America is Starving Afghanistan: Why U.S. Sanctions on the Taliban are Dangerous and Ineffective

Photo by Postcross.

For many Afghans, the gradual arrival of the winter season begets a terrifying crisis: with temperatures recorded in January 2023 falling as low as -29.2 degrees Fahrenheit—the coldest in over a decade—the country’s economic collapse has rendered a staggering number of families unable to afford coal critical to warming their homes.

Following the United States’ unceremonious military withdrawal and the Taliban’s subsequent seizure of power, a litany of sanctions that explicitly prohibit transactions with the Taliban have stunted Afghanistan’s economic development. As long as the group continues to maintain its position as Afghanistan’s primary governing body, the country as a whole will bear the brunt of these measures. As a result, it remains abundantly clear: U.S. sanctions have done more to worsen the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan than to exert pressure on the Taliban regime.

The Trump and Biden Administrations have both approached negotiations with the Taliban under the flawed assumption that the organization maintains any substantial capacity to be influenced in altering its policies under economic pressure. Indeed, the primary argument made by proponents of U.S. sanctions on the Taliban is that such measures are Western nations’ last reliable method of exerting diplomatic pressure on the group. However, in reality, the Taliban has remained resolute in refusing to comply with international demands. 

Flimsy promises of peace talks with the Afghan government in 2019 fell through shortly after Biden’s unconditional military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. After the group seized power, its unabated violation of human rights guaranteed a continuation of sanctions despite the futility of prior threats to do so. As the Taliban has prominently funded itself through illicit means including drug trafficking and extortion, prospects of sanctions within the legal market maintaining any significant persuasive power over the group are unlikely. Instead, Afghan civilians are the primary victims of the U.S.’ decision to freeze over seven billion dollars in public assets, decimating the economy’s capacity to import critical resources like food and medicine or fund necessary infrastructure.

Furthermore, the U.S.’ refusal to recognize the Taliban as a legitimate governing body informs its economic measures against the group. The Biden Administration initially assumed it could ensure the Afghan central bank’s independent operation from the Taliban, therefore isolating the harms of punitive sanctions. This fell through quite quickly, however, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports that the U.S.’ consequent targeting of the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) has rendered it “unable to supply adequate liquidity to banks because of the inability to print money,” which has crippled banking operations for firms and customers alike and all but halted lending. 

Additionally, fears of violating international sanctions with the Taliban have spurred foreign banks to observe regulations with an attitude of overcompliance, frequently going so far as to block any and all payment instructions involving Afghanistan. As one could imagine, the severe instability of Afghanistan’s financial system has been particularly catastrophic for the microfinance sector, with the UNDP reporting that the quantity of institutions providing funding for small family businesses has been nearly halved, pushing over two-thirds of the population into abject poverty. With its capacities for production severely hampered by a fragmented banking and financial sector, sanctions force Afghanistan to remain primarily reliant on humanitarian aid, which is also severely hindered by international restrictions on the transfer of money into the country. 

The impending loss of human life alone should provide more than enough incentive for the U.S. to lift its sanctions on the Afghan people. However, it should also be noted that financial ostracization is pushing Afghanistan into economically disadvantageous trade relations with China. In 2023, the Taliban signed a deal allowing the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to extract oil from the Amu Darya basin, which has been estimated to contain over 87 billion gallons of crude oil. While this deal will provide Afghanistan with critical economic relief, the CNPC’s refusal to comply with auditing and procurement regulations had led the prior Western-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to reject past projects with the company. The CNPC’s exclusion of Afghan companies from the tendering process also generates concern that the deal may set a dangerous precedent of exploitation, which could hinder future prospects for Afghanistan to develop its own export sector. A deepening Afghan reliance on Chinese investment would lead to the Taliban’s continued funding regardless of Western sanctions, seriously stunting Afghanistan’s long-term growth and giving rise to concerns that China’s increasing influence within Middle Eastern economies will threaten the U.S’ long-term predominance within the region.

As the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan exists partially as a result of over three decades’ worth of self-serving foreign policy, the U.S. has an undeniable responsibility to improve current circumstances for the Afghan people. Removing the sanctions starving Afghanistan requires little, if any expense to the American government. It is a simple solution to a catastrophic problem, and for every additional moment that the U.S. refuses to lift its sanctions, it directly contributes to the suffering of Afghan families in abject poverty.

Tazia Mohammad (CC ’27) is a staff writer at CPR majoring in economics and political science.