Shutdowns and Blackouts: An International Failure to a Post-Coup Sudan
Former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and French President Emmanuel Macron. Hamdok’s engagement with the international community during the democratic transition after the 2019 coup earned him widespread recognition for his efforts. Photo by Laurent Blevennec.
On October 25th of last year, protesters across Sudan were met with an unwelcome greeting by the government: total internet blackout. But on the anniversary of the violent military coup that displaced former Sudanese transition government leader Abdalla Hamdok, the government’s response was all-too familiar.
Today, the international community is holding its breath for the country. Sudan is facing severe food shortages amplified by the climate crisis, and a strain in the wheat market exacerbated by the war in Ukraine—substantially decreasing the nation’s economic activity. And while many grassroots protest movements (predominantly populated by students) have seen marginal progress in mounting strength against the state and the new-found military government, the new government has dismantled most of the resistance. Under the helm of military general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the signal sent by the government remains the same: stand down, or be ready for stun grenades and tear gas. Though the Sudanese people have fought off internet shutdowns and sweeping political repression by the coup government for almost a year and half, they have largely been met with silence and complacency from the international community.
Sudan has been embroiled in civil conflict ever since the 2019 coup that displaced former dictator Omar al-Bashir, a staunch human rights violator who committed a host of mass atrocities and ethnic cleansings against the Darfuri people across the Darfur region of the country. Most notably in October of 2021, the people’s renewed hope for Hamdok, a former Deputy Executive Secretary to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and women’s political rights advocate, as a democratic beacon was left in shambles after al-Burhan, once a general under Hamdok himself, initiated his own military coup against the leader. Al-Burhan has since committed to a mass-policy of jailing and persecuting political dissidents and human rights advocates across the country.
Though al-Burhan’s military takeover was backed by pro-military civilian groups, many of those groups have since reversed course on their approval of his government and cabinet. Between January and October of 2022 alone, nearly 380 civilians had been killed from interspersed conflict between Arab and non-Arab groups across the country, facilitated by a disorganized and brutal military response. Most alarming is the reignition of conflict in Darfur, which was already struggling to find peace after al-Bashir’s earlier campaign of violence in the region.
Moreover, the international community’s response to the conflict has been profoundly complicated by a renewed Russia-Saudi-UAE-Egypt bloc emboldening al-Burhan’s autocratic response to the uprisings. Russia in its own right has viewed the larger Sahel region, a segment of North Africa bounded by the Sahara to the north, with an eager eye as a potential site for military influence. It has continued its pursuit of engaging in a policy of unconditional military aid, in strong contrast to the U.S.’ policy of democratically-conditioned aid.
For Saudi Arabia and its allies, who sent three billion dollars in aid to the government after the 2019 fallout, the coup government is substantially more advantageous than a democratic one.They were particularly important in shaping the aftermath of the 2019 coup, as foreign investment from Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided leeway for the military-backed government to resist calls for a civilian-led government. The pivot to the Sahel is likely indicative of a larger exploitation of power vacuums in the region – all the while the U.S. and its allies are absorbed in other geopolitical conflicts, perhaps most obviously in Ukraine.
It’s unlikely that a policy of humanitarian aid is likely to compete with either Moscow or Riyadh’s allies, and yet that somehow still remains Washington’s strategy today. That’s why a stronger response to the crisis can’t simply come from aid package after aid package—rather, it must target the root of the Sudanese government’s stronghold. And central to this stronghold is al-Burhan’s aggressive policy of information blackout.
The government’s repeated tactic of silencing protestors through internet crackdowns has not only suppressed communication about protests and potential human rights abuses, but has also served to create an opaque curtain preventing the rest of the world from active engagement in the crisis. And for Sudan, the situation is likely not to improve without a substantial rethinking of the broader international community’s response.
While the country is already bearing the brunt of an autocratic regime and a substantial humanitarian toll, a new frontier for disaster threatens the region even further: a climate catastrophe. A report by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicates that, unless Sudan is able to develop climate policies to combat food insecurity and natural resource mismanagement, the reality for citizens in the country will likely only be exacerbated by the global climate crisis. Downturns in rainfall patterns and an increasing threat to food distribution will likely have a tremendous impact on food insecurity in the country. Combine that with a larger risk for natural disaster damage and the unique threats posed to women and other marginalized communities in the region, and Sudan is headed down a difficult path. And in a country where rising sea levels and natural disasters will likely leave the region uninhabitable by 2060, stronger climate strategies must be a part of the humanitarian strategy.
A climate disaster does not just have implications for the environment, but will likely make it substantially more difficult to form a united political resistance. As an aptly named UN Human Rights Watch article demonstrates, “For Sudan, Hope Isn’t a strategy.” Rather, real and tangible progress must be made to fight for what some might argue is some of the last remaining bastions of hope for the country.
As newspapers, foreign journalists, and national and international media continue to remain silent as the conflict brews, it is becoming more evident than ever before that a new strategy must be undertaken to successfully challenge the military government and its continued abuses against the Sudanese people. As the Council on Foreign Relations writes, “There is no papering over the chasm between civilians’ vision of the Sudanese state and the model preferred by those currently controlling it.”
Sudan will only be able to combat its growing security and climate risks with the aid of a sweeping international response that does not simply provide a short-term solution, but confronts and pressures al-Burhan’s government in the long-term and re-democratizes the spread of critical information in the country.
Shiva Yeshlur (CC ‘26) is a Staff Writer at CPR studying Mathematics.