Trump’s “Unwinnable” Trade War: A Calculated Risk that Could Win Him Reelection
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, situated in the Lehigh Valley. Photo by James Benetzky.
Throughout his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump frequently criticized his predecessors for their inability to eliminate the U.S. trade deficit with China, referring to the inequitable exchange as one of “the greatest thefts in the history of the world.” In 2018, Trump acted on his promises by rolling out a plethora of tariffs on Chinese imports, engaging in a tit-for-tat with the Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping that would eventually total $735 billion worth of duties. Trade conflict between the U.S. and China is not novel—China has long been criticized for harming U.S. industries by dumping steel, violating intellectual property laws, and engaging in unfair trade practices—however, such overt retaliation by both parties is nearly unprecedented.
As a native of Pennsylvania, an unexpected swing state after Trump’s slim 2016 victory, I questioned why Trump chose to make trade conflict with China central to his campaign, rather than focus on pertinent domestic issues like education and healthcare. If U.S.-China trade relations have long been inequitable, why address it now? In search of an answer, I dug into the voting patterns of my state and interviewed Pete Longo, the global logistics manager at East Penn Manufacturing, a battery manufacturer and one of the largest local employers. My findings reveal that Trump’s trade war rhetoric has resonated with recession-weary, working-class voters in the industrial counties of Pennsylvania, enabling him to carry the state. The economic damage of the trade war is mostly incurred by Midwestern agricultural states, leaving swing states like Pennsylvania largely unaffected; a calculated loss that allows him to still hold these integral counties in the 2020 election. However, as the recent COVID-19 pandemic unravels, Trump’s political gains from his trade war remain uncertain.
Trump’s victory in Pennsylvania is heavily attributed to his ability to flip three counties that had previously voted for President Obama. My research is focused on one of them: Northampton County, home to the Lehigh Valley and three of the largest industrial centers in the state. The Valley is no stranger to economic downturn, having struggled through the collapse of the U.S. coal and steel industries and the 2008 recession. However, after 2008, local politicians laid groundwork that has rejuvenated the local manufacturing and healthcare industries, which together now power a $41 billion economy.
In 2016, the voters in the Valley enabled Trump to win Pennsylvania, a state that had been a part of the Democratic bloc since 1988, but how did he do it? The answer lies in Trump’s uncanny ability to pander to blue-collar audiences. More specifically, his trade rhetoric resonated with Northampton factory workers on both sides of the political spectrum. These recession-weary former millworkers still saw much room for improvement, despite the growth of the past decade, as up to 30 percent of households in the county are counted among the working poor. For a group of middle-class workers who have lived through the collapse of the steel industry, the promise of job security and growth was too good to pass up. Trump’s vow to bring back U.S. manufacturing jobs and to stimulate those industries with more equitable trade spoke directly to their desire for more profitable work. This hope is what made many lifelong Democrats, whom I personally know, vote for Trump in 2016, and what ultimately delivered Pennsylvania by a slim 44,000 votes.
In March 2018, President Trump moved to deliver on these promises by first imposing a 25 percent tariff on Chinese steel imports. Over the course of 18 months, China has levied duties totaling to $185 billion on U.S. imports in retaliation to the $550 billion worth of tariffs placed on their exports. Naturally, a trade conflict strains the economy, and the media has not been afraid to criticize the President’s aggressive actions. However, when I interviewed Mr. Longo, he told a different story. Longo told me that the greatest challenge to East Penn was not the tariffs themselves, but the volatility of the trade war. The strategy for most manufacturers in the Lehigh Valley was to “stay the course,” as it would be impossible to efficiently adapt to the constant change in regulations and duties. While Trump’s levies on steel imports have brought increased cost to some steel manufacturers, the Greater Lehigh Valley Chamber of Commerce has described these tariffs as “a short-term pain for some” but “a long-term gain” overall. The mood during the trade war with China—and before the current trauma of COVID-19—was actually rather positive in Lehigh Valley, and Longo told me that, in fact, manufacturers had been more worried about the renegotiation of NAFTA. This positive outlook was also shared by the Lehigh factory workers; many of them have credited the President for a local economy that they see as being “100 times better” than before.
Allentown, Pennsylvania, in the Lehigh Valley. Photo by Paul Leiby.
If the industrial centers of Pennsylvania appear economically sound, where is the economic damage that the media is talking about taking place? Well, conveniently for Trump, his trade war seems to have mostly affected Middle America in states that are already comfortably situated within the Republican bloc. Most of China’s tariffs have targeted U.S. agricultural exports, like soybeans and grain, causing Midwestern states to incur the majority of the trade war damage as China finds new markets. Conversely, battleground states have seen little to no change: Pennsylvania has reported trade totals near the status quo between 2017 and 2018 and Florida actually showed an increase in exports exceeding $205 million. The fact that red states have taken the brunt of the trade war, while swing states remain largely unaffected, insulates the damage caused by Trump’s aggressive actions. In fact, his trade war may prove beneficial to his 2020 reelection as his promises to East Coast manufacturers are fulfilled and the losses in the Midwest can be offset by subsidies to farmers. Trump’s ability to keep the trade war in the news cycle (prior to COVID-19) with the announcement of a phase-one deal he signed in January, which includes minor Chinese concessions, is a show of his ability to fulfill the sensationalized promises he made on the campaign trail.
Interestingly, the trade war has also proved to be politically advantageous for Xi Jinping, regardless of the concessions he made in the deal signed earlier this year. In 2018, Xi faced harsh political backlash from Chinese elites when he positioned himself to rule for life by removing presidential term limits. To counter elite dissent, the Chinese government has a pattern of relying on international conflicts, like the trade war, to garner nationalistic support from the Chinese public. This practice of “diversionary aggression,” outlined by University of Southern California assistant professor Erin Baggott Carter, is a method of maintaining political support from citizens during internal political tension. By instigating international conflict, leaders can showcase their competence and justify their leadership by combatting the constructed foreign threat. Mr. Xi can use the trade war as a route to consolidate his power.
The recent outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States, and the criticism between the two countries regarding an appropriate response, will likely affect the course of the trade war. While Trump has temporarily removed duties on some Chinese imports, he has yet to remove the tariffs on $5 billion worth of medical equipment from China. It will be interesting to see how U.S-China relations play out as the two countries are forced to work together to grapple with the pandemic. Further, the 2020 presidential election is inevitably contingent upon Trump’s response to COVID-19. Depending on how the current administration handles this pandemic, it is unclear whether Trump’s trade “achievements” will provide him with any traction in his bid for reelection.
Andrew Thomas is a freshman in Columbia College studying Art History and Comparative Literature. He is in Camp Kesem and enjoys exploring the intersection between the Frontier Myth and American art of all forms.
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