Too Little Too Late: President Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy Leading Up to Turkey’s Consequential Presidential Elections

A man votes in the 2019 local elections in Turkey. There were numerous electoral fraud allegations during the election, despite Parliament (Büyük Millet Meclisi) overseeing the election results. Photo by Sandro Weltin.

Not only will 2023 mark Turkey’s 100th anniversary as a republic, but it stands to become the year that the country’s power structure might drastically change. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), has been in power since 2003. Efforts to oppose Erdoğan’s regime, which has become increasingly autocratic, have been widespread, begging the question: what could finally oust him from power? With worsening domestic economic conditions dominating the Turkish electorate’s preferences, Erdoğan’s attempts to strengthen foreign policy will be insufficient to secure the win in the presidential and parliamentary elections of May 14, 2023.

No single political party has been strong enough to oppose Ergoğan’s rule since it began in 2003 as Istanbul’s mayor, prime minister, and later president after amending the constitution to a presidential system in 2014. To maintain his power, Erdoğan used his control of the judiciary to prohibit Istanbul’s Republican People's Party (CHP) mayor, Ekrem Imamoğlu, from running for political office after reports of allegedly insulting the Supreme Election Council surfaced in December 2022. Moreover, Erdoğan is not above using corruption and ballot stuffing to ensure his electoral success. Evidence that he has utilized corrupt electoral practices has existed for years, like during the 2017 referendum that changed Turkish politics from the parliamentary to a presidential system. However, it should be noted that despite fraudulent efforts, including a recount, Imamoğlu was able to win the 2019 mayoral elections, demonstrating the feasibility of power transitions in Turkey.

Indeed, a six-party coalition known as the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı) might just have a running chance to win. The coalition first started organizing in 2021 and includes the Republican People’s Party (CHP) as the main opposition party. They named Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the head of the CHP, as their official candidate on March 6, 2023. Although past instances of fraudulent election practices make large-scale predictions difficult, Erdoğan is currently trailing behind Kılıçdaroğlu’s national approval ratings with 44.4% compared to Kılıçdaroğlu’s 55.6%. More conservative estimates posit that Kılıçdaroğlu has a 2.6% advantage, which might result in a runoff election between the two frontrunners on May 28.

Despite Erdoğan’s repeated autocratic attempts to remain in power, his low approval ratings can be attributed to Turkey’s economic situation and insufficient governmental response to the February 2023 earthquakes. It is these issues that pose the greatest barriers to his success in the fast approaching election.

Turkey’s economic stagnation is a significant cause of concern among voters. As of October 2022, the official annual inflation rate was 85.51%, the highest recorded in the country since the turn of the century. Since then, the rate has officially fallen to 55.18%. However, Turkish citizens remain concerned with economic policy. A poll in August 2022 by Türkiye Raporu disclosed that 53% of the population thought the state of the economy was “very bad” or “bad.” Erdoğan’s monetary policy, whereby he relies on foreign debt while lacking USD reserves and refuses to increase the interest rate, is one of the key reasons for a decline in his approval rating.

Adding fuel to fire, domestic disillusionment with the national government has increased ever since February 6, 2023, when a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Turkey and Syria. To date, the estimated death count has surpassed 46,000 people in both countries. Crucially, the devastating death toll has been attributed to insufficient regulation of building codes along the earthquake fault line. Erdoğan has tried to regain a facade of control over the government by encouraging nationalist sentiment and shifting blame towards individual contracting companies. However, the public is not as convinced as President Erdoğan has not taken responsibility for his role in insufficient earthquake response and lacking regulation of building code violations. Public discontent with governmental action—or accurately, inaction—significantly threatens the integrity of Erdoğan’s presidency, a position he has held and fortified ever since gaining power in 2002.

Against the backdrop of these troublesome domestic conditions, Erdoğan sees a shift towards foreign policy as an opportunity to strengthen his domestic voter base, increase his approval ratings, and distract voters from his failing economic platform. As such, there are two main foreign policy motivations that he is currently expanding: normalizing relations with geopolitical neighbors to strengthen his power and nationalist image and economic development in the pursuit of international prestige. Through such actions, Erdoğan is hoping to cast Turkey as a “strong man” in the global arena.

Foreign policy remains one of Erdoğan’s largest “successes,” as a poll revealed it to have the second highest success rate among all government policies in public opinion. This is, in part, because he has adopted a doctrine of “zero problems with neighbors,” aiming to fortify Turkey as a strong, regional power in the Middle East. These motivations are further reflected in his economic deals with Middle Eastern countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, due to Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, the doctrine has quickly become zero neighbors without problems. Turkey’s direct military involvement in 2011 marked a turning point in deteriorating relations with Syria. Erdoğan’s policy in Syria was deemed the country’s worst foreign policy mistake by journalist Uğur Dündar. Although this is an international issue, addressing the official 3.6 million Syrian refugees is one of the top policy concerns among Turkish voters, especially given how Erdoğan’s conservative supporters favor the refugees leaving the country altogether as a means of strengthening the conservative party’s nationalist leanings. Resolving the Syrian refugee crisis perpetuated by Erdoğan’s foreign policy failures is paramount to addressing his faltering voter base.

Economic troubles are even more pressing, especially with a domestic economic crisis already underway. One solution Erdoğan has implemented is strengthening economic relationships with other Middle Eastern countries. Evidence of this includes the Economic Partnership Agreements, bilateral trade agreements between Turkey and the UAE that have been active since May 2022. Erdoğan has additionally negotiated currency swaps with the UAE, China, Qatar, and South Korea, raking in $28 billion to increase the strength of Turkey’s central bank. Erdoğan is vying to secure a similar deal with Saudi Arabia. These swaps are directly related to the recent depreciation of the Turkish lira. By replenishing the central bank’s supply of foreign currency reserves, Erdoğan hopes to mitigate inflation without raising interest rates. However, his policy threatens to further tie Turkey into the very cycle of borrowing that contributed to the economic crisis in the first place. Despite this threat, Erdoğan is hoping that economically motivated deals such as these will help restore Turkey’s economy before this year’s election. 

Another key dimension of Erdoğan’s foreign policy is Turkey’s opportunistic usage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine to adopt a mediating role between the two countries. Although Turkey has publicly condemned Russia’s actions and actively supplies Ukraine with weapons, it has still maintained relations with Russia to access its oil exports. Following the success of the Turkish-led negotiations that opened Ukraine’s grain exports internationally, Erdoğan nevertheless stated that “we confirmed again Turkey’s key role in solving global problems.” While seemingly paradoxical, such words are part of a larger strategy. Erdoğan is attempting to position himself as a leader in peace negotiations, all the while retaining economic ties crucial for Turkey’s well-being. This exemplifies Erdoğan’s desire to establish himself as a strong and powerful yet moral actor in the world order.

It is important to note how Erdoğan has not only aimed to strengthen Turkey’s foreign policy, but also attached such diplomatic success to his persona, such as presenting himself as the self-appointed champion of developing countries. This can be seen in his 2013 slogan “the world is bigger than five,” referring to the five permanent members of the Security Council. The illusion of international strength has increased Erdoğan’s support among his domestic base, which consists primarily of historically peripheral and conservative communities like Islamists and conservatives. Erdoğan relies on the importance of such groups, as shown by his increased use of nationalistic language to appeal to a nationalist voter base.

Opposition forces have a different interpretation of his rhetoric. They are not as optimistic as to the international position of Turkey. Erdoğan Toprak, a member of Parliament in the CHP, declared that “the government is using foreign policy as material to cover up the economic disaster it has dragged the country into, telling tales of ‘diplomatic victory’ at home.” The opposition’s efforts to highlight and criticize Erdoğan’s manipulation of foreign policy may further impede the President’s electoral success. 

The AKP officially asserts that foreign policy still plays an essential role: “Voters are aware of the benefits of diplomacy. At times they will complain about the economy or refugees, but they will vote for Erdoğan for the continuation of an effective Turkey.” Yet, opinion polls tell a different story. In February 2022, Türkiye Raporu found that 33.1% of respondents supported Erdoğan’s AKP. However, when the same question was asked four months later in June, support for Erdoğan’s AKP was at 29.8%, with the CHP in second place at 29.5%. Such a sharp decline in approval ratings demonstrates the failure of Erdoğan’s current policies in appealing to his constituents. This supports the view that, although foreign policy’s domestic implications are important—especially given a rise in nationalist language and a refugee crisis at the border with Syria—they are not as central to electoral turnout as AKP officials make them out to be.

After years of public discontent and opposition, the perfect conditions for Erdoğan’s departure from power are prominent. Despite his efforts to hone in on foreign policy advances, these will ultimately be insufficient to appeal to a wider voter base. Although Erdoğan’s ability—and desire—to use corrupt practices to secure an election cannot be undermined, the presidency is less secure than ever. The Nation Alliance must capitalize on this electoral opportunity.

Ada Baser (GS ‘24) is a Staff Writer for CPR studying political science. Her main interests include U.S.-Middle Eastern relations, water governance, and transitional justice.