Dawn Break: As Morning Rises on November 6 in Asia

The color guard, with the 16th Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Regimental Combat Team, stand in front of the formation rendering a salute as the national anthems for the US and Japan play during an opening ceremony for Operation Rising Thunder at the Yakima Training Center in Washington. Photo courtesy of Staff Sgt. Miriam Espinoza.

With less than two weeks to the 2024 US Presidential Election, a palpable sense of uncertainty and fear is gripping American allies across Asia. The prospect of a Trump victory on November 5 looms large, potentially leading to a rapid and catastrophic upheaval in policies that have been in place since the end of the Second World War and were further entrenched across the long arc of the Cold War. A Trump 2.0 presidency could usher in an administration that cedes much to the authoritarian regimes in the region—North Korea, Russia, and China—resulting in disarray within the historical American-led Asian security architectures stretching from India to South Korea and from Australia to Japan.

For the US’s Indo-Pacific allies, waking to the news of a Trump win will force these nations to aggressively and unilaterally remilitarize as the US’s six treaty alliances and long-standing strategic ambiguity policy with Taiwan is suddenly upended. In an interview with Bloomberg News on July 17, 2024, Trump said that Taiwan should pay the United States for its defensive capabilities, adding that the US was “no different than an insurance company” and that Taiwan “doesn’t give us anything.” His comments deviate sharply from current US policy, in which the United States makes available to Taiwan any defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to continue to maintain an adequate self-defense capability. Trump’s comments have led to increased concerns that Chinese President Xi Jinping may sense a window of opportunity under a second Trump administration to execute his long-desired goal of reunifying Taiwan under the banner of the Communist Party, by force, if necessary. Xi would feel unconstrained in his military tactics to achieve China’s central foreign policy objectives across the region, significantly accelerating the timeline of his “China Dream,” a nationalist vision that aims to project Beijing’s dominance across the entire region.

Daybreak on November 6 could manifest Asia’s worst nightmare: a fractured US foreign security picture colliding with the myriad of nations that will resist China’s efforts to establish military dominance and sovereignty across the entire Indo-Pacific theater. Such conditions will lead to the most well-developed nations, such as Japan and South Korea, expanding their naval and military capabilities to fill the void left by a retreating Washington in the wake of a potential Trump victory. For Beijing, with the memory of Japan’s imperial crimes still in the tortured memory of its elderly and younger citizenry steeped in increasingly nationalistic fervor, an assertive Japan countering China would fuel as dangerous an environment as any national security official could envision.

Trump’s recent comments on Taiwan have also contradicted statements made by members of his inner circle, such as Frederick Fleitz, a former chief of staff of Trump’s National Security Council, who, following a meeting with Japanese national security advisors, stated, “I reassured them that the alliance will be strong, that Trump recognizes we have to work closely with our allies to defend their interests.” This continuing uncertainty over whether a second Trump administration will support Indo-Pacific allies, including on the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty, has only heightened doubts regarding Trump’s commitment to treaties with regional partners like South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. 

As the Republican Party continues to edge toward a more isolationist foreign policy position, it increasingly falls far more in line with the previous Trump administration’s actions and comments. For Japan, in particular, concerns over what a lessened US presence in the South China Sea and South East Asian regions could mean has already led to increased talks around reinstating military conscription in the country, which would be a massive reversal from Japan’s peace-oriented and defensive military strategy following the Second World War. In fact, Japan has already begun turning away from its self-defense-only principle. In 2023, its Cabinet approved a 16% increase in military spending and relaxed its post-WW2 ban on lethal weapons exports. This shift indicates that as China continues to pressure Taiwan and increase its naval presence in the region, other Asian nations have already begun to ramp up their military capabilities, a trend that a Trump win could exacerbate.

The potential erosion of diplomatic ties between Washington and its Asian allies under another Trump administration could very well light a match on the powder keg that is Southeast Asia. The already-tense environment has encouraged countries like Japan and the Philippines to begin conducting joint military exercises in the South China Sea. Additionally, other nations such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea—all of which have previously resisted China's effort to establish its military dominance in the region, have ramped up their military efforts. China may view these military escalations as a threat to Xi’s current “China Dream” plan, which could, in turn, lead to China accelerating its foreign policy objectives across the region in an attempt to achieve military dominance in the South China Sea region.

While Beijing publicly decries American military deployments in the region, the US military’s behavior seems ignorant of the emotional and historical weight that would come with renewed Japanese militarism. As much as China opposes the US’s “hegemonic behavior,” such tensions are likely preferable over ones with Japan that would reanimate the overtones of mass killings in Nanjing and medical experiments in Manchuria. Emotion would be introduced into China’s national security equations, something that, even after 80 years, still burns for those who suffered under Imperial Japan.

The negative impact of a diminished US presence in Asia under a second Trump administration remains a prominent fear for many of America’s Asian allies. While the first Trump administration might have been an outlier in American foreign policy, a potential second administration could represent a grim reality for South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and Australia. When the Asian Pacific region awakes on November 6, it has the potential to be a very different place, one marked by increased militarization by nations such as Japan and Taiwan, increased tensions between China and the rest of the continent, and a withdrawal of US support and influence in the region that has the potential to result in direct military action between an emboldened North Korea, Russia, China, and their neighbors, now unmoored to their once steadfast US ally.

Caitlin B. Anderson (GS ’25) is a staff writer at CPR studying political science and Middle Eastern and European Languages and Culture through Columbia University and Trinity College Dublin’s Dual BA program.