A Historical Approach to Engaging China in Climate Change Reform

Beijing’s Forbidden City under a thick layer of smog. Photo by Yinan Chen.

The issue of climate change does not have the luxury of being prolonged by international quarrels, yet the United States continues to struggle with getting China fully on board. The problem for the United States is that its strategy towards China is severely misguided. A cohesive strategy relies on understanding China’s past to uncover what really makes China act the way it does on the international stage. 

Fortunately, despite China’s long history—a history that dates back to the dawn of humankind—U.S. officials need only focus on four pivotal eras in order to better understand China’s international posture: The Century of Humiliation (1839-1949), the Legacy of Mao (1949-1976), the 1978 Reform era, and the Financial Crisis of 2008. Ultimately, only by understanding these four periods of Chinese history can the United States construct a more cohesive plan to engage with China on climate reform. 

The Century of Humiliation (1839-1949)

The Opium Wars between China and Britain ended in a humiliating defeat for China. Illustration by Edward Duncan.

China’s developed resentment for the West, constructed out of the imperialist powers’ exploitative nature during the century of humiliation, has provided barriers for the West to get China to concede on vital climate change reforms today. The Opium Wars between Britain and China, which started in 1839 and again in 1858, initiated China’s entry into the international arena and began its era of humiliation. Although the Opium Wars opened China’s doors to foreign trade and influence and brought China closer into the international sphere, they did so in a humiliating manner, leaving China to make its first real appearance into the international realm one of distrust and resentment. Further humiliation—including the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki following China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) exile of the Kuomintang (KMT) during China’s civil war, the Nanjing massacre in 1937 by Japan, and a variety of other humiliating events— built upon China’s resentment and fostered a desire to avenge itself and other developing nations exploited by imperialist powers. Most importantly, the historical legacies of the century of humiliation have allowed leaders in China to use this dark narrative to pursue aggressive policies both domestically and abroad.

Furthermore, the century itself has shaped the way China’s leaders approach the West and the rest of the world. For example, Mao was able to use China’s humiliating past to mobilize the public, launching a series of ill-fated movements such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Most notably, for the sake of climate reform policy today, China’s current leader Xi Jinping has used this narrative as a way to mobilize China’s resentment against the West to further separate China from having to cooperate with Western powers. With this rise in anti-Western rhetoric comes an additional internal sense of superiority over the West, making it even more difficult for outside countries to influence China on policies such as climate change.

By using the narratives spun by the historical legacies of the Century of Humiliation, Chinese leaders have been able to justify outward expansion to ensure that China does not lose its upward traction on the international stage. Because China is desperate not to fall back into an era of humiliation, China has been willing to defy certain components of its ancient middle kingdom approach that had isolated it from the rest of the world years ago. Today, Xi Jinping has boasted the idea of pushing China into the “great rejuvenation” period, which claims the ability to restore China to its middle kingdom legacy of superiority. However, superiority in today’s age for China, according to Xi Jinping, revolves around the need to expand China’s economy, which involves little regard for environmental repercussions.

The Mao Era (1949-76)

Soldier standing in front of the portrait of Mao Zedong at the Tiananmen Gate. Photo by Wikimedia.

Mao’s legacy (1949-1976) created the idea of Chinese nationalism, which further separated China from Western ideals and provided CCP leaders the tools necessary to mobilize the Chinese public against the West. Mao’s rise to power consisted of ousting the corrupt KMT government in 1949 by rallying the Chinese public with nationalist rhetoric promulgated by the CCP, planting the roots for Chinese nationalism. Soon after Mao had established the CCP’s control in China, Mao began deploying the ideals of nationalism as a tool to facilitate his many ill-fated reformations, including the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. These reforms, coupled with the newfound development of Chinese nationalism, set the stage for complications regarding climate change cooperation we see today.

While China’s mass industrialization reforms, starting with the First Five Year Plan, put China on the path to produce high carbon emissions rates, it was Mao’s ability to mobilize Chinese nationalism that gave future Chinese leaders like Xi Jinping the authority to dismiss international cooperation with Western nations on issues like climate change. Unlike Deng Xiaoping and others who sought a peaceful Chinese rise, Xi Jinping has taken Mao’s nationalist mentality to pivot Chinese policy to a more aggressive, expansionist direction under the guise of his “wolf warrior diplomacy.” This new assertive era of Chinese diplomacy has greatly stunted the West’s efforts to negotiate with China regarding all sorts of international issues, a significant setback in the face of combating the urgency of climate change requiring global cooperation.

Deng Xiaoping’s Reform Era 

Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter during the Sino-American signing ceremony. Photo by Karl Schumacher.

The 1978 reform era radically industrialized China’s economy and further opened it up to the international market, prompting the country’s newfound obsession with sustaining economic growth. China’s efforts to this end have led to mass pollution and a culture susceptible to expansive industrial projects. The idea behind the reform program was to create a stronger and more effective China by devising an international environment that allowed it to pursue its economic development. Peace and cooperation were a few of the main foreign policy strategies employed by China during this era, as the state relied heavily on incorporating foreign methods and talent into its own economic system. China’s strategy of engagement provided the West with an opportunity to form diplomatic relations with China now that the CCP was more willing to listen to ideas outside the confines of China and its communist shield. What China got in return was a mass industrialization spree in its country that has been compounding ever since, radically increasing China’s contribution to global carbon emissions.

While the reform program provided China with the means to rapidly industrialize its economy, it also caused pollution levels to drastically increase throughout the country. China has been able to (somewhat) justify its high carbon emission rates by criticizing the fact that today’s wealthy countries, whose development involved producing large carbon emissions during the Industrial Revolution, are the same ones who are trying to condemn China for the same offense. From the perspective of many Chinese leaders, it is ironic that China’s 1978 reform program, which pulled China into an era of mass economic development, was once so strongly encouraged by the rest of the world; however, now, after the West has had the opportunity to fully develop and has opened its eyes to the climate crisis that development has wrought, these same nations are trying to undercut China’s continued progress. The problem for the West is that the 1978 reform program set in motion a pace of economic progress that China is desperately trying to uphold to this day. Giving in to the West’s demands regarding climate change means that China risks stunting its decades-old spree of economic growth, the maintenance of which is essential for demonstrating the CCP’s legitimacy.

The reform’s contribution to climate change does have a silver lining, though: the program permanently transformed China’s relationship with its capitalist neighbors. Opening up to the international market allowed China to form diplomatic relations with the West, finally allowing foreign states to discuss international concerns with China. Although China today still prioritizes domestic stability and economic growth over international concerns, China has shown some initiative to cooperate with Western states since the reform era. For example, China could have completely dismissed the idea of arranging itself with the Western climate initiative under the Paris Climate Accords of 2016, but because the reform era brought China on to the international stage, China has a greater obligation to appease the international community. This is not to say that China has completely opened up to all concerns of the West, but it does imply that China now must at least listen to international concerns.

The Financial Crisis of 2008

China believed it “weathered the storm” of the 2008 financial crisis better than others. Photo.

The political aftermath in China following the 2008 Financial Crisis generated a unique international and domestic situation for China, allowing it to be confident internationally yet insecure domestically. This unique position exacerbated issues on climate change. For many Chinese officials, China had “weathered the storm” of the financial crisis better than other countries; thus, the CCP has been able to project a sense of economic superiority in the international arena to its domestic audience, boosting popular support for the CCP and its foreign initiatives. However, despite this projection of international strength, China’s economy was still massively impacted by the crisis. As a result, the CCP’s ability to produce positive economic results, a vital component to the CCP’s domestic legitimacy, has been called into question. Essentially, China’s newfound confidence in the international sphere after the financial crisis, coupled with its desperation to maintain economic growth for the sake of its legitimacy, cultivated an abrasive China with a mass superiority complex.

Because the Financial Crisis of 2008 obstructed China’s economic growth, the CCP had even less incentive to reform its policies on climate change. Throughout the 2000s, China had already constructed a series of coal-fired power plants abroad; they have no intention of letting this investment go to waste during a critical time for their economy. In the modern-day, China strongly believes that the growth of its economy depends on burning fossil fuels. This kind of thinking has influenced China to refrain from making productive concessions to combat climate change. For instance, during the 2009 international climate change meeting in Copenhagen, China refused to accept the United States’ proposal of a 17% emissions reduction standard. Instead, China countered by proposing that it would agree to reduce its “carbon intensity” as an alternative to an emissions cap. The ambiguity behind the definition of intensity allowed China to circumnavigate the U.S. proposition while still looking like China was willing to cooperate, resulting in a meeting that has subsequently been considered a failure for climate policy. The Paris Climate Agreement of 2016 was a bit more productive in reforming China’s climate policy, as the international community got China to agree to a national cap on emissions by 2030. However, China has been able to exploit the loopholes embedded in the accords—reducing pollution in China, yet continuing to pollute in countries abroad—allowing the CCP to prioritize its economic ambitions at the expense of the world’s climate crisis.

Applying These Historical Legacies to Engage China

The core foundations of China’s international relations—set by historical eras of humiliation, nationalist rhetoric, and economic obsession—provide a clearer explanation of the barriers to Western intervention regarding climate change reform. Nevertheless, the West can still navigate this schism by carefully engaging China through strategic cooperation that demonstrates an understanding of China’s unique history. Because China has built up resentment toward the West and an obsession with sustaining economic growth throughout its history, the United States needs to frame the climate crisis not only as an international problem but as a direct threat to China’s economy. The Obama administration’s strategy of selling the Chinese domestic tragedy of “Airpocalypse” over international concerns proved successful in getting China onboard the 2016 Paris Climate Agreement. Still, the plan did not go far enough as it failed to reach beyond China’s borders, and China continues to pollute on foreign soil today. While this is not an easy task, only by conveying to China that its entire economy is at stake if its carbon emissions remain high can the West expect to see substantial climate reform by China. Furthermore, while sanctions appear to be the favorable solution to deter economically driven countries, analyzing the historical legacies of China shows us that coercion through aggression should not be the primary strategy to engage China in positive climate change cooperation. Liberal use of aggressive policy toward China will only serve to remind China of its humiliating past experiences with Western powers, further fueling anti-Western rhetoric throughout China while building upon its resistance toward cooperation. 

This is not to say all aggressive tactics are of no use. In fact, the United States should be creating strong economic competition against China and its environmentally disruptive foreign infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Currently, the BRI has little competition; therefore, China has no incentive to properly regulate construction procedures nor comply with sustainable development methods, leading to mass pollution. If China will not stop, which history predicts it will not, the United States needs to step up and establish a market standard for infrastructure programs in developing countries that follows a path towards a green economy. This competition will give China little choice but to either match an environmentally-friendly market standard set by the United States or terminate the Belt and Road Initiative. Either outcome proves beneficial for reducing global carbon emissions and one step closer to solving the climate crisis.

In the end, the United States must be cognizant of China’s past to decipher what strategies work and, more importantly, what strategies intensify the issue. Only then will the United States and the West be able to more constructively engage China on an international stage and get China to pull its weight in combating climate change.

Derek Hammack (GS’22) is a student at Columbia studying Political Science. Prior to attending Columbia, Derek served in the military and was deployed across the globe as a special boat operator (SWCC) and medic.

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