Qatar: Strong Will, Soft Power

The Challenge 2015 - Sculpture by Iraqi artist Ahmad Al Bahrani. (Lusail, Qatar).

Spontaneous cheer or calculated move? As the Saudi national team upset favorites Argentina at the ongoing FIFA World Cup, the camera panned to Sheikh Tamim, Qatar’s Emir, wearing a Saudi flag around his neck. Was it planned? Or was it a deliberate gesture characteristic of the young Emir and the State of Qatar’s ever-increasing political might?

A tiny arid peninsula on the coast of Saudi Arabia, Qatar’s geography should have made the country one of the world's poorest and least-visited, but it is seemingly always in the news. Immensely wealthy thanks to its gas reserves, the country is currently hosting the FIFA World Cup, becoming the smallest nation to host and beating its much larger Arab neighbors to become the first Middle Eastern nation to welcome the prestigious event.

But its neighbors see Qatar as the problem child of the Middle East. For almost half a decade, Saudi allies forced a total blockade of the tiny Emirate, restricting trade and canceling all flights. To understand why the Gulf shunned Qatar and how it recovered so quickly, one must understand the country's efforts to develop its soft power.

In international relations, “soft power” is an invasive means of gaining influence through sheer cultural and economic might. Qatar’s immense wealth has allowed it to work in both of these domains to give itself an outsized profile on the world stage. Its foreign diplomacy thus operates through several axes. On the cultural side, it owns Al-Jazeera: the forerunner in the wave of so-called “new media” outlets established in the Arab world during the early 90s and based in the Qatari capital of Doha. The network quickly expanded and became the de-facto Arab TV channel, with Western media such as CNN purchasing hours of Al-Jazeera footage to reuse in their reports, as the Qataris had better access to most conflict areas in the Middle East. Indeed, during Operation Desert Fox, Al-Jazeera was the only international news outlet to have journalists on Iraqi soil. Al-Jazeera radically transformed its media landscape through its signature sensationalistic style, inflammatory reports, and controversial opinions. Pundits called this the “Al-Jazeera effect.” The channel’s reach startled the traditional Sunni powerhouse, Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom launched its competing Al-Arabiya channel, which failed to earn as much traction as the Qatari giant. Embarrassingly, Al-Jazeera would not refrain from criticizing it and other Gulf states, particularly after the start of the Yemeni Civil War, where the Saudis committed atrocities against civilians while fighting against local Iranian proxies.

While it criticizes its immediate neighbors, Doha is not afraid to go looking for non-traditional allies. The Qataris are masters in non-alignment and try to be friends with everyone. While the Emirate hosts the largest US military base in the Gulf, it maintains remarkably close ties with neighboring Iran. But contrary to countries such as Oman, Qatar is much less discrete about its more notorious allies. The peninsula has long hosted the Taliban government in exile, playing a pivotal role in their mediation with the US leading up to their return to power in Afghanistan. The country is also closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, a group of Muslim ideological fundamentalists that has long interfered in Arab countries. The Brotherhood helped overthrow Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, with their leader Mohammad Morsi elected President before being himself overthrown in a military coup. Qatar has also been accused of sponsoring militant groups ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The country allegedly turned a blind eye to the activities of large NGOs based on Qatari soil, including its largest, “Qatar Charity,” that would in turn receive “donations” to be discreetly transferred to the militants.

The West often turns a blind eye to Qatar’s unsavory friendships, recognizing the precious opportunities for dialogue and de-escalation that this unique ally provides. Qatar seeks diplomatic ties with countries that its Gulf neighbors dislike: while Gulf monarchies criticize Turkey for interfering in Libya and Syria, prolonging conflicts in these countries, and compromising Arab interests, Qatar is a close Turkish ally.

Ideological differences and perceived bias against its Arab neighbors have made Qatar a polarizing actor in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Qatar’s economic might has kept its prestige growing. While poorer countries love its philanthropy, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s young leaders are locked in permanent competition with Doha. Tensions boiled over in 2017 when Saudi Arabia led a total blockade of Qatar, slapping the Emirate with 13 incompressible demands, chief of which were the shuttering of Al-Jazeera and the rupture of ties with ISIL, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other militant groups. The Saudis wanted Qatar to stop all diplomatic interference and get in line behind it, as most Gulf cooperation council states already did. But Qatar shunned all demands and endured a five-year embargo. During the blockade, it continued hosting talks between the West and adversaries of all sides and building the stadiums it needed for the upcoming World Cup. President Trump supported the blockade of Qatar during his time in office. Qatar resisted well and successfully lobbied the Biden Administration to help it break the deadlock. But on January 4th, 2021, before Biden took office, Kuwait announced it had jointly brokered a deal with the US to resolve the Gulf crisis. While this was framed as a sign of goodwill towards Qatar, talk emerged that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (MBS) allegedly made peace with Qatar as a gift to the Americans. Already in trouble over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, MBS was scared of the new administration's threats to “make him a pariah” and sanction him for his behavior.

Saudi Arabia was unable to break Qatar’s influence on their shared western allies. Doha has poured billions into buying up diplomatic leverage in European capitals, and the West is unwilling to punish Qatar for its unquenchable expansionism. The Qataris own more land in London than the King, but the Emirate’s most recognizable possession is the French football club Paris Saint Germain (PSG). PSG is the flag-bearer for Qatari soft power. Doha built PSG into one of the most fashionable and recognizable teams on the planet, earning notable success in spreading the brand into the US: a market that has been otherwise slow to embrace the sport. It is also why the country was so eager to host the World Cup. Qatar invested an astonishing 220 billion into its event, building or rebuilding eight stadiums from the ground up and remodeling Doha into a mini-Dubai, armed with a brand new airport, metro system, and extensive road network. Supporters would be flying into Doha on board Qatar Airways' shiny new fleet that now rivals its well-established UAE rival, Emirates. Sheikh Tamim essentially bought a month’s viewing time from the world during which everyone will have their eyes set on his country. The event is not about celebrating football as much as it is a celebration of Qatar: a unique opportunity for the small country to set the foundations of its economic and political future. 

While criticism of the country’s patchy human rights record is entirely justified, some can’t help but notice how few concerns were voiced at the time of Russia’s hosting of the World Cup in 2018. This might be the sign of rising resentment in the West towards an obscenely rich nation that has reached incredible levels of development and living standards in a fraction of the time it took the rest of the world. But this may also be good news for Qatar: all publicity is good publicity, and if the West is now willing to start holding Qatar to account for its excesses, that might very well mean that Tamim has succeeded in anchoring the tiny Emirate at the center of global relations, and ensured the world knows where Qatar lies on a map.

Makram Bekdache is a Sophomore in SEAS, studying Computer Engineering. Makram is passionate about misunderstood and poorly discussed topics in international politics, and making sure everyone knows where Lebanon lies on a map. Makram can be reached at makram.bekdache@columbia.edu.