Another Death, Another (False) Victory: How the death of al-Quraishi is Hardly the End for ISIS
“Last night, operating on my orders, United States military forces successfully removed a major terrorist threat to the world.” This was the statement made by President Biden after Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, the head of ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), detonated a bomb that ended his life during an American raid in Northwestern Syria in the beginning of February. The raid, executed by American commanders, was hailed as an inevitable fatal blow to the Islamic State, and a statement to all terrorist organizations around the globe that the United States will never cease to wage the war on terror. The statement, however, failed to acknowledge that terrorist leaders, although significant to the organization of insurgent groups, are not central to the execution of terrorist acts.
The power of terrorism lies in its ability to radicalize individuals, adapt to a changing world, spread extremist ideologies, and carry out chaotic violence in an attempt to transform the global order. This purpose is not dependent on one individual, nor on a specific organizational structure. Decentralized terrorist groups, in fact, are just as violent and effective as those with a top-down structure: Boko Haram, a heavily fragmented Jihadist organization working in Niger, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad, has claimed 40,000 victims since it first became violent in 2009. The execution of highly organized operations on the behalf of terrorist groups has never been—and will never be—dependent on one individual or system. To claim that eliminating a terrorist organization’s head eliminates the threat would be to ignore the historical precedent that proves otherwise and advance a naive approach to the threat of terrorism.
Usama Bin Laden, arguably the most notorious terrorist figure of all time, was a target for more than 10 years before being killed by Navy Seals in Pakistan in 2011. Americans saw his death as the end of the war against al-Qaeda and the revenge they had sought since the traumatic events of September 11th, 2001. But the death of Bin Laden did not eradicate the organization as previously hoped; in fact, it reinvigorated hatred in the hearts and minds of members of the organization, driving up violence internationally. After the death of Usama bin Laden, 87 terrorist attacks took place in Pakistan, killing 451 individuals and injuring over 600 civilians. Conflict spurred by the death of Usama Bin Laden has bled into American foreign relations with Afghanistan ever since. Although the organization became a shadow of its former self, its power and strength remained long after the death of its leader. Bin Laden’s main deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, remains in power to this day. Regional relationships with other, smaller, terrorist organizations have made the threat much harder to track, with several organizational branches spreading throughout Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. This division among locals has allowed the group to maintain its strength in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and among other countries characterized by fragile political climates, despite the loss of several senior leaders. These new branches continue to associate with other terrorist groups and have taken credit for numerous attacks across the globe.
ISIS is a prominent example of an organization that, although momentarily impacted by the death of its organizational head, is adept at supporting the losses of individual members without upending the effectiveness of its power structure. Having lost over 95 percent of its territory by 2017, the assumption would have been that its power and execution would have severely degraded. However, ISIS has continued to carry out lethal and successful operations: the Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, in 2021, reported that “ISIS carried several complex attacks, suggesting a higher level of operational maturity.” In Syria, the group appeared to be consolidating in the desert and poised for increased activity in what the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) termed “the next stage of its insurgency.” Depending on its location, the group averages anywhere from 17 to 87 attacks a month. The decentralized methods of ISIS have done nothing to reduce its impact and capability to cause injuries, deaths, and the destabilizing of communities.
Although the death of ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi may cause a temporary power vacuum, the Islamic State behaves much like a corporation, with replacements and promotions all the same. Its strength lies in its diffusement—each individual branch has its own organizational methods and strategies, making the power vacuum less significant and impactful. The death might be a setback, but to think that the threat of ISIS has subsided would be to deliberately ignore the historical precedent of the organization. The Islamic State has endured the loss of many leaders, and ultimately, the threat to civilians in failed and destabilized states throughout Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia has remained.
However, it would also be flawed to ignore the strength of counter-insurgent and counter-terrorism units around the globe. Classic methods have been effective in decreasing resources, land, and creating temporary chaos: hundreds of lieutenants and adherents to both the Islamic State and al-Qaida have been captured or killed, and land and resources have been reclaimed. For the Biden administration, the strike against al-Qurayshi qualifies as a successful demonstration of its counter-terrorist ability. In fact, these traditional interventionist measures have eliminated many of the potential successors with whom ISIS could replace al-Qurayshi, causing a potential recruitment struggle that could weaken the organization.
ISIS might struggle to recover, but it is important to note that American counter-terrorist successes only provide temporary relief to a much larger and incomprehensible problem. In a world dead-set on eradicating their ideologies and military advantages, terrorist groups will continue to adapt and transform in order to survive. Whoever takes over ISIS will continue the fight towards a physical caliphate, resolute in their purpose and successful in their execution of attacks, whether Biden acknowledges it or not. Regardless of whether ISIS recovers, there will be other groups with similar origins and goals that will take its place: the Haqqani network, ISIS-K, and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin. The list goes on. Ultimately, American counter-terrorist efforts will continue to fall flat if the Biden administration generalizes and underestimates its foe.
Eve Muratore is a staff writer at CPR and junior (CC’23) studying political science and sociology. You can usually find her getting a “triple-S” sandwich from Milano’s, critiquing French restaurants, or having dance parties with her friends. She is from Seattle, Washington.