Policy 360: Walking the Line: Negotiating the Sino-Indian Border

The dispute over the Sino-Indian Border, an ill-defined, 2100 mile border running along the Himalayas between China and India, has led to simmering tensions in the region. Also referred to as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the rivalry first escalated into war in 1962—resulting in defeat for India—and has continued variably into the 21st century through numerous skirmishes, economic competition, and nationalist pride over fear of losing territory and status.

The biggest clash in recent years was in 2020 when 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers were killed in the Galwan Valley after thousands of Chinese troops advanced west of the border, striking another blow to an already contentious relationship.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), increasingly militarize their border and ramp up their economic bargaining with allies, a resolution to the dispute seems implausible.

This roundtable looks at six countries that are directly and indirectly implicated in this issue: China, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States. The articles analyze the issue’s regional impacts, discuss what the future of the border dispute looks like, and sketch potential solutions. 

Sino-Indian Border: India’s Historical Context, Current Challenges, and Future Prospects 

By Zareen Brown, BC ’26

As the world’s two most populous countries, China and India both have strong incentives to establish a peaceful alliance, yet their changing military and economic relationship may force them to reassess the possibility of a bilateral relationship. Their long-disputed border has resulted in unresolved tension, leading recently to the 2020 Border Clash—the first fatal confrontation since 1975. Both countries compete fiercely to build infrastructure along their border. Particularly, India’s new road to a high-altitude air base motivated, in part, the 2020 clash. India’s government maintains that keeping peace and respecting the LAC are key to a peaceful Sino-Indian relationship. With increasing tensions between the two nuclear-weapon states, India’s foreign policy toward China is a pivotal factor in its international reputation because escalation between the two powers could cause drastic economic fallout for India. India’s increasingly nationalist foreign policy agenda has the potential of seriously disconnecting them from other foreign powers such as China. Therefore, increased economic cooperation and confidence-building measures are necessary to diminish tensions ensuing from the border dispute. 

The LAC’s inconsistent definition means the line changes quickly, leading to confrontation. The variable definition of the LAC has the potential to cause “transgressions” between India and China because both states disagree on where the line should be. The inflamed tensions caused by the ill-defined LAC have increased India’s desire to stop pulling punches when it comes to China. India’s Ministries of External Affairs and Defense are interested in pushing back against Beijing, with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stating that the “overall relationship cannot be normalized until there is peace and normalcy in the border areas.” Indian relations with China have also been affected by China’s relationship with Pakistan, India’s primary adversary. China’s role is particularly important following the 2019 court decision to abrogate Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which exempts the Jammu and Kashmir states from the Constitution. This abrogation creates the opportunity for Indians to purchase and settle on land in the Jammu and Kashmir region, whereas previously, property rights in the region were denied to outsiders. Chinese Foreign Minister Mao Ning’s statement on the matter notably did not recognize the validity of the court decision, stating that the issue “needs to be resolved peacefully and appropriately” to “settle the dispute … [and] to maintain regional peace and stability.” 

Modi’s approach to Sino-Indian relations may also translate into the BJP opposition’s platform in the upcoming 2024 elections. India’s contentious relationship with China raises significant questions about Modi’s foreign policy. The BJP’s hardline Hindu nationalism isolates millions of India’s religious minorities. Additionally, Modi’s strongman persona permeates his foreign policy, such as in his counterterrorism strategy, increasing his popularity. India’s military capabilities have also grown due to increased defense partnerships with the United States and Israel. These strong ties indicate India is making significant geopolitical maneuvers to become an indispensable member of the international community. However, the Indian National Congress (INC), the BJP’s political rival, has criticized Modi’s approach toward China for being too lenient, especially after the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley Clash. Despite the ongoing debate between India’s two dominant parties over Sino-Indian policies, it is unlikely that the 2020 Border Skirmishes will drastically influence the upcoming election, in light of Modi’s immense popularity. However, the BJP’s nationalist “India First” platform may not be beneficial to the future of Indian foreign policy, as it further isolates India from states like China that could serve as strong allies. 

In a multipolar international system, the relationship between the two most populous countries in the world is steadily becoming more relevant to global politics. To preserve the possibility of a bilateral relationship between India and China, expanding confidence-building measures—such as military transparency, communication channels between military commanders, and joint patrols—could prevent further escalation and unilateral actions. Additionally, increasing economic cooperation, including research and development for both countries’ burgeoning tech industries, and trade relations could create incentives for both countries to prioritize a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 

China at the Border: Why Tensions With India Are on the Rise 

By Sofia Ferrari Bravo, GS ’25

China’s rising global influence has been pronounced by its growth in investments. From infrastructure and technology to international trade, China’s policies aim to place it at the top of the world’s economy. In its efforts to consolidate regional power, China has historically put its own security and status first, inevitably allowing for tensions to develop with its neighbors—namely, India. 

A closer look into China’s relationship with India reflects a historical struggle between two growing powers, marked primarily by their disputed border. Though it has evolved, several political scientists argue that China’s main concern goes further than India. China’s ambitions to match the United States and Russia as a global superpower shape its policies with its neighbor. From before the Soviet Union’s collapse and well into today, China’s strategy regarded keeping India nonaligned internationally to reduce its threat to its security and status. 

Nonetheless, in recent years, the border dispute has been brought to the foreground of Sino-Indian relations. Since 2013, border relations have escalated with tensions and aggression reaching historically unmatched heights. China’s main strategy regarding the border has been military coercion. It warns India by establishing a physical presence along the border while keeping the risk of international geopolitical backlash at bay. Although the economic and political asymmetry between the two countries has allowed this strategy to advance until now, the past years have revealed India’s ability and willingness to balance China’s coercive behavior. 

India’s Prime Minister Narenda Modi has consolidated power in recent elections. Although the leader has expressed an urgency in de-escalating tensions with China, his party’s nationalist rhetoric stymies any opportunity for negotiations, let alone a resolution—particularly in regard to loss of territory and national security concerns. When evaluating this strategy, it is relevant to address India’s relations with the United States and what role they play in determining Chinese policy. India’s cooperation with the United States is nonthreatening to China for now, but this only remains true while the US refrains from direct intervention at the border in support of Delhi. 

The border has never been historically delineated, and the lack of consensus on where the boundary itself lies worsens the crisis. The stakes are high for both sides. The two countries are wrestling to see who will succeed in exerting superiority (and eventual control) over the border. This struggle is manifested by the physical military balance of power on the ground and how this influences threat perception from a strategic standpoint. The most recent clashes occurred in May 2020, resulting in 20 dead Indian and four dead Chinese soldiers, despite the no-firearm rule established in 1966. China’s ambition to become a global power drives its strategy at the border. Territorial claims reflect greater ambitions for economic dominance, in which territorial expansion can be correlated with new manufacturing facilities and a tighter grip on the world economy. Military and infrastructure presence serve to stabilize this position and coerce India while simultaneously deterring US involvement. 

In terms of policy recommendations, the importance of credibly conveying signals through collective foreign strategy is key. Transparency is particularly urgent at the border to avoid a security dilemma. Given recent developments, and taking into account the ongoing Indian elections, it has become even more important for both nations to address the border issue by keeping nationalist tendencies and power ambitions at bay and instead focusing on crisis management and consistency.

Blueprint to Secure US-Indian Relations

By Josh Groysberg, CC ’25

The United States has a strong interest in maintaining its economic ties with India. Recently, US firms have withdrawn their manufacturing capabilities from China and have instead invested in India, increasing their manufacturing capacities there. For example, Apple Inc. plans for India to manufacture 25% of its iPhones within two to three years. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has encouraged such investment via the “Make in India” initiative. Currently, the Indian manufacturing sector is projected to grow 21% in the next six to seven years. Specifically, beyond cheaper labor costs and a younger working population compared to China, India is more closely aligned with US political interests. However, the US wants comfort in its investments in India by ensuring that the upcoming 2024 parliamentary elections position Modi to turn away from opposing political and economic interests. 

Modi has worked effectively with President Joe Biden on collaborations across defense, technology, and trade. Both India and the US have benefited from this arrangement. Additional foreign investment from the US and its allies enables India to improve its infrastructure and raise its citizens’ living standards by providing them with a larger job market. In essence, the US gets a manufacturing center with less geopolitical risk than China.

However, the US government worries about India’s growing involvement in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), an economic alliance similar to the G7. BRICS contains multiple US geopolitical adversaries, such as China, Iran, and Russia. Recently, in 2020, the Modi government organized a meeting of RIC (Russia-India-China) defense ministers in New Delhi, despite heightened LAC tensions with China. The US fears India’s alignment with the national security interests of American adversaries creates a conflict of interests, especially considering the military technology and strategy sharing which requires reliable discretion from India.

This principle matters more in the context of recent developments. For instance, the US approved a manufacturing license to produce the General Electric F414 engine in India in early 2023. The US and India also established a joint program preparing entrepreneurs to contribute to both countries’ defense industries. Such collaborations rely on trust, as a degree of secrets from military technological capabilities is likely to be disclosed to both parties. India’s continued involvement in BRICS undermines that confidence.

Modi’s popularity has remained high, but it is in the US’s interest for India’s parliament to divide even more in order to narrow Modi’s majority. By doing so, the US hopes that additional pressure will force Modi to reduce his involvement in BRICS or even cut it off altogether in favor of more transparent trade with the US. This is, however, unlikely, as Modi’s Hindu nationalist agenda remains popular, widening his majority in the upcoming 2024 elections. A disintegrating parliamentary opposition has only consolidated support for Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJT). Previously, Indian governments from the flagship opposition party, the Indian National Congress, have worked more closely with the US, such as former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who emphasized a united US-Indian security apparatus based on their shared democratic statuses. With a wider majority, Modi would be less likely to make India’s growing manufacturing sector more geopolitically hospitable to US investment.

The US has already spent substantial policymaking to regulate trade with China out of geopolitical risk. The investment opportunity for India is too great, and the US does not want to be trapped into a position where cutting off that potential would be necessary for American national security.

Maintaining Power: India’s Growth and Its Implications for Pakistan

By Roma Tivare, CC ’27

Pakistan and India have had long-standing tense relations since the partition of British India in 1947. Unsettled border disputes in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir led to several skirmishes and wars until a tentative settlement was reached through the 1972 Simla Agreement, establishing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separated the Jammu-Kashmir region into separate India-controlled and Pakistan-controlled territories. However, violations of the LAC by the Indian army, Pakistani army, and Kashmiri militants between 2017 and 2018 reignited tensions between the two nations. With India serving as Pakistan’s most significant rival in the region, Pakistan needs to maintain and strengthen an allyship with China to compete with India’s increasing power.

Like Pakistan, China engaged in similar border disputes with India in 1962 in a region referred to as Aksai Chin and Ladakh by China and India, respectively, and the North-East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh and Assam). The cessation of Pakistani control of Shaksgam Valley—an area now claimed by India—to China established Chinese dominance in the Aksai Chin/Ladakh area, denoting Pakistan as a strategic Chinese ally in South Asia.

Broadly, China is an incredibly important ally to Pakistan. The $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—an infrastructure project through Pakistan established as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—was designed to attract investment, create jobs, and develop critical infrastructure throughout Pakistan. Pakistani and Chinese government officials agree that a shared economic relationship between the countries will be mutually beneficial. 

China’s support of Pakistan is also important in maintaining Pakistan’s presence as a controlling power in the Jammu and Kashmir regions, due to China’s role as a regional hegemon. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning reaffirmed the necessity of the Kashmir issue being resolved “in accordance with the U.N. Charter, Security Council resolutions, and relevant bilateral agreement.” This statement, coupled with the fact that Chinese maps still display Jammu and Kashmir as disputed territory, makes it clear that China does not recognize the validity of the Supreme Court of India’s decision to abrogate Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which effectively established Jammu and Kashmir as Indian Union territories. China’s repeated denial of India’s claim of sole control over Jammu and Kashmir is not only necessary to maintain Chinese control of Aksai Chin/Ladakh but also lays the foundation for Pakistan to assert authority over areas of Jammu and Kashmir as well. The strong relationship between Pakistan and China will become even more important in light of new changes in the balance of power in South Asia.

As the United States and India form a partnership, which is projected to become even stronger as time passes, it is of utmost importance to Pakistan to ally with China to compete with India’s growth in South Asia. Additionally, with a GDP growth rate of 7.2%, India was the fastest-growing G20 economy of 2023 and is projected to become the world’s second-largest economy by 2075. Thus, Pakistan needs to maintain economic growth and regional control if it does not want to be dominated by India’s growth. By forging a deeper relationship with China, Pakistan gains both the monetary support and international recognition necessary to assert its role as a dominant state actor in South Asia. Pakistan should strengthen its economic and military ties with China by increasing bilateral trade and engaging with cooperative defense efforts, particularly at borders with India. Converging interests between India and the US mark a transition away from an economic relationship between India and China, giving Pakistan the ability to cement itself as China’s best South Asian ally.

Afghanistan: A Site for Sino-Indian Regional Competition 

By Sarah Lerner, GS ’25 

As the border dispute between China and India over the Line of Actual Control (LAC) intensifies, the longstanding three-way conflict between India, China, and Pakistan grows in complexity. India’s increasing militarization to combat Chinese territorial encroachment in the Himalayas along the LAC may indicate the possibility of future competition for influence in the region, including in Afghanistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan has been seeking assistance from nearby states due to domestic instability concerns, providing India and China with the perfect opportunity to compete for regional influence. Given its lack of options regarding alliances and assistance, the Taliban must, at least temporarily, entertain both a Chinese and Indian alliance. 

Following the Taliban’s renewed control of Afghanistan in 2021, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated rapidly partially due to COVID-19 and rising inflation. Though these issues have lessened in urgency, household poverty levels have been skyrocketing. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that around 23.7 million people in Afghanistan, over half of the Afghan population, will require humanitarian aid in 2024. Nearly half of the Afghan population lives in poverty, which women disproportionately experience.

No state or international organization officially recognizes the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, but states like China, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, and India have engaged with the Taliban anyway. Regarding China and India, Beijing has more actively attempted to normalize connections with the Taliban than New Delhi has. In January 2023, a Chinese company signed a contract with the Taliban granting the company oil extraction privileges in the Amu Darya basin and oil reserve development rights in the Sar-e Pul province in northern Afghanistan. Furthermore, Afghanistan joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in May 2023 via an extension from Pakistan. The Taliban’s dire need for infrastructure and investment assistance has driven it toward Beijing’s BRI and associated business proposals. 

India has taken a more passive, but equally effective, approach to forging ties with the Taliban. Out of concern about encirclement via regional influence by Beijing, New Delhi sent a technical team to its Kabul embassy in 2022 to ensure continuity of operations. New Delhi has been sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and India’s union budget for 2023-2034 contains a $25 million development aid package for Afghanistan. The Taliban has welcomed these initiatives. Tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan because of controversy over the Durand Line—the Afghanistan-Pakistan border—and attacks in Pakistan by the Taliban’s sister group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, have provided India with an opportunity to replace Pakistan as the Taliban’s patron given the longstanding conflict between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Furthermore, New Delhi has been building its soft power in Afghanistan for decades, having been second only to the United States as a development assistance provider to Afghanistan after the 2001 fall of the Taliban. As a result, the Afghan people, overall, view India positively.

Recognition of the Taliban as a legitimate government by the international community and, thus, the Taliban’s acquisition of significant development aid will likely be impossible unless the Taliban loosens its hardline Islamist decrees, especially those concerning women. The Taliban’s unrecognized position is a geopolitically tenuous one, and recognition is an important prerequisite to joining the United Nations and establishing trade ties. In the short term, the Taliban should extract as much aid as possible from China and India for the sake of its citizens, although this may exacerbate regional competition between China and India. In the long term, the Taliban will have to relax its hardline rule to gain international recognition and, in turn, the potential for national stability and economic success.

Nepal: A Yam Between Two Boulders

By Elizabeth Yee, BC ’26

Flanking both India and China, Nepal has often been imagined as a “yam between two boulders.” Tense Sino-Indian border disputes have made Nepal a central arena for great power rivalry, as each vies for strategic gains in the region. While Nepal enjoys stronger cultural, religious, and political ties with its northern neighbor, China has endeavored to challenge India’s influence through trade and development programs in recent years. As its neighbors battle for dominance in Asia, Nepal faces the challenge of balancing its relations in an increasingly volatile political climate. Although it stands to benefit from growing foreign investment, competition between India and China also leaves the nation vulnerable to foreign interference. 

Over the last decade, China has attempted to shore up economic ties with Nepal. These efforts have included the signing of a Trade and Transit protocol—granting Nepal expanded access to Chinese sea and land ports—as well as the 2017 expansion of China’s global infrastructure project, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI), into the Himalayan country. Beijing’s growing interest in the region has been driven both by Great Power rivalry and national security concerns. Historically a safe haven for Tibetan dissidents, Nepal also holds symbolic significance to China. By gaining greater influence, Beijing seeks to secure its northern border and ensure the stability of its contested rule over Tibet.  

These projects were initially welcomed by Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital, which sought to reduce its sole dependence on India after an unofficial blockade in 2015 left the country with critical shortages of fuel, food, and medicine. However, China’s attempted power projection has met several obstacles. Many of its promises, such as its trade protocol and BRI projects, have stagnated due to funding modalities and a lack of political will. This declining momentum has also been met with challenges from a unified Indian and American front. The United States facilitated the signing of Washington’s Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact in 2017—a direct counter to China’s BRI—while similarly ramping up defense cooperation and investments in both the Nepalese government and the national private sector. Likewise, India has intensified its presence in Nepalese energy, escalating its import of Nepalese hydropower and securing new plant contracts, a sector in which China has also heavily invested in.  

Hoping to steer Nepal away from its rivals, China has warned Nepal of the US and India exploiting Nepal for their own gain, positioning itself as a more sincere security and trade partner. Seeking to drive a wedge in relations between Kathmandu and New Delhi, China has also backed Nepal in its long-standing Kapalani dispute, accusing India of encroaching on sovereign Nepalese territory. 

This environment of heightened Great Power competition has exposed Nepal’s fragile electoral system to foreign interference. Both China and India have been accused of allegedly meddling in the country’s democracy to serve their respective alliances: China for purportedly attempting to save pro-Beijing KP Sharma Oli’s former government, and India for allegedly fueling ethnic tensions. 

While leveraging important gains from Sino-Indian competition, Nepal should pursue a basic strategy of neutrality and non-alignment. Certainly, managing relations with its maritime counterparts is not only an economic but humanitarian concern, as India and China primarily control imports of essential goods and services into the country. 

Although it stands to gain short-term benefits from China, India, and the US’s increased economic attention, it also faces the risk of becoming a “proxy battlefield” and jeopardizing the integrity of its domestic political system. Instead, Nepal should assume the role of a facilitator and bridge the gap between its two neighbors. This tripartite approach will not only ensure greater peace and stability in the region but also serves to raise Nepal’s global standing. 

Conclusion

As geopolitical tensions between established and emerging global powers become increasingly volatile within the international system, the long-standing dispute at the Sino-Indian border has taken on a new face. Not only has the conflict come to radically shape relations between China and India in recent years, but it has also implicated less powerful border states and captured the attention of the United States. 

As the two most populous countries in the world, China and India’s competing military and economic interests are visible in their actions at the border and have caused the issue to reverberate across the region, implicating less powerful neighboring states and global powers alike. China’s assertive stance and growing need for strategic alliances, especially with Pakistan, underlie its ambitions for regional dominance centered on controlling the border. Simultaneously, India’s efforts to maintain its territorial integrity and navigate larger geopolitical interests as a rising power in South Asia guide its more careful, passive approach. More broadly, other states in the immediate region, such as Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, have their own roles within the conflict, as each has a stake in remaining allied with either China or India. The United States also has an individual interest, especially as it looks to shift its economic involvement abroad from China to India while balancing the potential conflict of interests as India becomes a key player in BRICS. 

This roundtable serves as a pertinent evaluation of the complexity of the Sino-Indian border debate, illustrating the key players, their past and current interests, and the global interconnections essential to the border’s future enmeshed in a rapidly evolving, multipolar international system.