To Score His Goals Abroad, Erdogan Can’t Be Offside With His People

Fenerbahce and Galatasaray play in Turkey’s premier football league, the Turkish Super League, in November 2016. Photo courtesy of Flickr.

Turkey’s premier football league, the Turkish Super League, is no stranger to partisanship, but this year’s Turkish Super Cup match brought with it a new level of drama. The country’s two biggest rival teams, Galatasaray and Fenerbahce, were set to face off in a highly anticipated standalone match on December 29, 2023. For the first time, the match would take place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Yet, on the day of the match, both teams packed up and flew back to Istanbul without even walking onto the field. Why?

To say the Turkish population influenced the decision is an understatement. On the days leading up to the match, social media and domestic news outlets constantly circulated updates on the match. The people—and players—were outraged that the two teams would not be able to wear jerseys sporting the first president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, during warm-ups or display any of his quotes. Finally, Fenerbahce and Galatasaray issued a joint statement that they would not be playing because of Saudi restrictions against Ataturk-related “political” imagery.

The public rejoiced at this apparent communication error between the Turkish Football League (TSL) and Saudi officials as a “victory.” Turkish teams had upheld their commitment to the country, even above the two teams’ long-lasting rivalry. On the 100th anniversary of the republic, Turkish pride prevailed.

Turkish foreign policy strategists should not feel as victorious. By cutting off its rapprochement with Europe in favor of the Middle East, exemplified by its increasingly antagonistic position in NATO in the past decade, Turkey has backed itself into a corner. Turkey cannot afford to risk its relationships with key regional allies, much less one as powerful as Saudi Arabia. Instead, it must balance domestic public opinion with longer-term, bilateral trade agreements with Saudi Arabia. If Erdogan continues with the status quo–making rash foreign policy decisions the focus solely on economic gains with no regard for public opinion–Turkish foreign policy decisions will be increasingly more volatile.

Nothing demonstrates this dynamic like the Super Cup.

The Turkish Football Federation worked hard to secure a deal for Riyadh to host the match. In addition to hosting at the Al-Awwal Park stadium, the Saudi government planned on distributing a total of over $3.7 million to both teams and covering their transportation and housing costs. As such, Turkey was very set on following through with the deal, which would consequently fortify its relations with Saudi Arabia, a rising power in international sports.

Alongside the significant economic benefits, the Turkish league wanted to take this opportunity to appeal to a larger international audience. The league is currently trying to increase its international presence and prestige. Football has always been integral to Turkish culture, and the country regularly sends three or four teams to the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). Playing on international fields is another way to augment the teams’ public-facing images.

As for Saudi Arabia, hosting the match was part of its bigger goal of global superpower status in sports. Earlier in 2023, the country effectively bought the Professional Golf Association to diversify its oil-dependent economy. Holding a Turkish domestic match would further highlight Saudi sports domination. According to official Saudi statements, hosting the Turkish match was a means to continue the “close relationship” between the two countries.

Although Turkish and Saudi officials recently highlighted their close historical and cultural ties, the two countries had strained diplomatic relations from 2018 to 2022. In 2018, Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered at the Saudi embassy in Istanbul, Turkey. Erdogan publicly denounced the murder and accused the monarchy of having played a role in the death. This decision, commended by the international community for upholding the freedom of the press, strained official relations between the two countries.

Any moral high ground did not last too long. Turkey continues to be regionally isolated. After slowly abandoning its European orientation after the Justice and Development (AKP) and Erdogan came to power in 2002, Erdogan has aimed to shift Turkish relations to the Middle East in a policy called “No Problems With Neighbors.” As the name suggests, Erodgan has tried to repair otherwise tense relationships with neighboring Middle Eastern countries. 

Despite a seemingly coherent regional policy, Turkey currently has “No Neighbors Without Problems” after trying and failing to bolster the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the Arab Spring in 2011. This unsuccessful attempt to institute political Islam in Egypt created a rift between Erdogan and Gulf monarchies. Regional alienation only continued with Erdogan’s decision to engage militaristically in the Syrian Civil War. Since then, Turkey has been scrambling to rethink Turkey’s position as a key regional actor. Consequently, it needed an economic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia much more than Saudi needed entrance into the Turkish market, sports world, and tourism sector. Because of this, Erdogan went back on his initial moral claims about the Saudi government and resumed diplomatic business as usual. 

Turkey has accepted direct aid from Saudi Arabia. In May 2023, the Saudi government deposited $5 billion into Turkey’s Central Bank as its foreign exchange reserves reached a twenty-year low. For the ruling AKP, immediate cash flow supersedes public opinion or domestic support because of the dire domestic economic situation. 

But in the case of the football match, Turkish negotiators and Erdogan made an integral mistake. They completely ignored the power of nationalism and public opinion. Through negotiations with Saudi Arabia, the teams could sing the national anthem but could not promote Ataturk memorabilia and quotes because the Saudi government did not allow so-called “political” messaging. Turkish journalists have questioned why these discussions did not occur earlier. Why were traditions—t-shirts with Ataturk on them and his quotes—not included in the agreement? Was it simply a mistake? 

Key actors have not directly answered these questions, but it is in Erdogan’s political interest to minimize Ataturk’s secular legacy. Ataturk paved the way for Turkey’s rapprochement with Europe. Erdogan’s foreign policy has involved an alienation of Europe in favor of the Middle East, which is in direct contrast to Ataturk’s position. Despite Ataturk’s lasting legacy among the public, Erdogan’s foreign policy ambitions are at odds with the public’s efforts to pay homage to their first president. 

Erdogan’s motivations are increasingly clear when comparing his responses to the canceled match with that of political opposition. Turkey’s largest opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) took to X, formerly Twitter, to applaud the teams’ decisions not to play. CHP Chairman Özgür Özel went so far as to say “We will not forget those who caused Turkey this embarrassment,” seemingly against the Turkish and Saudi negotiators that established the rules of the match.

In response, Erdogan called the event an act of “sabotage” against Turkey’s interests and relations with “brotherly allies.” He did not clarify who he blamed for the cancellation of the match. However, his emphasis on relations with Saudi Arabia instead of responding to public outcry about maintaining Turkish traditions and respect for its history further reveals his priorities—economic and personal gain.

To Erdogan, economics is necessary to secure his authoritarian strong-hold. His economic policy is in shambles, and it almost cost him his re-election in 2023. Inflation is officially at 64.8%, the highest since its decades-long peak in November 2022. A horrific earthquake in February 2023 cost over $34 billion in direct costs, not including much-needed reconstruction efforts. Taken together, Erdogan needed every opportunity to increase immediate funds into the Turkish economy.

Enter Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi interest in Turkey is predominantly to counter Iran’s rising power by fortifying Turkish-Saudi defense agreements, Turkey has been prioritizing economic gains. Saudi Arabia ended its boycotts of Turkey in 2022 and resumed flights to the country. Since then, tourism from Saudi Arabia has been at an all-time high, surpassing 800 million annually in 2023. Another source of Saudi investment is through private property. Foreign ownership of Turkish land has increased since 2016, and Saudi Arabia is the second largest country of origin. However, real estate investment alone does not facilitate long-term growth for Turkey’s domestic GDP. Instead, selling key industries to foreign companies has contributed to a decrease in Turkey’s investment and manufacturing capabilities since 2022.

Turkey’s main opposition party is not thrilled with these developments. In the aftermath of Khashoggi’s assassination, Turkish people were seemingly in a consensus about the need to condemn Saudi involvement. The CHP has continued to argue for a harsher stance against Saudi Arabia from a humanitarian perspective. 

Public opinion is not entirely supportive either. Especially in the aftermath of the football match, a poll conducted on December 30 and 31, 2023 had 59% of respondents agreeing that Saudi Arabia had disrespected Turkish values. Albeit a smaller diplomatic hiccup—and failed economic opportunity—this football fiasco should be an important lesson for Turkey on foreign relations: do not entirely underestimate public opinion or nationalism. Although diplomacy rarely prioritizes public opinion, the football match demonstrates that nationalist pressures from within the country can carry weight. Overriding the people as passive actors in Turkish policy is an oversight that Turkey cannot afford—literally.

Turkey should balance its necessary foreign policy decisions, such as increasing regional alliances while bolstering domestic sentiment at home. In the context of the football match, Turkish negotiators should have adequately addressed the game’s deep-rooted traditions and avoided making a deal if those conditions could not be met. Without abandoning Saudi relations entirely, Turkey must walk the fine line between over-reliance on economic aid from a regional power and re-prioritizing its people. Domestic stability without being overly reliant on foreign actors with Saudi Arabia requires the trust of the Turkish public.

Instead of adequately addressing or considering public opposition, Erdogan’s Turkey has opted for short-term economic gains. Unwilling to provide domestic support for industries, instead opting to privatize them with rampant corruption, Erdogan has relied on Saudi investment and economic deals. Chances are Erdogan will not change his stance, but this football match has demonstrated that opposition to solely economic deals can thwart their effectiveness. Erdogan should not forget this.

Ada Baser (GS ’24) is a columnist for CPR studying political science. Her main interests include U.S.-Middle Eastern relations, water governance, and transitional justice.