Adapting to the Information Environment: Why U.S. Internet Freedom Policy Should Promote the Use of Telegram in Russia
In 2010, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked that “the spread of information networks [was] forming a new nervous system for our planet.” These technological advances, she reminded her audience, were not an “unmitigated blessing,” but a tool that could be misappropriated to “undermine human progress and political rights.” Clinton’s proposed solution to these issues was internet freedom: the extension of the free web to citizens living under oppressive governments.
Although Clinton’s State Department tenure concluded in 2013, her goal of global internet freedom guides U.S. foreign policy to this day. In May 2022, the State Department announced a new fund for the international dissemination of anti-censorship technology, as well as an initiative to prevent the misuse of technology by authoritarian governments. Unfortunately, these policies represent a well-intentioned yet misguided attempt at democratic progress and a fundamental misunderstanding of the information environment in many adversarial states.
Traditionally, U.S. internet freedom policy has focused on information access and public media production (in other words, one’s right to freely consume and share information online). On several occasions, “information access” has meant throwing diplomatic weight behind American companies under pressure from foreign governments to compromise users’ information or to censor dialogue. For example, in 2010 Secretary Clinton supported Google’s refusal to censor Chinese users’ search results after Chinese hackers compromised the Gmail accounts of numerous activists and U.S. officials. In addition, the State Department has made a consistent effort to identify and to denounce foreign propaganda. Although these policies bring significant international attention to the issues of disinformation and information access, they overstate the importance of traditional news sources and neglect the critical role of secure messaging platforms.
The issue of internet freedom is especially pertinent to the current situation in Russia for multiple reasons. Most obviously, the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the potential of fake news to incite violence. In February 2022, Putin justified his invasion of Ukraine with accusations of a genocide against ethnic Russians in Ukraine, claiming Russian troops were on a mission to "denazify" Ukraine. It goes without saying that these claims were false, but a series of draconian internet regulations made it difficult for Russian citizens to access alternative sources of information.
The second reason why internet freedom is of critical importance in Russia is because it provides an opportunity to shake the foundation of Putin’s power. Since becoming president in 2000, Putin has presented himself as a guarantor of order; yield to him and he provides security, comfort, and stability. The most significant uprisings during Putin’s time in power have occurred when his regime failed to uphold its end of the unofficial social contract (that is, the government curtailed citizens’ rights without providing the necessary stability). Given the ongoing situation in Russia, internet freedom will help citizens come to terms with the disconnect between the Kremlin’s messaging and the reality on the ground. Even if a wide-scale reckoning occurs yet does not result in concrete political change, it has the potential to divert significant government resources from the war effort.
To effectively support civil resistance within Russia, the State Department must focus on facilitating private dialogue amongst citizens, rather than on information access. Firstly, most Russians get their news via state television channels (in recent years, independent news outlets attracted a sizable readership, but these outlets’ official sites have been blocked since March 2022). This means the state exercises near total control over traditional media, and that directly accessing international news sources is impossible—not to mention dangerous—for most citizens. In addition, the State Department should be careful not to promote certain sources too passionately, as it risks “tainting” them. As seen in the Post-Soviet Color Revolutions, the Kremlin has a habit of denouncing legitimate organizations as U.S. agents on a mission to undermine Russian sovereignty. To refrain from playing into Putin’s threat narrative, the State Department should actually maintain a certain distance between itself and any news outlets it seeks to support.
Second, the State Department should prioritize the promotion of secure messaging platforms because doing so is a long-term investment in Russia’s democratic health. Yes, information access is an area of concern, but more important is citizens’ ability to speak freely amongst themselves, to work through conflicting understandings of current events, and to organize on a local level. Enabling these earnest conversations will eventually make the government’s failure a “public fact,” causing the system to crumble organically (the collapse of the Soviet Union is an apt example of this phenomenon). In other words, the State Department should focus not on the immediate gratification of small internet access victories, but on the long-term strategic benefits of secure civil discourse.
Telegram, a messaging app founded in 2013 “with a focus on speed and security,” is the platform best suited to the challenges faced by Russian citizens. The app offers users multiple levels of security, including end-to-end encryption, self-destructing messages, and the option to hide one’s phone number. In addition, Telegram can sync messages across devices and allows users to send large files, such as documents or video (this is especially important for reporting human rights abuses). The app is organized via groups and channels, making it easy to share content with large audiences. However, there are four main factors differentiating Telegram from other instant messaging platforms.
First, Telegram offers end-to-end encryption, meaning messages cannot be read except on the devices involved. Second, Telegram has a history of denying the Kremlin access to users’ private information. Third, many opposition and international news outlets have an official presence on Telegram; this is currently one of the only ways for citizens to access accurate information. And finally, Telegram became Russia’s top messaging app in March 2022 and has been downloaded over 4 million times since the invasion of Ukraine. In short, the app is secure and offers users access to countless online communities and topical channels.
Critics have cited the use of Telegram for illicit activities such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The reality, though, is that it is impossible to prevent the app’s misuse without monitoring conversations between users, thus compromising the overall privacy of the platform (it is important to note that Telegram has removed public posts inciting violence). Other common concerns include the app’s end-to-end encryption, which is optional but not automatic. This issue, however, could be addressed via a simple educational campaign or clearer messaging by Telegram itself. Telegram is far from perfect, but its status as Russia’s top messaging app shows it has earned citizens’ trust during its years as a platform for human rights activism. Now, Telegram is supporting the dissemination of media from the war in Ukraine, enabling difficult conversations within Russia, and helping Ukrainian and Russian emmigrants communicate with loved ones.
In conclusion, Telegram is uniquely suited to support civil discourse in Russia’s closed media environment. Instead of focusing on free access to the traditional internet, the State Department should throw its weight behind Telegram and other secure messaging platforms on which Russians can read independent news and speak freely amongst themselves. To be specific, there is a need for clearer messaging regarding how users can further protect their personal information. Supporting Telegram—in addition to other forms of secure communication—will enable Russian citizens to have the difficult conversations necessary to come to terms with the atrocities in Ukraine, and to process the state media’s misrepresentation of the conflict.
Amelia Fay (CC’23) is a staff writer for CPR. She is a senior in Columbia College studying Comparative Literature and Russian.