Better as a Monolith?

People’s Republic of China President, Xi Jinping, holds a virtual meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Photo by the Presidential Executive Office of Russia. 

As Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner troops advanced on Moscow, Vladimir Putin was not the only autocrat reeling from the mercenary’s rebellion. China’s Xi Jinping, who is both politically and personally tied to Putin’s Russia, could not have been but deeply disturbed by the prospect of political instability in his most important ally. Though catastrophe in the Kremlin was averted by the last-minute intervention of Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko, the Wagner upheaval demonstrates that Xi made a bad bet on Putin when he declared a “no limits” partnership with the Kremlin. 

Xi’s folly, however, presents an opportunity to reign in Russian aggression. Prigozhin’s mutiny further suggests Russia is the junior partner in the Sino-Russian partnership, one likely to be more subservient to Beijing’s concerns than in the past when the relationship was not as one-sided. As such, to restrain Russian aggression, Washington ought to encourage Xi to forge a closer partnership with Putin’s Russia. 

Partners but not Equals

In any alignment between China and Russia, by default, Russia would be the junior partner. Russia’s economy is ten times smaller than China’s, and while Russia’s economic sphere of influence is concentrated and limited to hydrocarbons, Beijing’s diplomatic and political influence is greater than that of the Kremlin by virtue of China’s status as a global trade, technology, and manufacturing hub. Additionally, Russia’s trade with China represents roughly 20% of Russia’s total trade––the highest with any trading partner––while China’s trade with Russia accounts for merely 3% of its total trade. Of these, the bulk of Russian exports to China are hydrocarbons and resource inputs, while Chinese exports to Russia are diversified finished consumer goods, demonstrating a disparity in economic development. 

The war in Ukraine has accelerated this inequality. The West’s sanctions package left Russia with few economic partners other than China. Beijing has thus been able to drive a hard bargain in its economic relations with Moscow, obtaining generous prices on Russian hydrocarbons and encouraging cross-border trade done in renminbi, leading the yuan to be the most traded currency in the Russian stock exchange. Accordingly, the war in Ukraine will accelerate the trend of Chinese businesses gaining greater market share in Russia. Finally, by aiding Ukraine with military aid, the West has indirectly blunted Russian military might; given how China has become a military power in its own right and how Western export controls have hamstrung the Russian military-industrial complex, it is no surprise Moscow has also requested Chinese military assistance. 

Prigozhin’s mutiny will further this asymmetry. Indeed, after Wagner troops halted their advance on Moscow, the Kremlin was quick to contact and reassure Beijing, illustrating how important China has become for Russia’s political establishment. Crucially, with Putin’s grip on power weakened so publicly by Prigozhin, and with Putin’s influence abroad reduced by such a dramatic political setback, Xi could increasingly become a political lifeline for Putin’s regime, not just an economic one.  

Restraining the Bear

Russia’s increased dependence on China spells good news for Washington. Though Washington and Beijing have many areas of disagreement, as two highly globalized economies, they both have an interest in fostering stability in important regions. To be sure, like Washington, China would prefer to avoid instability in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe––areas home to substantial Chinese economic interests. As such, with the potential exception of Taiwan, Beijing’s opposition to Washington is more diplomatic and economic in nature, opting for less disruptive means by which to blunt American economic and political power that do not rely on excessive displays of force.

In contrast, by virtue of its less potent economic and soft power pull, Moscow’s power projection relies more on displays of disruptive hard power, such as military interventions in Syria and Georgia, the two invasions of Ukraine, and threats to cut off Europe from natural gas. An unrestrained Putin, therefore, will be more likely to engage in overt acts of disruption, actions that could reverberate on Chinese interests in Europe and the Middle East. In this regard, the closer the Sino-Russian entente is––and thus the more dependent Russia is on China––the more likely it is that Beijing will seek, and be able to, restrain the Kremlin. 

Circumstantial evidence of such a situation is already available, with Xi publicly rebuking Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. There are also signs of Chinese displeasure with Russia’s repeated threats to end the Black Sea Grain deal, with the Biden Administration hoping Beijing can get Putin to abide by the deal given the negative economic consequences Russia’s exit could have on China. Furthermore, China’s refusal to provide lethal aid to Moscow could also be a sign that Beijing hopes to reign in Russia for fear of having its wider interests harmed by further instability.   

Of particular note is that there exists a Cold War precedent suggesting a closer Sino-Russian partnership with a clearer hierarchy benefits Washington. As Columbia University Professor Thomas Christensen notes, unclear leadership within the Sino-Soviet alliance produced negative externalities for Washington during the Cold War. Indeed, early alliance coordination problems stemming from Stalin’s hope that Mao’s Communist China would be firmly subservient to his dictums––which at the time, Stalin was unsure of––led Kim Il Sung to play Moscow and Beijing off each other by appealing to Stalin’s sensibilities, helping lead to the Korean War. 

Furthermore, after the Sino-Soviet split––in which China became independent of Moscow’s influence––while the more globally-minded Soviet leadership during the 1960s sought better relations with Washington, Mao’s hope that China, and not the Soviet Union, would lead the international communist world led him to aggressively support global communist movements, most notably the efforts of North Vietnam. Fearing that its leadership in the communist world would be threatened by doing nothing, Moscow increased its support for North Vietnam, leading to a competition between the Soviets and China over who would better help the Vietnamese communists. As such, disputes between the Soviets and the Chinese catalyzed communist aggression against American interests in a way that would not have been possible had Moscow fully directed decision-making.  

Soviet concerns about Mao’s aggressive stance echo China’s current predicament. Russian actions in its near-abroad have an impact on China’s wider global interests, meaning China is not likely to benefit from further acts of Russian aggression. To be sure, beyond inducing economic instability in the vital European export market, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinvigorated the Western alliance and revitalized American leadership. The effects have been felt beyond Europe with U.S. treaty allies in Asia raising defense spending and deepening defense ties with Washington, all while America has accelerated efforts to compete with China. Moreover, Putin’s war has provided an impetus for the U.S. and its allies to “de-risk” and “re-shore” supply chains and manufacturing, potentially to China’s detriment. In addition, perceptions of collusion between China and Russia have harmed China’s standing in Europe and fostered greater transatlantic cohesion on China policy. All these efforts have complicated Chinese ambitions. In light of the many structural, demographic, and economic problems China already faces, the last thing Beijing needs is further Russian-induced confrontation with the West. 

As such, China will likely not favor future disruptive Russian actions that could further harm Beijing’s interests. This presents Washington with an opportunity to benefit from Xi’s blunder. As Napoleon Bonaparte declared, one should not interrupt an opponent when they are making a mistake. To heed this maxim, Washington ought to deny Xi the opportunity to use the Prigozhin affair as a pretext by which to distance himself from Putin and instead encourage a closer Sino-Russian embrace, both by further aiding Ukraine and intensifying the sanctions, as well as by tailoring American actions against China to produce a reaction on Beijing’s part that creates closer ties with Moscow. These could include further export controls on technology, joint U.S.-European sanctions against specific Chinese officials, and further arms sales to Taiwan.

Putin’s Russia will retain a degree of autonomy going forward on smaller matters, but on issues of vital importance for Moscow, the Sino-Russian partnership will serve as a restraining force on the Kremlin, not an empowering one. In this regard, Moscow and Beijing are better as a monolith. 

Lucas de Gamboa (CC’25) is a staff writer at the Columbia Political Review and studies political science and economics. He is interested in national security, transatlantic relations, and Sino-U.S. relations.