has failed to help end hostilities, let alone facilitate cooperation. However, in the case of Israel and Egypt, two adversaries-turned-partners, the U.S. has managed to facilitate cooperation at the governmental and military levels. Following decades of war, the United States used aid to facilitate cooperation between these adversaries, a fact corroborated by statements from individuals representing the United States, Israel, and the Gulf States. 

What complicates possibilities of cooperation is that, unlike Israel, where the public overwhelmingly supports positive relations with the Gulf, Arab leaders would have to pay a political price for cooperation and show their constituents that they received something in return, such as military aid. Israeli Minister Hanegbi summarizes this reality as follows:  “The story is the cow and the lamb; the lamb wants to be fed and the cow wants to feed. The cow is the United States and the lamb is the Gulf states. They understand they can gain from the Americans if they comply with them.” The U.S. should use aid to foster cooperation between the Gulf States and Israel in order to enhance their common interests.

Case Study: Facilitating Cooperation between Israel and Egypt

According to Mohammad Soliman, a political analyst based in Cairo, the relationship between Egypt and Israel today can be described as a “full partnership, unbreakable alliance and diplomatic completion.” They cooperate in the fight against the Islamic State-Sinai Province (IS-SP), and Egypt is often the middleman between Israel and Hamas in their sporadic episodes of violence. This was not always the case—–before the United States brokered a peace agreement signed in 1979, the two nations were bitter enemies. 

In the time between the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the signing of the U.S.-mediated peace treaty in 1979, Egypt and Israel fought five wars and many smaller skirmishes along their border. These wars occurred under different leaders and for different reasons, but all had something in common: the United States intervened in one way or another, employing different tactics to end the hostilities. 

In May 1948, Egypt and other Arab armies invaded the newly founded state of Israel. Throughout the war, the United States imposed an arms embargo on the region. Following the war, in 1949, Egypt was the first Arab country to sign an armistice agreement with Israel. 

Yet, merely a  few months after signing the armistice agreement, Egypt blocked Israeli ships from passing through the Suez Canal and sent Egyptian soldiers to commit attacks in Israel. The U.S., after failing to prevent the joint French-British-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 through the United Nations, decided to make a $1 billion loan contingent on the ceasefire, departing from its previous embargo tactic. This loan, coupled with President Dwight Eisenhower’s significant promise to maintain freedom of navigation for Israeli ships and create a U.N. committee monitoring the territories Israel withdrew from, prompted Israeli withdrawal. 

In May 1967, the Soviet Union gave Egypt false intelligence that Israel was preparing for a war against Syria, with whom Egypt shared a protection agreement. Therefore, Egypt started moving troops towards the Israeli border, expelled the U.N. officials from the area, and blocked the Straits of Tiran, a move declared illegal by the U.N. and U.S. In response, Israel preemptively attacked Egypt. Under the guidance of President Lyndon Johnson, the United States decided to be “neutral in thought, word, and deed” and imposed another arms embargo on the region. The war lasted six days, at the end of which Israel had conquered the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip from Egypt, and territories from other countries, which it only relinquished at the signing of the peace agreement. Only a year after the 1967 war, Israel and Egypt clashed again. The United States put forth the Rogers Plan, supporting the right of all countries in the region to security. Moreover, the U.S. decided to use diplomacy instead of aid, and the U.N. sent Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to mediate between the sides. 

The 1973 War marked a shift in United States policy towards engagement and aid to the Middle East. On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria invaded Israel, a move that the Arab states accompanied with an oil embargo on western countries they viewed as supportive of Israel, the U.S. among them. On the battlefield, Israel managed to march through the Sinai Peninsula, and air battles raged on. Unlike in the previous wars, the United States initiated arms transfers to Israel through a massive emergency airlift, which included spare parts, tanks, bombs, and other supplies totaling $2.2 billion. According to official accounts, the United States believed the Arab-Israeli standoff could harm the former and its détente with the USSR. However, during the war, Egypt received aid from the Soviets. President Richard Nixon decided that the U.S. could not allow the balance of power between the two superpowers to change and decided to supply aid to Israel, setting the stage for U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Kissinger “to make a major effort at Arab-Israeli peacemaking.” 

This approach launched what became known as “shuttle diplomacy,” a series of short flights Secretary Kissinger took between Middle Eastern states in order to craft disengagement agreements. The peace process began with two leaders, Anwar Saadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel. However, the talks reached a deadlock in 1978, and President Jimmy Carter initiated a two-week summit with the leaders. The resulting peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was not simply an agreement to cease war, but a commitment from both sides to cooperate in the security sphere.

Security cooperation and assistance has facilitated and maintained the peace treaty between adversaries. According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States has provided Egypt with significant military and economic assistance since the late 1970s on the basis of sustaining the peace treaty with Israel. The report also notes that Egypt has been broadening its international base of support and that its “key partners” include Israel, among the Gulf states. For example, from 1946 to 1979, the United States granted Egypt assistance totaling $16.5 billion. From 1979 to 2017, the United States supplied Egypt $120 billion. American aid to Israel also has increased since the peace treaty with Egypt was signed. From 1951 to 1979, the United States provided Israel with $42.5 billion in aid, and $180 billion since 1979.

Another trend has been the increase in American military aid to both Egypt and Israel since the signing of the peace agreement. Before 1979, the two countries received $33.5 billion in economic aid and $28 billion in military aid. Following the agreement, they collected $91 billion in economic aid and $183 billion in military aid, signifying the new emphasis on military aid over economic aid. 

Hence, in the case of Egypt and Israel, the most successful method to attain peace was the provision of aid to both sides of the conflict. The characteristics of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, such as conflicting economic, national, territorial, and political interests, as well as the presence of two strong armies in the same region, are evident in many conflicts. Hence, this case can be used to draw conclusions about other conflicts between the major powers' adversarial clients across the world.

Political Leaders’ Views of the U.S.’s Role in Israeli-Gulf Relations 

The United States used assistance and cooperation to mediate between adversaries and does so to this day, the most prominent example of this mediation from recent years being the warming relationship between Israel and the Gulf states. These new relationships are striking, considering that the Gulf states that have been working with Israel over the past years—Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have never recognized Israel’s existence, while Oman and Qatar granted, but later rescinded, recognition to the state. To investigate the effect of U.S. assistance on these relationships, I interviewed three individuals representing the three sides of the security cooperation and assistance triangle: one representing the United States as the provider of assistance, one representing Israel, and another representing the Gulf States as the recipients. I asked the interview respondents about their respective governments’ relationship with the other two nations, as well as the effect of security cooperation and assistance on that relationship. 

According to Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation, this is not the first time Israel and the Gulf states have cooperated. After the Oslo Accords, the minister states, “there were breakthroughs and interests’ offices [in the respective countries],” but “it lasted for a short period of time and without a deeper mental change.” Minister Hanegbi attributes the failure of Israeli-Gulf cooperation to the latter’s commitment to the Palestinian issue after the collapse of the Oslo Accords. Another possible reason, not mentioned by the minister, is that the United States only saw Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon—but not the Gulf states—as relevant to this process, as indicated by the United States Historian’s official account of U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 

However, Minister Hanegbi claims that there is an important difference between the Israel-Gulf relationship immediately after Oslo and their cooperation in the last decade. Over this time, he says, “the perception started to change… we started hearing interesting statements speaking about the Jews as people you have to live with, having a right to protect themselves, actual cooperation.” He also cites “Netanyahu’s visit to Oman… Saudi Arabia’s decision to allow Air India to fly over Saudi airspace twice a day [to Israel],” and more.  In explaining this change, the Minister argues that the Trump administration saw the solution through a regional, not narrow, lens and that it is clear the Americans are putting in effort for a genuine attempt to legitimize this dialogue between Israel and the Gulf states. 

Rabbi Marc Schneier, the founder of the Foundation for Ethnic Understanding and an advisor to many Gulf leaders on Judaism and Israel, agrees with Minister Hanegbi on the role the United States should play in the Israel-Gulf relationship. He believes that for the first time, “you have the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf on the same page” in regards to President Trump’s peace plan. Moreover, “[the Gulf states] see Israel as an extension of the U.S., so U.S. aid draws them closer to the west...and as a part of it, to Israel.” 

According to the Rabbi, three factors bring the Gulf closer to Israel—the common threat of Iran, economic transformation in the region, and Israel’s position as a vehicle to strengthen relationships with the United States. The first, however, is the most important one for the Gulf states. Some leaders, including the King of Bahrain, even tell Schneier that “the only guarantee for a strong, stable, Muslim, Arab region is a strong Israel,” while others even hint at a desire to form a NATO-style organization in the region that includes Israel. When asked about what he thought the future of United States policy in the region should be, he said that he does not “think the United States should give the Gulf economic aid… the Gulf needs assurances that the United States would be there if Iran attacks them. This would help facilitate the cooperation between the Gulf and Israel, [and] build a ‘NATO’ alliance between them,” potentially leading to economic cooperation. 

Like both Minister Hanegbi and Rabbi Schneier, U.S. Representative Ted Deutch, Democrat of Florida’s 22nd district, believes Iran poses “the gravest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East,” namely because of its involvement in Syria, nuclear activities, support for terrorist groups, and human rights violations. Combating Iran, according to the congressman, is a shared interest of Israel and the Gulf states. Deutch argues that such security cooperation and cooperation on “other vital regional issues” is also in the interest of the United States.  

Unlike the recipients of assistance, who mainly discuss what their respective parties would like to get from the United States, Representative Ted Deutch, who represents the provider, addresses the need to make sure arms are not distributed without careful strategic analysis of the situation. He says, “the U.S. provides arms sales to the region to ensure our own security interests and interoperability with our own systems” and that, in order to do so, “all sales must ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge.” Representative Deutch believes that “a threat to Israel, our strategic ally in a turbulent region, is also a threat to U.S. national security. Enhancing Israel’s security is a step toward strengthening our own national security,” so the United States should keep giving assistance to Israel at “unprecedented levels.” According to Deutch, this should trump the assistance given to Gulf states, even if it is given in order to facilitate cooperation between the two sides. 

The Path Forward 

This article argues that countries seek to maximize their utility, even at the price of cooperation with their adversaries; this explains why many Gulf countries are willing to cooperate with Israel in return for gaining U.S. assistance against the Iranian threat. 

While this case study has limitations—it only analyzes the United States as the provider of aid and Middle Eastern countries as the recipients—it offers the United States a future approach to facilitating cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. America should adopt the comprehensive method of engagement alluded to in Minister Hanegbi’s interview and the view that more weapons do not necessarily lead to recurrence of conflict between former adversaries. The U.S. should learn these historical lessons, take advantage of the common interests that parties share, and employ the same approach that helped reach a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, using explicit requests for cooperation and military aid as incentives to cease war and to broker peace for other cases. The U.S. should also adopt a more inclusive view and involve both the Gulf and Israel in promoting regional initiatives—perhaps even establishing a NATO-styled organization, which could also serve the United States’ interests.  

Ofir (SIPA ‘22) is studying International Security Policy and Conflict Resolution. As an Israeli, she is passionate about issues of security cooperation and Arab-Israeli relations in the Middle East and the world.