Meloni and the Media: An Investigation into Public Sentiment in Italian Media Surrounding the 2022 Election of Giorgia Meloni
Giorgia Meloni and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak meet in front of the press. Photo courtesy of Simon Dawson.
On September 25, 2022, after a political crisis and the resignation of president Mario Draghi, a snap election was called in Italy which resulted in a center-right coalition with neo-fascist origins winning an absolute majority in Parliament. As Italy’s furthest right leaning government since Benito Mussolini and the Partito Nazionale Fascista, the election of Giorgia Meloni symbolized, for many, a return to one of the darkest periods of Italian history, and casting a long shadow over Italy and the rest of Europe.
The Italian press differs from other European countries in that it is extremely regionalized as a result of Italy’s persistent regional rivalries, which have been a mainstay in its domestic politics since its official unification in 1861. Moreover, the majority of Italian newspapers are owned privately, predominantly by media groups or political parties. It has become increasingly difficult to discount the pre-eminence of social media as a viable news outlet, but here I will omit social media sources due to the difficulty of pinpointing whether these news posts are legitimate and reliable. According to a 2018 study by the Pew Research Institute, approximately a third of Italian adults believe the news to be very important, while three-in-ten trust the news. This is unsurprising given that former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi exercised control over both private and public news outlets during his time in office: he owned the media organization Mediaset—which includes Italy’s top private TV stations. There is a precedent of Italian media outlets being used to promote an individual’s political agenda, suggesting that bias in reporting is particularly pernicious in Italy. Thus, the country is all the more pertinent as a case study.
The 2022 Italian Political Election
Corriere della Sera, a moderate newspaper presenting both right and left-wing perspectives, published a guide to the campaign promises of the parties running for election following Draghi’s resignation. Renato Benedetto details Meloni’s plan for fundamental structural change of government in Italy by altering “la forma parlamentare della Repubblica, per dare più stabilità politica al Paese” (the parliamentary form of the Republic, in order to give the country more political steadiness). By emphasizing the instability of the Italian government previously, which had seen “negli ultimi 10 anni si contano 7 governi con 6 premier diversi” (7 governments with 6 different premiers in the last 10 years), Benedetto depicts FDI as a reformer party, determined to alter Italy for the better. In contrast, the center-left is painted as ineffectual; their ambitions rest only in bureaucratically “fermare la destra” (stopping the right) rather than introducing policies of their own.
Greater color is provided in the investigation conducted by La Repubblica, a newspaper recognized for its liberal ideals, into FDI’s leader. In a clear mockery of Meloni’s own “Io sono Giorgia” slogan, La Repubblica claims that, “È donna. È madre, ma soprattutto è madrina della vecchia destra, truccata di nuovo” (She is a woman. She is a mother, but above all she is the godmother of the old right, made up again). The word “truccata”, used conventionally to describe applying makeup, evokes a sense of concealment, of Meloni deliberately disguising her party’s origins to make FDI more palatable for Italians. FDI’s connections to fascism are emphasized with direct comparisons to Mussolini: “La stessa [simbolo] che arde sulla tomba di Benito Mussolini” (the same [symbol] which burns on Benito Mussolini’s tomb). La Repubblica’s inquiry is scathing, likening Meloni to the ultra-conservative Marine Le Pen and “[il] dispotismo antidemocratico” (the antidemocratic despotism) of Viktor Orbán, who is charged with Hungary’s democratic backslide. Altogether, La Repubblica’s commentary on Meloni is unabashedly critical and disparaging. Bonini and collaborators express doubt as to whether Meloni is capable of clinching a victory in the 2022 election, in repeated “se” (if’s) and the skeptical “davvero”: “Se vincerà lei, se Giorgia Meloni sarà davvero la prima donna a varcare la soglia di Palazzo Chigi…” (if she does win, if Girogia Meloni really is the first woman to cross the threshold of the Palazzo Chigi…). It is unsurprising that La Repubblica can hardly entertain the thought of Meloni taking power; as a left-leaning magazine, La Repubblica is likely to understate Meloni’s chances.
In La Repubblica’s second installment of their inchiesta su Meloni, the derisive, faintly ironic tone has grown stronger. Bonini references the fervor she incites in her voter base, namely the “…voglia di abbattere i palazzi e con le macerie costruire muri, erigere barricate, posizionare steccati” (desire to tear down buildings and build walls with the rubble, erect barricades, place fences). Meloni’s party is instantly portrayed as a destructive, violent force, the language of “build walls” and “place fences” brings to mind Trumpism in the United States and xenophobic, hate-fueled sentiment. Meloni’s speech, and specifically her nationalist rhetoric, at the Spanish Conservative Vox rally is denounced: “Patria, bandiera, nazione, lotta all'aborto, alle identità di genere, agli immigrati, all'islam. Stesso linguaggio, stessi obiettivi” (Country, flag, nation, fight against abortion, gender identities, immigrants, Islam. Same language, same goals), while infernal imagery throughout conveys the destructiveness and danger of her ideology. Altogether, Bonini suggests, Meloni’s election is a symptom of wider Italian prejudice and xenophobia.
Yet Meloni has received consistent praise as Italian Minister of Youth under Berlusconi’s Fourth Government, even by the overtly critical La Repubblica and other left-leaning publications. The Catholic newspaper Avennire, in a profile of Meloni, admires Meloni’s work ethic and success in developing her party: “un pezzo per volta, ne costruisce l’identità” (one step at a time, she builds [FDI’s] identity). Spagnolo references “la manifestazione politica giovanile della destra italiana da lei creata e fatta crescere come un laboratorio politico” (the political youth movement of the Italian right that she created and grew as a political laboratory); by emphasizing role as founder, he contributes to a characterization of Meloni as an innovator and effective leader. While there is some acknowledgment of the legacy of the far right, and the ugliness that is bound up with it, Spagnolo is adamant that Meloni’s force of will has proven these fears baseless.
Fratelli D‘Italia in Power
Meloni’s economic reforms since her election, namely minimum wage and her reorganization of citizenship income, have been divisive to say the least. Le Monde—a French center-left leaning newspaper—was among the most vocal publications to denounce FDI’s decision to abolish Cinque Stelle’s 2019 citizenship income reform intended to reduce poverty and its replacement by an “inclusion check” from January 1, 2024 with far more limited effects. The article condemns Meloni for her introduction of “mesures impliquant la suppression des aides existantes pour les plus pauvres…” (measures involving the abolition of existing aid for the poorest). The positive effects of the “vital” citizenship income reform are discussed in detail—it has helped one million people out of poverty—rendering Meloni’s decision to scrap these measures all the more reprehensible in context.
La Stampa, a Turin-based newspaper, published an interview with Giuseppe Conte, the leader of the Cinque Stelle opposition party, almost a year after Meloni’s election. Conte is sharply critical of Meloni’s governance, and La Stampa lends Conte a platform from which to disparage Meloni’s economic policies. Conte is quick to criticize Meloni’s refusal to introduce a minimum wage in Italy and introduction of a windfall tax on Italy’s banks, suggesting that, “al governo manca una visione complessiva”(the government lacks an overall vision), concerned only with pandering to its voters to “di tenersi buone le lobby potenti e le piccole categorie di riferimento elettoral” (keep the powerful lobbies and small electoral reference categories quiet). Ultimately, Meloni is portrayed as lacking direction while introducing measures which would disenfranchise the most impoverished Italian citizens.
In Il Giornale, a conservative newspaper previously owned by Silvio Berlusconi, Meloni’s economic policies are defended, with the introduction of a second budget law involving a renewal of tax wedge cut and a reduction of taxes on productivity bonuses serving to “concentrare i fondi sui salari piu bassi” (focus funds on the lowest paid workers). Meloni is hailed as a hero, devoted to supporting the Italian people financially while simultaneously “smascherando la solita ipocrisia della sinistra” (unmasking the usual hypocrisy of the left). The Democratic Party, then, are untrustworthy and portrayed as incompetent, interested only in blocking FDI’s proposals. Il Giornale’s explicitly subjective rhetoric and deprecation of the Democratic Party is a clear example of the ideology-based reporting at the heart of Italian media.
The extent of divergence in Italian reporting is apparent in Unità’s—a centrist newspaper—description of the dynamic between the majority and opposition party. Where Il Giornale praised Meloni for her reforms, Unità condemns a policy created by Meloni which would prevent NGOs from operating in the Mediterranean to save migrants aboard boats, referring to it as “quella legge folle” (that crazy law). She is criticized for violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international maritime law, and the Italian constitution, all the while “fare polemica sostenendo evidenti bugie” (raising controversy by supporting obvious lies). Like Sablone’s Il Giornale article, the language of dishonesty is employed, here directed at Meloni rather than the Democratic Party. The same political dog whistle language reoccurs, but employed by different newspapers to support their own ideological messages.
Meloni’s parochial stance on social issues is widely deplored by liberal, left-leaning newspapers. Unità, for instance has decried the “istituzionalizzata” homophobia of the Meloni government, listing a series of sobering statistics, including an Istat survey showing that in a sample of 1200 people, 91% feel somewhat or extremely discriminated against.Parallels are again drawn between the highly conservative, authoritarian governments of Poland and Hungary to suggest a social regression in Italy following Meloni’s move to prevent the registration of same-sex couples’ children. Most damning of all is Azzaro’s avowal that Meloni intends “creare una società fondata sulla discriminazione” (to create a society founded on discrimination). While it is undeniable that Meloni’s policies, beliefs, and rhetoric are often xenophobic and homophobic, the totalizing nature of Azzaro’s sentiment speaks to the polarization of the Italian political landscape under a Meloni government.
To some extent, it must be acknowledged that divergence in how events are portrayed in the media is inevitable. It is an indication of a free and open society that Italy has such a wide scope of news sources; the alternative, in which one school of thought dominates, is distinctly Orwellian. It is nonetheless imperative that we draw attention to divisive and potentially misleading language in the media. As anticipated, conservative newspapers admire Giorgia. To them, she is a patriot, committed to implementing economic reform to improve Italian lives. On the other hand, liberal newspapers are sharply critical of Meloni’s migration policies and xenophobic rhetoric. Left-leaning newspapers generally emphasize FDI’s connections to fascism, while conservative tabloids insist that Meloni has successfully distanced herself from fascism’s ugly past. In an ironically bipartisan manner, both sides are keen to use language of dishonesty to depict the opposition, to sow a distrust of the opposing party in the reader.
Over time, Meloni has transformed into an increasingly viable candidate for election. Despite being eclipsed by more magnetic personalities in 2018, by 2022 Meloni had gained voters and was undeniably a favorite for election. Il Fatto Quotidiano offers the compelling perspective that Meloni has become increasingly moderate since taking office; that the leader of FDI, having been elected as a far-right candidate, has since “ha scelto di stare al centro” (chosen to stay in the center). Indeed, her capacity to upset all sides of the political aisle has become a crucial point of common ground for the historically regionalized Italian media environment. As a result, Meloni has toned down her divisive rhetoric in an attempt to gain more widespread support, a trend that is likewise reflected in her international politics. Though these changes are only recent, it is likely that Meloni’s transition away from overtly partisan rhetoric will be accompanied by less derision from the press. Her continued survival in the Italian political ecosystem may depend on it.
Schuyler Daffey (CC ‘26) is majoring in English and political science. She is interested in international relations, EU politics, partisanship, and British literary history. She is also a staff writer for The Blue and White magazine and an iced coffee enthusiast.