Kissinger Strikes Again: A shift in US efforts to promote peace in the Middle East

Henry Kissinger working on his maps. Photo generated by the Author using Midjourney AI.

The Biden administration is close to scoring its first major diplomatic achievement in the Middle East. Last week, simultaneous statements from Israeli and Lebanese government officials announced the conclusion of negotiations on a “historic deal.” Both countries agreed to draw their maritime borders and define their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The Eastern Mediterranean neighbors have been at odds since the 1948 Israel-Arab war, with Lebanon hosting a sizable community of Palestinian refugees, and Israel often leading military operations on Lebanese soil. Tension and resentment run deep on both sides, and any form of agreement or informal treaty between both countries has long been out-of-reach, especially in light of Hezbollah, a powerful Shiite militia, and Iran’s tight grip on the Lebanese State. This apparent success hints at a shift in US diplomatic mediation in the Middle East, adopting a different approach after the Trump and Netanyahu administrations’ much publicized Abraham Accords through the use of “shuttle diplomacy,” a long-forgotten staple of Cold War diplomacy. 

The Abraham Accords—a set of peace deals signed between Israel and three Arab countries that previously had poor or no relations with the Jewish State—(and their catchy name) are a mighty marketing tool for their brokers. The Trump administration was able to claim significant credit for doing more to normalize Israel’s standing in the Middle East than any of its recent predecessors. On the other hand, Netanyahu showed that a right-wing leader could still lead diplomatic discussions with Arab neighbors claiming to be guarantors of the Palestinian cause. Yet the Abraham Accords mainly served as public reveals of existing covert relations between Israel and its former enemies. As fellow US allies, the UAE and Israel famously practiced discrete diplomacy, especially in the domain of political and military collaboration to hinder Iran’s expansionism in the Arab world—diplomatic normalization was unsurprising to pundits. Late signee Morocco traded reestablishing ties in exchange for US recognition of its claim over Western Sahara—a trade-off the country was more than willing to entertain in order to gain US support for its disputed territorial claim. Although the Accords did enormous good for Israel’s relations with some of its Arab neighbors, they have failed to improve the Jewish state’s image among the Arab population who still see it as a major threat to their security. This perception has much to do with the Israeli government seeing the Accords as an Arab-sponsored carte blanche to continue bullying its own Arab population. This perceived anti-Arab bias makes the population of signatory Arab states wary of visiting Israel, threatening the economic proposition of the deal, which rests heavily on bilateralism and trade reciprocity. This has discouraged other countries from signing on to the Accords’ template, and seriously dented their perceived efficacy in Arab States. 

These Accords prove that America’s showy blockbuster democracy has run its course in the Middle East. The Camp David Accords were the crowning achievement of these outdated diplomatic efforts. Egypt was the political and cultural leader of the Arab world and had fought multiple wars with Israel. The US rightfully built up this complex agreement into the crowning achievement of 1970s American diplomacy. But apart from a 1994 peace deal with Jordan motivated by land and water disputes no such deals have materialized since. The US government had to find new ways to convince warring Arabs and their Israeli enemy to make peace. With Syria still in a state of war, Lebanon was the next big step for America to take. 

Beirut shares a strategic border with the Jewish state and has recently discovered gas deposits straddling their blurry EEZs. Economically depressed Lebanon sees these resources as a crucial asset to its economic reconstruction, while the Israelis are eager to supply the European market with gas following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the threat of Hezbollah has cast a shadow over the Eastern Mediterranean, troubling the oil majors, and has been a consistent blockade to Israel’s efforts.

The Biden Administration seized on this gas-led opportunity to leverage the situation and extract concessions from Lebanon and Israel. It sent a special envoy, Amos Hochstein, on shuttle diplomacy duty—essentially a round of indirect negotiations held between two enemy parties that communicate through a neutral broker. Hochstein made many trips between Beirut and Tel Aviv to start drafting a mutually-beneficial deal between both parties after in-person Israeli-Lebanese talks broke down. This previous round of talks took place in UN-controlled Southern Lebanon last year, where an American delegate ran back and forth between two tents hosting the Lebanese and Israeli delegations to enable communication between two parties unwilling to talk face-to-face since Lebanon does not recognize Israel. The new envoy would make weekly stops in both capitals, speaking directly with the highest-ranked officials, employing a method made famous by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during his negotiations between Arab countries and Israel in the late 1960s. This helped to bypass mistrust between sides and legitimize the deal. Lebanon would recognize Israel’s claim on a 3-mile stretch of buoys off their shared coast, a strategic border that blocks visual observation from Southern Lebanon over Haifa and Northern Israel. Israel would let Lebanon exploit its gas reserves, even if they partially encroached on Israel’s EEZ. Both parties agreed to these terms after 11 years of failed indirect talks over the delimitations of their maritime borders.

Shuttle diplomacy was mothballed for decades after several unsuccessful initiatives but has now proven to work in resolving tension between two enemy sides when a shared interest is at stake. The Lebanon-Israel deal does more for peace in the region than the Abraham Accords ever will. It ensures Lebanon and Israel are unlikely to war in the future and will lead to economic growth in both countries. Considering Iran’s influence in Lebanon, the deal is the strongest sign that talks between the Islamic Republic and the West are close to being revived since the US-brokered deal would have never seen the light of day without Hezbollah’s assent. Although both countries remain at war while their land border dispute remains unresolved, we must note this deal is not analogous to the UAE accord. Instead of aiming for unrealistic full cooperation and normalization, it patches the immediate security risk while setting a historic precedent upon which any further deal could be set. More importantly for America, it cements its role as an indispensable mediator between both countries and excludes any short-term foreign interference from rivals such as Russia and China. 

This shuttle diplomacy formula can be reused by America to block Russia and China’s maneuvers in American areas of influence, by reasserting the US presence as a trustworthy and proven broker in mending ties between warring nations. Turkey has found success in this, using its mediation between Ukraine and Russia as a means to reinforce its diplomatic prestige. The US should play more aggressively, but more discreetly. The details of the Lebanon-Israel deal only recently emerged. It was a careful, strictly business-oriented approach. The Israeli Supreme Court has just allowed the government to sign the deal without consulting parliament, and it will likely then take effect in a few days. The agreement will likely be implemented, especially since all the main Lebanese actors are in favor. It is truly a diplomatic tour de force that signals a positive shift in the US understanding of the Middle East and its means of exerting influence in a way that isn’t disproportionately biased to one actor but truly works in favor of broader regional peace. It’s a refreshing departure from outdated blockbuster diplomacy and again proves America can now induce real change in the region through cautious mediation between sides that don’t trust each other but may be willing to make peace if the right conditions are proposed by the mediator. For once, domestic political gains and electoral considerations have ceded place to an actual desire to help create peace in the region, and any further efforts of this kind should be applauded and encouraged.

Makram Bekdache is a Sophomore in SEAS, studying Computer Engineering. Makram is passionate about misunderstood and poorly discussed topics in international politics, and making sure everyone knows where Lebanon lies on a map. Makram can be reached at makram.bekdache@columbia.edu.