Patronage Politics and the War in the Donbas

Illustration by Julia Ulziisaikhan CC ‘22.

Following its 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russia further capitalized on instability in Ukraine to entrench itself in the state’s southern and eastern regions, known historically as the Donbas. By supporting Russian-speaking separatists, both financially and militarily, Russia succeeded in expanding its influence in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. As a result of this support, the aforementioned regions were able to declare independence from Ukraine to form the Donetsk People’s Republic (D.P.R.) and Luhansk People’s Republic (L.P.R.). Continued support from the Kremlin has created a crisis in Ukraine, with Kyiv seeking to stymie Russian involvement in the area and Moscow emphatically denying involvement altogether. Nearly six years later, a cloud of uncertainty remains over the Donbas as the international community considers what would cause Russia to cease its support for rebel violence, in addition to what drove such a foreign policy decision in the first place. Following an examination of key facts and events, I aim to argue that the answers to both of these complex questions lie in Russia’s style of informal patronage politics.

In many states, particularly those throughout Eastern Europe, formal institutions are often supplemented by a robust system of informal patron-client networks. Within this arrangement, “patrons” at the top of network hierarchies distribute resources and opportunities to receive loyalty from “clients.” These networks are tied together by the frequent exchange of favors and bribes, often based on personal connections. While outsiders may interpret this system as a form of corruption, it is largely condoned and even encouraged, as failing to participate could result in punishment and a loss of personal influence. If network members, especially the patron, are unable to secure the interests of other members, they are likely to suffer an erosion of trust that severely damages their power within the network. Therefore, when it comes to foreign policy, states driven by a strong patronage system may appear to be erratic on the world stage as they respond to the competing needs of network members.

Patronal politics are particularly salient in the Donbas region, as many Ukrainian networks remain highly interconnected with those in Russia despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example, Russian oligarchs and business leaders like Konstantin Malofeyev are known to have funded many of the original separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine. Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was a client embedded within these networks, and therefore willing to advance foreign policy that was relatively favorable to network members. The European Union, however, threatened to upend these intricate networks by attempting to incorporate Ukraine into its sphere of influence via an “Association Agreement.” Such an arrangement would subject Ukraine to anti-corruption measures, the likes of which heavily disrupted Russian natural gas networks in Lithuania upon its ascension to E.U. membership. This potential for network destabilization increased dramatically following the ouster of Yanukovych and the subsequent establishment of a pro-E.U. government in Kyiv. Vladimir Putin likely intervened at this point to save his networks, seeking to display his strength in order to protect his credibility as the “head patron” of the system. Russian involvement in the Donbas reflects such a possibility, as it seems that Putin will only cease his support for rebel violence if he is certain that his networks will be preserved. In the following paragraphs, I seek to outline four possible situations that would result in such a foreign policy change.

The first situation would involve Ukraine’s fulfillment of key components of the Minsk II agreements, specifically the points regarding elections and autonomous status for the Donbas region. These agreements, negotiated by Putin and former Ukrainian President Poroshenko in 2015, specify provisions for a ceasefire and local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk, along with constitutional reforms that would essentially grant rebel-held areas of the Donbas with the power to veto decisions made in Kyiv. Putin is particularly invested in the prospect of local elections, as he could interfere in favor of loyal D.P.R. and L.P.R. candidates who would veto attempts to disrupt his networks. Putin has already signaled a willingness to pursue such a path, as he refused to submit to Angela Merkel’s 2014 demand that elections in the Donbas be held under the jurisdiction of Ukrainian law. As such, Moscow attempted to exert its influence in the D.P.R. and L.P.R. elections on November 11, 2018 by supporting candidates under its control and blocking popular leaders from the ballot. This strategy reflects a broader pattern for Putin, who has largely succeeded in supplanting local separatist leaders with leaders who are likely clients within his networks. However, Ukraine and the West have refused to recognize the validity of the 2018 elections, leaving open the possibility that Russia may try to interfere once more in the next round of elections. If these efforts were to succeed, Moscow could attain direct influence within the Ukrainian state in the form of D/LPR leadership. Putin could then be reasonably confident that the interests of his networks would be secured by hand-picked insiders, making his support of rebel violence no longer necessary.

While Putin may seek to secure his networks through the above-mentioned election strategy, experts are pessimistic toward Ukraine’s ability to implement the reforms that Putin depends upon for such a strategy. For example, Max Leder, lecturer at the University of Leiden, claims that many of the measures delineated in the Minsk agreements are highly ambiguous or outright impossible. Therefore, Putin may view an alternative settlement as a more reliable approach to securing his networks. One potential area of compromise lies in the Kremlin’s current efforts to grant citizenship and identity documents to D.P.R. and L.P.R. residents. As many separatists continue to fight due to a lack of amnesty or Russian citizenship, a settlement that offers both to D.P.R. and L.P.R. residents could drastically reduce rebel violence. Such an agreement would serve as the second possibility for Moscow to cease its support for rebel violence, this time in favor of a “frozen conflict,” a situation in which violence is curtailed without an official peace resolution. This arrangement would likely please Putin, as the reduction of outright violence in frozen conflicts provides the perfect conditions for his clients to engage in organized crime and smuggling. Therefore, crafting a new settlement along these lines would protect Putin’s networks and render his support for rebel violence irrelevant. Fortunately for Putin, current Ukrainian President Zelensky has displayed openness to new peace talks as recently as July 2019, suggesting that such a deal could be imminent.

Unlike the previous possibilities, the third situation with the potential to end Russian support for violence in the Donbas would originate outside of the region entirely. Sanctions from Western powers, although relatively ineffective at the moment, have the power to raise the stakes by crippling some of Putin’s closest clients. The United States, for example, has sanctioned over 665 individuals and companies involved in Crimea and the Donbas since September 2019. Many of the targeted entities have suffered a disruption of business, frozen assets, and even travel restrictions. Sanctions may initially appear ineffective despite these ramifications, as many tycoons and officials with close ties to Putin have been successfully targeted by the West with limited reactions from the Russian government. However, it is worth noting that patronage systems, in Russia and elsewhere, are often opaque and unpredictable by nature. Therefore, it is certainly plausible that Western sanctions have not yet targeted a very specific, important set of clients that would cause Putin to make large concessions in the Donbas. Recent American laws regarding Russian sanctions, SSIDES and UFSA, may facilitate the targeting of such clients, as they authorize secondary sanctions for a wider range of individuals involved in the crisis. In this case, Putin may suddenly revoke his support for rebel violence in the Donbas in order to lift sanctions that are threatening much more important clients elsewhere. While it may seem counterintuitive to abandon the protection of networks in an entire region in order to protect specific clients, such a decision is quite plausible in a system where the interests of powerful clients are in constant competition.

The final situation in which Russia may cease its support for rebel violence is also the most risky: a Russian-backed coup in Kyiv. While some may balk at such a suggestion, it would not be the first time in recent memory that Russia has forcefully intervened in states seeking closer relations with the West. In 2016, for example, Russia was accused of a failed plot to kill the Prime Minister of Montenegro after the state seemed poised to align itself with NATO. As Ukraine threatens to align itself similarly with the E.U., it is not out of the question that Putin may attempt to depose Zelensky and install a new government. Zelensky in particular has been a thorn in Putin’s side, as the Ukrainian president is a complete outsider to the patronage system and cannot be easily controlled. Moreover, Zelensky has expressed support for sweeping anti-corruption measures and an affinity for the West, making him an increasingly large threat to networks in the Donbas. Putin may attempt to stage a coup in light of these facts, rendering his support for rebel violence irrelevant with the assurance that a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would protect his clients. However, as previously mentioned, such a path would be incredibly dangerous for Moscow; Putin risks drawing widespread ire from the international community, and the uncertainty surrounding a coup could result in a backlash that jeopardizes Putin’s position as the head of the patronage system.

Each of the four situations discussed in the preceding paragraphs rely heavily on the belief that Russian foreign policy is guided by informal patronage networks. However, other observers of the Donbas crisis contend that realism, not the informal patronage system, has driven much of Russia’s behavior. Under this paradigm, self-interested states are the primary actors. Because the world is an anarchy with no central authority, states are forced to seek out security in the form of relative power in order to survive. Defensive realism, a subset of the theory, asserts that preserving the existing balance of power is the best way to achieve said security.

Therefore, to defensive realists, Russian support of rebel violence is largely a reaction to Western encroachment into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Prominent realists assert that the enlargement of NATO was particularly threatening to Russian security, as the alliance had promised to grant membership to Ukraine in the future. According to realists, Russia interpreted this move as a threat to its geopolitical power, resulting in the annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas in order to impede Ukraine’s accelerating drift toward the alliance. As a result, realists believe that Russia will only cease its support for rebel violence if NATO completely halts all attempts to pull Ukraine into its orbit. However, such an argument is ultimately myopic and logically flawed. Russian officials never criticized NATO enlargement during the Obama administration, and evidence shows that Russian defensive forces actually dropped steeply in the military districts closest to Ukraine from 2000-2010. While some evidence may substantiate concerns over NATO enlargement, claiming that enlargement itself was Russia’s primary grievance still obscures the domestic concerns that would motivate such an attitude. The disruption of patronage networks that could have accompanied NATO enlargement, for example, likely would have been more threatening than enlargement itself.

The crisis in Donbas remains a contentious issue, especially as the Russian state continues to support rebel violence and ceasefire violations within the region. Due to the influence of patronal politics on Russian foreign policy, it appears that relatively few options will dissuade Putin from providing such support. As in all other states with robust patronage systems, concerns surrounding network preservation and client loyalty exert considerable pressure on rulers, and Putin is no exception. In fact, Putin would have had less and less latitude to test the loyalty of important clients in the past few months, as he required broad support from his networks in order to overcome the “2024 problem” that barred him from serving another term as president. Modulated by patronal politics, Putin is likely to continue on his current path in the Donbas unless one of the previously outlined situations forces him to change course.

Tony Bodulovic is a rising junior in Columbia College studying Political Science and Russian Literature and Cultures. When he’s not discussing politics, you can often find him reading Anne Carson or buying too many disposable cameras.

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