Policy 360: The Battle for Influence In the Solomon Islands

The South Pacific is a region of critical geopolitical importance—not only for the island countries who call it home but also for a myriad of global actors, who, for a variety of reasons, have a stake in the area’s power balance. One South Pacific nation in particular, the Solomon Islands, has become a battleground over which countries like the United States and China are dueling to preserve their national interests. The Solomon Islands is a key point of contention for many reasons, from its vital geographic position in the Pacific to its abundant marine resources. Its recent decisions to sign a security pact with China on one hand, and on the other, agree to a US-Pacific Partnership, are only two examples of its strategic engagements with both sides, as tensions flare to a boiling point.

This roundtable seeks to explore the importance of the Solomon Islands through the lens of its biggest stakeholders, to highlight its importance as a determiner of the global balance of power. China’s recent security pact and development initiatives in the Solomon Islands illuminate its desire to strengthen ties with the nation, revealing crucial insights about both its domestic concerns and overall Pacific maritime strategy. China’s involvement, however, has alarmed the U.S., which seeks to counteract its rival’s growing power while benefiting from close ties with the Islands itself. The battle for the Solomon Islands implicates Australia as well, who as the largest donor to the Solomon Islands since the 1970s and a close ally of the U.S., has struggled to preserve its dominance within the Pacific region. Lastly, the small island country of Fiji finds itself in a difficult position amid these power moves, as it attempts to weigh its good relations with China against its commitments to Australia.

In analyzing recent events and foreign relations surrounding the Solomon Islands, we see the struggles of an island nation attempting to walk a thin line: advancing its own goals as a nation, without simultaneously alienating the most influential global powers.

The Solomon Islands: Striking a Balance Between Two Superpowers

By Zachary Troher, Columbia College ‘26

In November 2021, protestors stormed the Solomon Prime Minister’s residence and nearly set it on fire, as unrest raged throughout the capital and the nation was put on a near 24/7 curfew. The roots of this uproar lie in a high-stakes diplomatic fight between the United States and China. As China attempts to increase its influence in its backyard, Beijing has made overtures to its increased presence throughout the island nations that dot the Pacific, including the Solomon Islands. Meanwhile, the U.S. hopes to maintain its presence in these islands, which serve as a first line of defense against Chinese expansionism. As the Solomon Islands becomes caught in the crossfire of a new great power competition, it is attempting to preserve some sovereignty while achieving long-term economic and development goals. 

After months of talks and bribes, the Solomon Parliament voted in September 2019 to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the latest in a series of Pacific island nations to do so. Since then, the Chinese government has embarked on dozens of improvement projects across the islands, including repairing the country’s only gold mine, building a regulation-size soccer stadium, and funding “constituency development funds” for local members of Parliament to dole out. Chinese influence has not been unconditionally accepted. In November 2021, large protests broke out on Malaita, the most populous but poorest island, and became a source of perennial tension with Guadalcanal, the largest, most developed island that houses the federal government. These protests were initiated by Malaita’s majority Christian population, who oppose the “communism” and “atheism” of the Chinese government. Three days of rioting and looting on Guadalcanal left much of its Chinatown destroyed. 

The unrest forced the prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare, to call for peacekeepers from New Zealand and Australia. After this event, however, he wanted to diversify his nation’s security guarantors. In April 2022, his government signed a security agreement with China, allowing Chinese naval ships to dock at the islands, and permitting the deployment of Chinese armed police and military personnel, if invited. American officials expressed concern that this could potentially be a backdoor for China to establish a military base on the islands, less than 1200 miles from its Australian ally.

This security agreement must not be read as a wholesale embrace of Chinese presence by the Solomon Islands. In the weeks following its announcement, China’s foreign minister visited several Pacific nations to persuade them to join the “China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision,” a bloc entailing closer coordination on policing and security, as well as freer trade between China and the Pacific nations. To China’s surprise, the Solomon Islands rejected this proposal, because it was negotiated unilaterally, without any of its input. After centuries of great-power competition in the region, many Pacific islanders are facing exhaustion from years of imposing policies of larger nations on the island, and they loathe the current state of affairs which keeps them under the thumb of a superpower, yet again. Instead, in September 2022, at a summit in Washington, Sogavare signed the “U.S.-Pacific Partnership” declaration, a deal that will open new embassies in the region and provide 810 million dollars in aid to empower the state to fulfill its aim of protecting their territory against rising sea levels. Sogavare thus achieved one of his main goals: extracting economic aid from both superpowers without being cornered into one camp. 

As the Pacific increasingly resembles a geopolitical hotspot, the Solomon Islands remains caught at a crossroads—not wanting to become reliant on any one superpower, yet still in desperate need of development aid and protection against the rapidly increasing danger of rising sea levels. With close partnerships with both the U.S. and China, the island nation hopes to endure through this period of rising tension with its sovereignty intact and future survival ensured. For the long-term stability of the nation, balanced caution is the best course of action for the Solomon government and people. 

China’s Security Agreement with the Solomon Islands: An Analysis of China’s Maritime Strategy in the Pacific

By Irene Jang, Barnard College ‘24

As states seek spheres of influence in a multipolar political environment, an expansion of maritime strategy beyond the Pacific, and into the Indian Ocean, has become of significant importance. The expansion into the Indian Ocean revisits standard maritime strategy of the “fire island chain,” a linkage of islands and large land masses in the Pacific that serve a crucial geopolitical security position as defensive or offensive infrastructure. China’s recent focus on the Indian Ocean provokes states to expand their maritime strategy to include the Pacific. Other states, such as the U.S., have decreased their presence in the region.

Beginning in 2017, as one of the first Belt-Road Initiative projects, China has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into its first military base in Sri Lanka, a state that is part of the first island chain. China’s security agreement with the Solomon Islands in April of 2022 can be seen as its growing influence in Oceania––with the potential creation of a second fire island chain––and enactment of its larger foreign policy goals. For the Solomon Islands, this can be seen as a strategic decision to boost its national security with Beijing’s aid. The security agreement allows China to utilize the Solomon Islands’ geographically strategic ports while improving not only the Islands’ security operations, but also the bilateral relationship between the two states as evidenced by the increased fish trades in the last couple of years. 

First, China’s influence in the region is strategic for the Solomon Islands’ domestic security. The Islands’ strategic placement in geopolitics makes its location a critical crossroads for the U.S. and Australia. Most importantly, China’s security presence prompts the Islands to reassert its influence and presence in the region, and allows it to protect its own lines of communication. 

Second, the Solomon Islands is of geopolitical interest for China given Beijing’s emphasis on “One China,” a Chinese policy focused on the unification of Taiwan under one sovereign state. Should China build a second naval military base on the Solomon Islands, the proximity between the islands and Taiwan would effectively allow China to rapidly deploy more troops into Taiwan. The construction of a second naval base, however, is highly contentious and such plans have already been denounced by island natives. While the citizens on the Solomon Islands have denounced Chinese militarization on the islands due to their long-term relationship with Taiwan and opposition to China’s secularism, the Islands’ security agreement with China has made many Western states nervous about China’s growing political influence in the region. 

Lastly, China’s growing economic interests overseas, and its dependence on neighboring countries’ maritime territory, highlight the importance of geopolitical alliances and infrastructure necessary to deploy its maritime foreign policy of: “near seas defense and far seas protection.” While the near seas are used to protect domestic borders, the far seas are intended to protect Chinese interests abroad. China’s security pact with the Solomon Islands can be understood as a “far sea” strategy to give China a unique position to secure its BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) projects, provide security for Chinese residents outside of the mainland, and contribute in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. Moreover, given the expansive nature of China’s BRI projects, it is crucial to maintain alliances throughout the Indian Ocean, particularly given China’s high level involvement in Africa, Pakistan, and other states with conflict zones. Disrupting Chinese foreign policy initiatives is not a distant memory. 

As Xi Jinping’s assertive foreign policy goals continue with the beginning of his third term, China maintains strong relations with the Solomon Islands and neighboring countries in the Pacific. While China is expanding its presence into Oceania, it is also critical to recognize the moderate pace of China’s naval strategy. Although there are increasing worries of Chinese influence, as reflected in Solomon natives’ denunciation of Chinese militarization and Americans’ security concerns, active Chinese militarization is not warranted, at least for now. As the Solomon Islands struggles with domestic unrest, its security cooperation with China is mutually beneficial for its internal security. China should use this opportunity to strengthen relations with the countries on the fire island chain and build strategic partnerships rather than bolstering claims of military control over the region. 

Rising Tides, Sinking Boats: The United States’ Pivot to the South Pacific 

By Farhan Mahin, Columbia College ‘25

As tensions between the United States and China continue to rise over issues such as trade and Taiwan’s sovereignty, the battlegrounds of the tacit conflict are beginning to reveal themselves. One recent development is taking place in the South Pacific state of the Solomon Islands, where a recent security pact signed between the island nation and China has alarmed U.S. foreign policy experts and politicians. The perceived fall of the Solomon Islands outside the U.S. sphere of influence represents a significant loss with far-reaching implications, including potential Chinese military deployment around the Islands, which would exacerbate tensions and threaten the U.S. military foothold in the region. 

U.S. diplomatic involvement in the South Pacific started soon after the decolonization of the region’s islands in the 1980s, and largely took the form of security pacts and aid. The newly formed island nations welcomed the safety of the global hegemon, and several countries signed Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the U.S., thereby allowing the establishment of American military bases across the South Pacific. U.S. aid still makes up a large percentage of the GDP of many Pacific microstates, showcasing the extent of its regional influence.

U.S. hegemony in the South Pacific, however, has been increasingly challenged by China. The recent pact between the Solomon Islands and China could allow China to send security personnel to the island nation to protect Chinese interests and properties, potentially foreshadowing the establishment of Chinese bases in the region. This would spell the effective end of U.S. military primacy in the South Pacific and could lead to harmful escalations between U.S. and Chinese ships. Chinese military presence in the South Pacific could also disrupt maritime traffic in the region, including American commercial tuna fishing, a key area of bilateral cooperation with the Pacific Islands that is tied to all regional non-COFA aid. Thus, it is crucial for the U.S. to halt China’s creeping military presence in the South Pacific.

The U.S. response has been emphatic. Vice President Kamala Harris has stated that the Pacific Islands should be more centered in American foreign policy, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced in February 2022 that the U.S. embassy in the Solomon Islands will be reopened. Additionally, after the Solomon Islands initially refused to sign a compact between the U.S. and other Pacific Islands due to references to China, its government signed an amended document, which will continue to provide the Pacific Islands with a sum of 810 million dollars in increased aid throughout the following decade. The U.S. is clearly keen to communicate that it will not allow its influence in the region to wane, and that U.S. diplomacy and strength in the region remains strong. 

Although the U.S. has historically focused on developing trade and security agreements in the South Pacific to increase its influence in the region, the most productive next steps would be to refocus on climate change as the primary object of cooperation. Climate change has long been cited by Pacific Islands Forum leaders as the most pressing concern for the South Pacific; the U.S. could demonstrate its regional commitment by subsidizing the construction of renewable energy infrastructure and providing compensation for losses incurred due to climate related disasters. 

China’s investments into the Pacific Islands have largely been characterized by loans to build infrastructure, leading to severe debt in Tonga, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea. The unsustainable levels of debt could supply China with leverage over their domestic policies and assets, as demonstrated by the recent possession of a Sri Lankan port by a Chinese firm as part of a loan repayment. The downside for China is that debt spiraling inevitably causes resentment, which the U.S. can take advantage of by helping to pay off some of these debts via aid, further discouraging ties with China and building goodwill. By extending developmental support for building renewable energy infrastructure, and capitalizing on the cultural advantage decades of U.S. aid and funding to the South Pacific has provided, the U.S. can deter these island nations from cooperating with Beijing.

A New Player in Australia’s Backyard

By Lizzy Yee, Barnard College ‘26

Australia, as the guardian of the South Pacific within the AUKUS alliance, has been tasked with countering Beijing’s diplomatic maneuvers in the geopolitical battle for influence. The country has traditionally established the Pacific within its sphere of influence, accounting for 40% of all aid in the region, and the Solomon Islands is no exception. With close to $1.5 billion spent on the Islands since 2008, Australia’s historic investment has far exceeded the economic benefits it can extract. Its chief goal, then, is rather to ensure that the small Pacific nation remains an innocuous force in its “backyard,” and does not pose a threat to its security. 

China, however, now stands to threaten Australian hegemony in the region. Since establishing formal diplomatic ties with the nation in 2019, the country has taken little time to cement its partnership with the Solomon Islands. While Prime Minister Sogavare has assured that Australia remains the Solomon Islands’ “security partner of choice,” China has expanded its role in the nation’s infrastructure—aiding efforts to repair mines and building a stadium for the 2023 Pacific Games. 

Similarly, concern has mounted over Beijing’s military ambitions among defense leaders in Australia. The countries signed a bilateral security agreement in April 2022, permitting China to deploy forces to the Solomons Islands if needed, and sparking fears of a potential Chinese base in the region for warships to refuel and replenish. China is now also training the Solomon Islands police force, which previously took guidance from the Australian police. 

With the Solomons being less than 2,000 kilometers away, China’s establishment of a forward military and political presence along the second island chain greatly threatens Australia’s ability to shape its strategic environment—a key goal laid out in its 2020 Defense Policy.

The Solomon Islands has the ability to impact vital lines of communications, as well as supply and trade routes between Australia and the U.S. If the current security treaty developed into a Chinese base in the Pacific, it may allow the People’s Liberation Army to conduct intelligence gathering directed at Australia, and possibly even interdict the country’s ability to provide reinforcement for Taiwan.

Canberra is now faced with the challenge of regaining lost ground, and must exert counterpressure to prevent further cooperation with Beijing. Australia’s current policy, articulated by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, is to re-engage with the Pacific, increase face-to-face engagement with leaders, and ramp up investment. By reasserting its influence through soft power and hefty donations, Canberra hopes to dissuade any further extension of Chinese power in the Pacific, demonstrating that it is best-placed to provide assistance “without the need for external support” from the East.

Both Pacific Minister Pat Conroy and Foreign Minister Penny Wong visited the Solomons earlier this year, and Albanese welcomed a visit from Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogavere in Canberra in October 2022. In the same month, the Albanese government also pledged 900 million AUD over four years to support the Pacific. It also announced this year that it would provide around 17 million AUD in funding to support their hosting of the 2023 Pacific Games. 

As Australia ramps up its investment, however, it should make deliberate efforts to address pressing local priorities. With climate change cited as the “single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific,” and 80% of Solomon Islanders residing in “low-lying coastal areas,” it should direct its investment towards renewable infrastructure to help the country weather storm surges and rising sea levels. Despite the increasing competition posed by China, Australia can still ensure its position of dominance within the Solomon Islands and beyond by curtailing its own emissions and remaining committed to the Paris Agreement. 

The South Pacific’s Double Agent: Is Fiji Playing Both Sides? 

By Moya Linsey, Barnard College ‘25

Fiji, a small island nation in Melanesia, has found itself caught between two larger regional powers: China and Australia. On the one hand, Fiji has retained close ties with China, as demonstrated through its military reliance on the superpower. On the other hand, Fiji’s security forces have become increasingly allied with Australia. 

In October 2022, Fiji signed a status of force agreement with Australia, allowing both countries to host the other’s military forces within its own borders. This agreement aims to facilitate cooperation when confronted with security threats and natural disaster crises. Said security arrangements are, presumably, meant to combat the challenges of climate change while  allowing Australia to resist Chinese expansion into the Pacific. 

The joint statement from the Australian and Fijian Ministers of Defense did not mention China by name, only referencing the agreement’s “security cooperation.” Nonetheless, the impacts of China’s recent signing of a security pact with the Islands were certainly considered. Given the Solomons Islands’ proximity to Australia, Australia’s incorporation of Fiji—and its defense forces—into its sphere of influence seems like a concerted effort. As Australian Prime Minister Richard Marles argued: “Now’s the time to be close to friends.” 

With Australia’s enemies physically close, Australia appears to want its armed friends even closer—or perhaps the friends offering the largest aid packages. In recent years, Australia has provided large sums of money to Fiji; in 2020-2021, it sent $187.6 billion in ODA to Fiji to aid with Australia's development initiative. Clearly, Australia has been injecting money into the small Pacific island, which likely played no small part in Fiji’s newfound openness to Australian interference.   

Through Fiji’s alignment with Australia, it has also increased cooperation with the United States, one of Australia’s important allies. Fijian Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama’s comments at the first-ever U.S.-Pacific Island Countries Summit in Washington D.C. in October 2022 affirmed that “The Pacific Islands Forum family welcomes this opportunity to set the USA towards becoming the true Pacific power it can become.” In fact, Fiji just signed on to the U.S.-Pacific Partnership, a deal in which the U.S. will open new embassies throughout the area and grant $810 million dollars to the Pacific Island Nations. The U.S. is also in the process of bilateral security negotiations with Fiji for a “new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement,” the channel that allows the U.S. Department of Defense to provide and acquire services to and from Fiji. These two agreements demonstrate that the U.S., like Australia, is seeking to support Fiji in tangible ways, and arguably curry favor for the West as the U.S.-China conflict extends into the Pacific.  

However, while Fiji has clearly demonstrated an openness to both Australian and American security cooperation, it has also had a long-standing relationship with China. In mid-October 2022, Prime Minister Bainimarama sent a congratulatory message to President Xi Jinping of China after he won reelection for General Secretary. According to the official website of the Fijian government, Bainimarama stated that “the friendship between Fiji and People’s Republic of China has stood the test of time.” In the past, this “friendship” has manifested in China’s donation of 47 specialized military vehicles to Fiji’s defense forces. In addition, the Chinese ambassador to Fiji, Qian Bo, has averred that the relationship between the two countries is “excellent,” and that the two must support each other especially with sustainable development goals. Between Bo and Bainimarama’s comments, it is clear that there is a relationship of mutual respect between Fiji and China. As such, Fiji is now caught in the broader U.S.-China conflict, despite its small size and years of international isolation because of Bainimarama’s military regime. 

It’s fair to say, then, that Fiji occupies a unique strategic position, caught between the much larger powers of Australia, a seemingly welcomed partner, and China, whose long-standing assistance remains influential and symbolic. Seen by both sides as an ally—by one to counteract Chinese encroachment and by another for achieving mutual goals in areas such as fisheries, climate change, and agriculture—which side Fiji ends up leaning toward is yet to be determined.

Conclusion

After the Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s announcement of the national diplomatic recognition switch in September 2019, the Islands has been a victim to the fallout from international rivalry. The relationships of China, Fiji, Australia, and the United States with the Solomon Islands appears to reflect states’ unilateral strategic interests, defined by the affirmation of soft power onto the Solomon Islands itself—having the Islands help advance respective countries’ agendas—and/or demonstrating larger international relations initiatives, particularly placing stoppers on Chinese power advancement. 

As reflected in this roundtable, the Solomon Islands is, in turn, caught in a crossfire between the ambitions of global superpowers, all while attempting to realize its own national interests. This is not unlike other international relations issues, and is quite telling of the general current political atmosphere—a consistent push-and-pull relationship as smaller countries become both strategic actors and collateral in a larger power struggle.