The Decline of Russian Regional Power: The Invasion of Ukraine and Complicity in the Ethnic Cleansing of Artsakh - CAFA From the Source
Russian peacekeepers stand by as Azerbaijani protesters block the Lachin Corridor in December 2022. Photo courtesy of Mahammad Turkman.
The Azerbaijani military’s ethnic cleansing of the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023—known as Artsakh to Armenians—followed decades of persecution and genocide of Armenians by Azerbaijani and Ottoman forces. Russian involvement in the longstanding conflict has been pivotal for Armenia. Historically, Russia has been an ally to the Armenian people, often acting as a protector and a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Correspondingly, Armenia is the only post-Soviet country in which Russian military influence has grown since the fall of the Soviet Union. Since 1992, Russian guards have protected Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran, and in 1995 a major Russian military base was opened in Armenia’s significant city of Gyumri. In a consequential exertion of military influence in 2020, Russia deployed peacekeeping troops to protect the only remaining physical passage between Armenia and Artsakh in a trilateral agreement, ending the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and protecting Artsakh as an Armenian territory.
However, in September 2023, despite their commitment to protecting Artsakh’s Armenians, Russian peacekeeping forces permitted Azerbaijan to carry out a mass exodus that displaced 120,000 Artksah Armenians and killed upwards of 400. Shortly afterward, Russian troops fully withdrew from the region, prematurely ending their protective military presence. Russia’s concession of Artsakh to Azerbaijan and abandonment of its peacekeeping presence strained the already fragile relationship between Russia and Armenia. This withdrawal also signals a shift in Russia’s foreign policy, in which Russia is now prioritizing negotiating with Azerbaijan over its longstanding alliance with Armenia.
Two days before Russian forces marched for Kyiv, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow. During the visit, the two leaders signed the “Declaration on Allied Interaction Between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation,” a comprehensive military partnership that bypasses Russian-dominated regional institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union. The partnership’s conditions mark a critical shift in Russia’s relationship with Azerbaijan: Moscow now treats Baku as an equal peer rather than a junior partner. By invading Ukraine, Russia has heightened its economic and strategic vulnerability, resulting in increasing concessions to Azerbaijan at the cost of honoring its historic partnership with Armenia. Russia’s withdrawal from Artsakh marked the collapse of a status quo that had allowed it to maintain diplomatic and military dominance in the Caucasus, highlighting how Russia’s shifting strategic priorities in Ukraine have diminished its influence as a major regional power.
The European Union’s (EU) energy sanctions on Russia and Russia’s dependence on Iranian drones have increased Azerbaijan’s diplomatic leverage over the superpower in the Caucasus. International sanctions on Russian oil and gas caused the EU to turn to Azerbaijan for energy. Shortly after announcing a major gas deal with the EU in November 2022, the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) announced that it would begin importing Russian gas. The agreement enables Azerbaijan to export its own gas to meet demand in Europe, while importing Russian gas to supply domestic markets—ultimately bolstering SOCAR’s international influence by effectively laundering Russian gas. According to a Global Witness investigation, this sanction loophole has supplied an estimated €1.1 billion to the Kremlin in 2023. Similarly, Russia’s growing dependence on Iranian drones for its bombing campaigns against Ukrainian civilian targets and energy infrastructure has heightened its interest in securing the Zangezur Corridor, a land route linking Azerbaijan to Iran. This strategic border region has incentivized Russia to cooperate with Azerbaijan because it provides greater access to arms in its war against Ukraine, at the expense of Russia’s relationship with Armenia.
Armenia is surrounded by enemies: Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Russia had never been one of them. Russia was one of the first countries to recognize the murder of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire before World War I as a genocide, before the International Association of Genocide Scholars. The Russian Empire provided refuge and humanitarian aid to Armenians fleeing the genocide. Russia’s pivot to Azerbaijan and failure to stop the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh was therefore viewed as a significant betrayal. The Armenian government has pursued alternative mediators to Russia in negotiations with Azerbaijan. At the BRICS 2024 Summit in October 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev instructed their foreign ministers to finalize a peace agreement. All of Russia’s attempts to mediate through the “3+3” process, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Russia, were firmly rejected by Armenia, indicating Armenia’s interest in securing a geopolitical dynamic in the Southern Caucasus that excludes Russia entirely. In August 2024, Russian troops which had been guarding Armenia’s border with Iran and Turkey since 1991 were dismissed. Armenia has also further suspended its involvement in the CSTO—a Russia-led regional military alliance in which Armenia formerly played a crucial role—marking a significant fissure in an organization emblematic of Russia’s hegemony.
Russia’s diminishing diplomatic role is not only reflected in Armenian policy but also in the public opinion of the Armenian people, as opinion polling shows a decline in respect and an increase in apprehension towards Russia as a military and diplomatic power. According to an International Republican Institute poll, the number of Armenians who described the country’s relationship with Russia as “good” fell drastically from 93% to 31% between 2019 and 2023. A survey from December 2021 showed that 57% of Armenians cited Russia as Armenia’s greatest political ally (pg 34), with only 15% of Armenians viewing Russia as a political threat (pg 37). By contrast, as of 2023, 40% of Armenians view Russia as a political threat (pg 56), citing France as Armenia’s greatest military ally (pg 51).
Though Russia’s relationship with Armenia is deteriorating as it increasingly accommodates Azerbaijani interests, Azerbaijan is also keeping Moscow at a distance. In an interview with Russian news agency TASS, Azerbaijani Ambassador to Moscow, Polad Bulbuloglu, expressed Azerbaijan’s resistance to the opening of a Russian consulate in now Azerbaijani-controlled Artsakh. Russia cannot rely on Azerbaijan to replace Armenia to promote its influence because Azerbaijan also seeks regional power, and any Russian influence threatens its own. Azerbaijan’s hesitancy with Russia is also reflected in statements made by Armenian officials. In May 2023, former Armenian Ambassador to Russia Stepan Grigoryan told Novaya Gazeta that Russia’s “only support” in the South Caucasus was Armenia and Artsakh, one of which is now lost. Without Armenia’s loyalty and Azerbaijan’s trust, Russia is left with very few avenues for re-exerting its political influence.
Russia’s strategic abandonment of regional control marks a shift in its foreign policy goals: from striving to uphold broad regional influence to waging war against Ukraine. This paradigm of priorities manifests in other regions of Russia’s post-Soviet backyard, such as Central Asia, where China is poised to take on a greater security role as Russia relocates security services from Central Asian bases to Ukraine. Post-Soviet states beyond Armenia, such as Moldova and Uzbekistan, view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a warning and are seeking further integration with the West or China to protect from similar violent encroachment. Currently, the Russian pattern of prioritizing military goals in Ukraine over political influence in the post-Soviet space accelerates the rise of competing regional hegemonies such as China and Azerbaijan, signaling a long-term decline in Russia’s status as a regional power.
Lora Tseytlin (BC ’27) is a student double majoring in political science and Eastern European regional studies with a minor in economics. She is from Seattle, Washington, and can be reached at lt2956@barnard.edu.