Ethiopia’s Nile Dispute Runs Deeper than Physical Resources
Sand dunes along the Nile River, Egypt. Photo by Alchemica.
Even centuries before the visible impacts of the ongoing climate crisis, Egypt and Ethiopia have long disputed issues surrounding the Nile. As a result of Egypt's near total dependence on water from outside its own borders, the Nile is viewed as critical to Egypt’s national security. Ethiopia, which supplies over 85 percent of the water that flows into the Nile, argues that it has the right to utilize the natural resources of the Nile to address the nation’s widespread poverty. Meanwhile, Egypt has used its political allies and colonial-era agreements to prevent other countries from constructing major infrastructure projects on the river, including Ethiopia. Specifically, Egypt has utilized the 1959 Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and Sudan as the legal framework for allocating the Nile’s waters, but Ethiopia and other upstream riparian neighbor states disagree. The 1959 agreement allocated all the Nile River’s waters to Egypt and Sudan but afforded no water to Ethiopia or other upstream riparian states despite these states being the primary sources of the Nile’s water supply and installed Egypt with veto power over future Nile River projects.
Now more than ever, the region bears the brunt of the effects of the climate crisis, which has forced these states to continue to compete for water, food, and energy. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a non-consumptive hydropower project under construction by Ethiopia on the Nile, has further complicated the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia. Ethiopia frames the GERD project as integral to its country’s functioning and a valuable investment in its economic future. The project offers Ethiopia an opportunity to pull millions of its citizens out of poverty by making the nation a major power exporter. Ethiopian officials state that the GERD will benefit countries in the region beyond Ethiopia as a source of affordable electric power and by managing the Nile to mitigate droughts and provide water salinity.
Meanwhile, as Ethiopia's downstream neighbor, Egypt argues that the GERD will threaten Egypt’s very existence, claiming that the project endangers the Egyptian agricultural industry and the nation's freshwater supply, as the waterway provides nearly all Egyptians with drinking water. Notably, the dam will not decrease water flow to Egypt in the long term, but it does decrease flow during the time it takes to fill the reservoir, which is currently underway. A 2021 University of Southern California study examined various dam-filling scenarios and water shortage impacts for Egypt and found that—using short-term filling strategies of three to five years favored by Ethiopia—the water deficit in Egypt could nearly double with 83 percent of the water loss stemming from the dam restraining flow and evaporation while 17 percent will be lost due to seepage into sedimentation.
Thus, Egyptians are feeling the negative effects of the GERD project, but more may appear depending on how the project’s design pans out when construction is finalized. Aside from the negative consequences of dam construction, the United Nations estimates that Egypt will be considered water-scarce by 2025. However, the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is about much more than physical resources; it is about cultural and national identity, crucial factors as both countries navigate climate change solutions.
In particular, the dam’s threat to Nile use would redefine Egypt's national identity—a rich history and cultural identity not only centered on but synonymous with the Nile River. This national identity is based on the belief that since the ancient Egyptians adopted the Nile River, it now exclusively belongs to Egypt. At the same time, though, the dam project has immense significance for Ethiopia—the Carnegie Endowment for National Peace argues that for Ethiopia, the GERD symbolizes "unity in the face of poverty and perceived backwardness." The Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Demeke Mekonnen, stated that the GERD is a matter of ensuring sovereignty. Becoming a major power exporter would provide needed energy to the nation and redefine its economic power by reducing abject poverty and advancing lucrative external relations.
The GERD is also helping rebrand the Nile—and Ethiopian national identity, for that matter—to Ethiopians. Historically, the Nile has harbored negative connotations; now, its image is changing from a river often viewed as a curse that stole Ethiopa’s natural resources to a force for Ethiopian development. With the GERD at its core, the river is being used to unify a new Ethiopian identity centered around industrialization.
Moreover, it would be remiss to omit the impact of the clashing attempts to "Africanize" and "Arabize" the Nile in this conflict. Ethiopia frames the dam as an African project because the river is shared by 11 African countries, with many hoping the GERD will support Africa's green transition as a continent. Conversely, Egypt views these developments as threatening Arab water security. Contestation over the GERD is not merely about the security of resources but also a conflict between Egypt's ancient identity and Ethiopia's new national identity centered on the Nile.
After a near decade of failed talks, Ethiopia and Egypt said last month that they aim to finalize an agreement over the GERD by winter of this year. The joint statement on “expedited negotiations” was issued by Ethiopia’s government after Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, discussed the dam with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi on the sidelines of a regional meeting about the conflict in Sudan, who is also a third party to the talks. It was not described as a legally binding agreement, which both Egypt and Sudan pushed for in the past, and does not mention whether it will be under the mediation of the African Union, as preferred by Ethiopia. However, it still marks a breakthrough in negotiations on the topic.
By constructing the GERD, Ethiopians feel they are finally getting a fair share of the natural resources. Yet Egyptians have a rational fear of the Nile’s resources being exhausted by its neighbors, leaving its population thirsty. While a temporary solution may be in the works, it is clear that the battle for rights to the Nile will continue. Amongst the unpredictability of the drought-prone region, the two countries remain unclear on how future contention will be solved—including the amount of water Ethiopia will release downstream in case of a drought emergency in Egypt. Heatwaves that swept the Middle East and North Africa this July, causing widespread panic as wildfires ravaged the region's mountains and countrysides, are a reminder that climate change effects are only worsening; to effectively combat them, we must consider cultural and national identity in our approach. As climate change continues to make many countries drier, we will likely see similar issues arise in the near future.
Further, negotiations must shift to a new operation with an understanding that the GERD is not going away. Overcoming identity-based divides could create a new opportunity to revolutionize clean energy and industry with a partnership between the two nations, inspiring other countries in the process. Ethiopia should increase its responsiveness to Egypt's need for vital water supply assurance, and Egypt should consider the benefits of the GERD in the region for both Arab and African countries—including mitigating floods while investing in optimizing its water use.
Rather than oppose development because it threatens Egypt’s monopoly on the water, Egypt must understand how efficiently using the Nile’s resources will better equip the region against climate change and external threats that severe drought could make them vulnerable to. Achieving a deal between the two states based on a scientific and less political approach could ultimately empower the infrastructures and economies of both nations to build valuable defenses against climate change. With a time-sensitive issue such as climate change, countries—inside and outside the region—must focus on collaboration that benefits all parties involved and acknowledge that achieving joint goals is in the national interest rather than slowing progress due to power cravings.
Colette Yamashita Holcomb (GS ‘26) is a second-year student in the dual degree program with Sciences Po, studying political humanities and human rights. When not writing for CPR, she enjoys overpriced chai lattes, scouting additions to her overflowing tote bag collection, and reading books of all kinds.