To Induce a Sino-Russian Split, Support Ukraine
U.S. President Biden meets Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the former’s visit to Kyiv earlier this year. Photo taken by Adam Schultz.
On the morning of February 21, 1972, the world shook. As the morning mist cleared in Peking, the citizens of the world’s largest communist country woke up to the sight of Air Force One landing in their capital. President Richard Nixon, hitherto arguably America’s most fervent anti-communist politician, was on his way to meet Chairman Mao. Their meeting resulted in an alliance that would help end the Cold War in America’s favor.
Fifty years later, another plane was on its way to Beijing (renamed in 1979). On board was Vladimir Putin. Like Nixon, Putin sought to herald in a new alignment, only this time it would be directed at Washington, and this time it was Russia who would band together with China. In this endeavor, Putin succeeded, jointly declaring a “No limits” partnership with China’s President Xi. Three weeks later, Putin would declare war on Ukraine, and, in so doing, he declared a new Cold War.
Since Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the emerging Sino-Russian entente has troubled American strategists and politicians. Beijing and Moscow acting in unison potentially pose a dire threat against U.S. interests across multiple areas. As a result, many American commentators have wondered if replicating Nixon’s 1972 masterstroke is possible. After all, the current Sino-Russian alignment is a historical anomaly, as Moscow and Beijing have interests that directly clash. Pulling a “reverse-Nixon” by engaging in detente with Russia to balance against a stronger China, as some American pundits advocate, would be consistent with Washington’s national interest. In such an outline, America must give Putin something in return, and theoretically that something is Ukraine.
These pundits are correct when they note that pulling Russia out of China’s influence is in Washington’s best interest in the long term. But their way of going about this is dangerously flawed, and more likely to lead to the opposite result. As such, if America hopes to lay the foundations for a Sino-Soviet split, it ought to push Russia and China closer together in the short term by further aiding Ukraine. Doing so will lay the foundations for a long-term Sino-Russian split by allowing the internal contradictions within the Sino-Russian entente to be amplified.
The Bear and the Dragon
When Putin made his bet on Xi’s China, he made Russia China’s junior partner. Ten times smaller than China’s economy, Russia’s economic and political influence pales in comparison, as further illustrated by Moscow’s significant military failures in Ukraine, Western sanctions’ harm to the Russian economy, and the Prigozhin mutiny’s public demonstration of significant disagreements within Russia’s political leadership. History and politics suggest such an unequal alignment will breed resentment between the two nations.
Russia is, at its core, a civilizational power. Ingrained in Russian foreign policy elite thinking is a conception of Russian exceptionalism dating back to the Tsarist era of the Third Rome: a civilizational force destined for external expansion across its boundaries to eventually become one of the world’s preeminent powers—expansion that often took place at the expense of China. This conception of Russian interests persists despite Moscow’s repeated military failures in Ukraine, and remains a guiding ideological force for Russian foreign policy, taking the form of Russian hopes to dominate the nations of the former Soviet Union and within its wider periphery. Accordingly, Russian elites deem their nation worthy not of vassalage but of the title of superpower. Though Putin may be comfortable positioning his state as subordinate to Xi’s China to gain Ukraine and undermine U.S. power, the Russian nationalism he has set loose––and that both his successors and immediate circle embody––will not be comfortable permanently relegating the proud Russian state to second place within a Chinese-led international framework.
Russian exceptionalism notwithstanding, Russia and China have been pushed together by opposition to American hegemony––and by Putin and Xi’s personal interests in protecting each other’s authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the relationship has areas of substantial disagreement. Russian foreign policy elites view Chinese economic policies with deep suspicion in what they deem to be Russia’s traditional sphere of influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and they also have concerns about Chinese inroads in the Arctic. Moreover, the War in Ukraine has accelerated a trend of Chinese economic investment and movement of Chinese workers into the sparsely populated Russian Far East, amplifying the already stark economic inequalities between the two states and generating greater market share for Chinese enterprises in Russia. As a result, the renminbi has now become the most traded currency in the Russian stock exchange, something that surely troubles Russian nationalists who wish to see the ruble as a prominent currency of international trade. Amplifying these concerns is the fact that, though past border disputes between China and Russia have been resolved on paper, there are still Chinese nationalists who are pushing for Chinese expansion into Russian lands, as illustrated by China’s recent inclusion of Russian territory under purported Chinese historical control.
Putin’s successors are thus likely to be suspicious about economic and security disagreements with Beijing as the imbalance in the relationship intensifies. At the same time, though Xi evidently believes his partnership with Putin is worth the short-term costs to burnish his authoritarianism at home and facilitate competition with the U.S. abroad, the damage done to China’s reputation in Europe by supporting Putin is significant. Chinese strategists have been quick to point this out, so it is likewise not inconceivable that a future Chinese leader, favoring better ties with Europe, would attempt to distance China from the Kremlin, aggravating relations with Moscow. Consequently, the prospect of a future Sino-Russian split is not inconceivable, as Moscow and Beijing have many reasons to be distrustful of each other.
Theory Meets Reality
The existence of contradictions within the Sino-Russian partnership, however, does not necessarily mean they are exploitable in the short term. Contrary to what some realist scholars argue, a “reverse-Nixon” would be politically impossible in today’s international and domestic political climate. Not only are Putin and Xi too tied to each other to make such a politically fraught break in their relationship plausible without further undermining their internal image––especially given both autocrat’s considerable domestic problems––but the West, and especially Washington, is too politically committed to confrontation with Russia in the short-term to make such a policy proposal feasible. This becomes even more apparent when taking account of what those who advocate for a “reverse-Nixon” approach say Washington ought to give up to placate Moscow: Ukraine.
Ignored by some realist scholars is the fact that ending support to Ukraine in exchange for a new partnership with Moscow is not only politically impossible today but also contrary to U.S. interests. Washington has invested too much political, economic, and personal capital in ensuring Ukraine’s success. Ergo, suddenly turning around and backing Moscow’s claim would be impractical, not least because the domestic pushback on such a move would likely be bipartisan and severely chip at Biden’s image of foreign policy competence. Furthermore, after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, American allies remain weary of potential abandonment. Given all the resources the U.S. has expended on Ukraine so far, an about-face on Ukraine would thus be devastating to America’s international influence and image. Eastern European states would feel betrayed, Western European states would call into question U.S. leadership, and any potential or current U.S. ally would have to operate under the assumption that Washington will walk back commitments when given a potentially better deal. Hence rallying allies together against China would become more difficult, calls for nuclear proliferation would increase in South Korea, Japan, and potentially even in Europe, and Taiwanese leaders would come to doubt America’s staying power. None of these outcomes would benefit U.S. national interests vis a vis China.
More concerningly, a grand bargain with Moscow over Ukraine would likely produce the opposite results it intends to foster. Indeed, if Putin essentially gets what he wanted from Washington all along––a recognition of Moscow’s privileged influence over its bordering neighbors––by the threat or act of moving closer to Beijing, then by giving up Ukraine in exchange for a “partnership” against China, Washington has created a perverse incentive structure whereby Putin will continue inching towards Beijing to force concessions from the United States. To be sure, the Kremlin would henceforth operate under the assumption that, to get what it desires from America, it must simply tell Washington it will move towards China. Such a dynamic would be dangerous: by giving up Ukraine, Washington in all but name is incentivizing Moscow to play the China card permanently. There will inevitably be a point where what the Kremlin asks cannot be given up––like, for example, a withdrawal of NATO forces from Eastern Europe––so Russia would naturally move closer to China regardless unless the bluff is called. Accordingly, not only is giving up Ukraine to Putin politically impossible, but it will also likely push Russia closer to China. Ending aid to Ukraine to placate Putin, therefore, will fail at achieving the intended result.
Proper Incentives
How, then, can Washington engineer a Sino-Russian split? The answer lies in creating a proper incentive structure for Moscow’s leadership. To paraphrase Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis, to expect concessions to Moscow on Ukraine today to be reciprocated with Russian concessions on China is naive: Putin’s strategy will not change until the Kremlin has encountered a sufficiently long string of failures to convince his successors that Russia’s current alignment with Beijing will fail to advance its interests. Or, to borrow from George Kennan, Washington must embrace “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” to punish Russian alignment with China.
The aim, therefore, ought to be a demonstration to the Kremlin that a partnership with Beijing will not achieve Russia’s stated objectives. As such, an extended period of confrontation whereby U.S. actions make it impossible for Russia to further its interests will enable the aforementioned tensions in the unbalanced Sino-Russian partnership to fester, breeding resentment among the Russian elite. Then and only then will the internal contradictions within the alliance be ripe for exploitation, as the nationalist intelligentsia would come to see their nation become a vassal with nothing to show for it.
It is worth noting that there exists a historical precedent for such a strategy. During the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet partnership crafted by Mao’s “tilt” to the Soviets in 1949 created a threatening international environment for Washington. As a consequence, splitting up the two communist giants became a key national security goal for the United States dating back to the Truman administration. President Eisenhower’s policy for inducing a Sino-Soviet break in particular, however, serves as an ideal blueprint for today.
Eisenhower pursued a counterintuitive-sounding policy aimed at generating tensions between Moscow and Beijing by making China more dependent on the Soviet Union through dogged political and economic confrontation with, and containment of, Mao’s China. This policy helped create the conditions for Nixon’s visit. As Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, explained, “‘the best hope for intensifying the strain [between the Soviets and Mao]... would be to keep the Chinese under maximum pressure’” thus compelling “‘them to make more demands on the USSR which the latter would be unable to meet.’” In so doing, Eisenhower’s administration determined that the Soviets would come to resent China because of the high costs incurred through alignment with Beijing, and the low reward the aggressively revisionist––yet economically and politically weak––People’s Republic of China would produce. At the same time, by virtue of Washington’s policy of international isolation in response to China’s Soviet tilt, the highly nationalistic Chinese came to resent their dependence on the USSR and realized that alignment with Moscow failed to achieve their core security and economic interests. Accordingly, Eisenhower’s policy created a suitable environment for the internal combustion in the alliance to burst, helping Mao see that China’s goals were better served by tilting toward Washington.
Applying Dulles’ reasoning to contemporary events, to intensify the impact of the aforementioned areas of disagreement between Moscow and Beijing today, Washington ought to put Russia under maximum pressure. To be sure, by supporting Ukraine and maintaining the sanctions regime against the Kremlin––denying Russia success in its foreign policy objectives while making it more dependent on China by extension––Washington can lay the foundations for a future Russian leader to reconsider their nation’s position vis a vis China given the small benefits alignment with Beijing would produce. At the same time, by pushing a weaker Russia closer to China, Chinese leaders will come to realize that alignment with Moscow will fail to bring forth the desired dividends they expected, and that the partnership runs contrary to Chinese interests in Europe and Asia in the long-term. Consequently, through a policy of successful containment of Russia through continued aid to Ukraine’s war effort, Washington can create the conditions upon which a future Sino-Russian break will occur while also potentially restraining Russia’s worst impulses in the short term. It then becomes a matter of waiting for the chasms in the relationship to widen.
Continued aid to Ukraine, therefore, is not only morally but strategically sound. Of course, pushing Russia and China closer still carries risk, so Washington must be ready for any contingency and invest in its sources of material and political strength to see a strategy of competition with Moscow and Beijing to its ultimate conclusion. Additionally, though any future US-Russian rapprochement would depend on how the outcome of the war in Ukraine plays out on the battlefield, Putin’s war has driven Ukraine firmly in the liberal economic and political order. It is now on Washington and Brussels to avoid rigid frameworks on Ukraine that may make future rapprochement with Moscow more difficult. Regardless, rather than abandoning a nascent democracy in its fight for independence, Washington has a better chance of pulling off a “reverse-Nixon” by continuing to aid Kyiv’s efforts, as only through successive failures for the Kremlin while in alignment with Xi’s China will the conditions for a break manifest themselves.
Accordingly, American leaders today must avoid the temptation of quick fixes running counter to American values when approaching Ukraine and Russia and instead embrace patience. As George Kennan further noted, “The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States,” as Washington “needs only to measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation” over the long term to prevail. As such, just like the Soviet Union in 1947, the Sino-Russian partnership today has made American interests dependent on the whole nation “accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.” Whether America can continue to answer the call is still in question.
Lucas de Gamboa studies political science and is interested in international economics. He also likes to research national security, transatlantic relations, and Sino-U.S. relations.