Putin’s Soviet Nostalgia: The Revival of the USSR’s Legacy in Modern Russian Media
President Putin visiting state-owned Channel One. Photo courtesy of Alexey Druzhinin.
The Russia-Ukraine War drastically escalated on February 20, 2022, when Russian military forces invaded Ukraine’s sovereign territory, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties, the displacement of residents, and environmental damage. But the war first started in 2014, with Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Russia was also involved in conflict with eastern Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region, providing support to separatist groups and escalating violence in the area. These repeated acts of aggression were no mere coincidence. Russia has frequently taunted the governments of post-Soviet states and threatened their security, including Ukraine’s. The historical legacy of the Soviet Union plays a significant role in shaping Russia’s tensions with the neighboring former-Soviet republics.
Many post-Soviet states, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, remember the Soviet era with varying degrees of bitterness borne from political repression, forced Russification, and other forms of social and political control. Whether it be through the war with Ukraine, the occupation of 20% of Georgia’s territories, or a persistent military presence throughout the region, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s leadership regularly expresses Soviet models of control and expansionism. Similarly, in both the Soviet Union and modern Russia, there is a notable concentration of political power in the hands of a minute, central leadership. These parallels suggest a degree of continuity between the Soviet governance model and modern Russian autocracy.
Russia’s political system and its geopolitical relations with the post-Soviet bloc are particularly relevant in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War. The Western perspective frames the conflict emphasizing principles of international law, national sovereignty, and human rights. Despite Western media bias, perspective is not widely impacted by the state. The West’s independent relationship with the media facilitates conversations based on objective reporting, which lead citizens to accordingly disapprove of Kremlin rule. Meanwhile, in Russia, the Kremlin’s tight grip on media content manipulates public opinion creating a more emotional and subjective understanding of the conflict.
Vladimir Putin employs media control techniques reminiscent of the Soviet era, shaping public opinion, suppressing dissent among Russian citizens, and exerting a strong influence over the nation’s political landscape. Naturally, as technology has developed worldwide since the Soviet period, the state’s capacity to spread certain sources, opinions, and ideas has become more accessible and widespread. In modern Russia, there are more complex and pervasive ways of spreading the Kremlin’s propaganda and hand-selected narratives. These methods have been used intensively in the state media’s coverage of the Russian attack on Ukraine, presenting a misleading image of peace and conformity to the Russian citizenry. The power Putin possesses with the development of technology, heightens these strategies in the modern age, posing a bigger threat to global politics.
Cult of Personality and Narrative
By examining the media strategies of Putin following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one can observe how public opinion in Russia is mediated by the state. Putin’s personal image is hugely important to Russian citizens and simultaneously correlated with certain Soviet models of expansionism, belligerence, and manipulation.
Putin uses his platform to speak directly to Russians and shape their understanding of the conflict. When Russian forces invaded Ukraine, Putin criticized the tension between the two nations, attempting to redefine the conflict on his own terms. He referred to Kyiv as a genocidal regime and mentioned the need for a “de-Nazification of Ukraine.” By framing Russia as a victim to the unjust acts of Ukraine, he justified his “special military operation” as a response to the crimes committed against Russian-speaking Ukranians. In his speeches, he frequently accuses others of prompting Russia’s military violence by phrasing situations in a way that imposes a narrative of the “world against Russia.”
Similarly, at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1939, Stalin addressed various issues facing the country, including the purges that imprisoned and executed his rivals and the alleged existence of internal enemies such as political rivals and critics. He framed the purges as necessary measures to protect the socialist state from counter-revolutionary elements, while not acknowledging the true scale of human rights abuses and political repression his party imposed on civilians. Instead, he diverted attention by accentuating the righteousness of his actions in fortifying the safety of the USSR. Much like Putin, his narrative was one of victimization, presenting the USSR as under siege from an internal enemy. This narrative necessitated a united Russian front against alleged traitors, a sentiment Putin echoes today. He has adapted to the digital age and leverages the use of online platforms, creating a new frontier for spreading propaganda and controlling the narrative. Not only is his personality in tune with that era, but it is intensified by its mass spread domestically and internationally due to rapid globalization and technological developments.
Media Control
In a 2015 interview with Russian state media, Putin claimed that his government had “no desire to recreate the empire, to resurrect the Soviet Union, but [had] to protect our Russian independence and sovereignty.” Multiple times, Putin has denied the narrative of Russia wanting to reunite the USSR. However, his interest in “Russian independence and sovereignty” directly aligns his methods with the Soviet model of enclosing citizens in a vacuum of disinformation. While Putin highlights the distinction of modern Russia from the USSR, his government uses state media channels to promote a specific narrative, a tactic analogous to the Soviet system, which facilitated strict government control of the media through the censorship of TV channels. 70% of Russia’s population turns to television for information, which means that Russian media outlets hold significant sway over public opinion. A prominent example of this is the state television channel Russia Today, which is a consistent source of Russian propaganda.
Russia Today (RT) showed a warped perspective of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and did so again during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In Russia Today’s archives, there are multiple examples of a tactical use of headlines to promote extreme Russian nationalism. In a broadcast on February 25, 2022, days after Russia's attack, one headline read: "Operation in Ukraine: Russia had no choice but to act in this way." Another headline on RT read "Russia: National security threats left no choice but to start military operation."
RT continuously refers to the war as a “special military operation” and presents Russia’s violence as defensive. By calling the invasion of Ukraine a “special military operation,” Putin is able to paint a more palatable image of Russia’s actions. Through this meticulous use of terminology, he consistently presents an idealized version of Russia’s military aggression. This is exemplified through Putin’s use of words such as “liberator” in reference to Russia and how it “freed” citizens from Kyiv’s attacks. The selective use of images and phrases, while similar to the Soviet era, is immensely stronger, as the development of certain technology only helps the spread of information as such.
Selectively presenting information to shape public perception occurs through the framing of events, minimization of negative news, and promotion of a positive image of government. Izvestia was the official newspaper and publication of the Soviet government. It covered foreign relations and was known as the mouthpiece of the Kremlin. During the 1939-40 Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union, Izvestia reported on Finland’s actions regarding peaceful citizens, claiming that “Mannerheim’s bandits burn homes, kill workers, and terrorize the population in an incredible way.” While the USSR clearly sought to gain territory bringing upon a bloody war to the much smaller nation of Finland, their newspapers focused on the treatment of citizens and mass executions by Finland, presenting the country in a certain way. Meanwhile Western media looked at the broader picture and sympathized with the outnumbered Finnish soldiers presenting them as brave defenders against Soviet aggression. As with any other Soviet paper of the time, Izvestia placed Russia on the moral high ground. This control over information and its framing is part of what connects the two eras of Russian media. The current Russian system is able to take these methods, and exemplify them through the massive use of television and other technological efforts to spread propaganda as rapidly as possible.
Censorship
The Russian government censors the information that the Russian people receive. During coverage of the Ukrainian war, Russian media was very careful with the images it released to the public. The Novaya Gazeta media outlet blurred out a poster held by a protester who interrupted a broadcast of Vremya, a Russian state TV network. Her poster read, “No war. Stop the war. Don’t believe the propaganda. They’re lying to you here. Russians against War.” Blurring images and other forms of censorship restrict Russians from seeing perspectives on the war other than that of the Russian state.
Novaya Gazeta posted a blurred image of the poster on their social media accounts, claiming that “the contents [were] forbidden by the Criminal Code” and had to be erased. There are multiple laws regarding the media in Russia that monitor and regulate activity of media sources. When the war in Ukraine broke out, the government enforced a censorship law that banned independent media sources from using the words “war,” “invasion,” and “attack,” to prevent “fake news.” The law criminalized independent reporting on the war, making it punishable by up to 15 years in jail. Thus, legal regulations enforced the state’s chosen narrative.
The Russian foreign agent law is another prominent censorship law that ensures “patriotic” coverage rather than coverage that includes “Western ideals”. There is a clear disregard for foreign narratives due to the output of state controlled images. For example, two independent Russian websites, Meduza and Mediazona, were blocked and declared “foreign agents” due to the content that they presented regarding the Ukrainian war. They had called the conflict a “war” and often critiqued the government. Meduza now has to disclose its new status as a “foreign agent,” resulting in a loss of credibility among the Russian public.
Similarly, the Soviet Union exercised strict control over all forms of media. Any media or individuals who expressed views critical of the government were quickly censored or silenced. During Soviet rule, there was a protection organ called Glavlit which censored “state secrets” in articles, newspapers, television, and literature.
The domestic manipulation of narratives has been an essential factor in the perpetuation of the Russia-Ukraine War. Historical ties to the Soviet Union help explain the Kremlin’s flaunting of democratic norms and strict control over the media—with both contributing to Russia’s confident use of aggressive military force. This power over narrative in the country has only gotten stronger over the years, and even more dangerous. Despite Putin’s carefully manicured public image, some are able to see him for who he really is: a man who not only threatens the security of post-Soviet nations along his country’s borders, but one who lies to Russia’s citizens about its acts of invasion and oppression.
Lizzie Melashvili (BC ’27) is a staff writer at CPR. She is studying economics and political science. She is from the country of Georgia and is deeply interested in international affairs, transatlantic relations, and Eastern European politics.