The Abraham Accords: A Powerful PR Move
Though the Abraham Accords have certainly ruffled some international feathers, the agreement has largely been praised by the various implicated parties. States certainly have reason for celebration.
The Accords represent an acknowledgement of the economic, technological, and strategic benefits of partnering with Israel. The sequential signings of the Abraham Accords can be viewed as a domino effect, in which the UAE lead the charge, followed by Bahrain, Sudan, and finally Morocco. Many hope that more countries are on their way, with predictions that Mauritania, Oman and Indonesia are next in line to fall. Besides Egypt and Jordan, no other Arab country had publicly normalized relations with Israel since the nation's formation in 1948, claiming they would support a boycott of Israel until they resolved the conflict with the Palestinians. The agreement marks a shift in international policy in the Middle East towards increased negotiations with Israel that has the potential to bolster stability in the Middle East.
Part of the desire to normalize relations with Israel surely stems from the country’s seemingly miraculous transformation since it became a state only 72 years ago. Today, Israel has one of the strongest economies globally, is a technological powerhouse known as the startup nation of the world, maintains a powerful defense system and a nuclear arsenal, and is one of the few non-authoritarian governments in the Middle East. Some of its greatest achievements include inventing the first drip irrigation system, making massive advancements in desalination, and producing a solar window.
In signing the Abraham Accords, these Arab countries acknowledge that they have greater enemies than Israel. Further, the agreement evinces that these Arab governments have shifted towards emphasizing pragmatic concerns over ideological maneuvering. Several Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have secretly worked with Israel to combat Iran for years. The consummation of their relationships will only bolster their ability to combine forces against this common enemy which threatens imminent mutual destruction. A more unified front could create a powerful deterrent for Iran, which could lead to a greater willingness from both sides to reenter negotiation talks and help stabilize the entire region.
But are the Abraham Accords really as significant as the headlines have made it out to be, or as former President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have tried to convince us they are? Viewed through one lens, the implications of the agreement are less severe than one may think. A peace deal by definition must end a situation of war, and none of the countries involved were previously at war with Israel. Further, besides combating Iran together, several Gulf countries have engaged with Israel in other ways for many decades, including in trade relations and shared intelligence. With this in mind, the agreements seem more as an institutionalization of preexisting relations.
The agreement is certainly beneficial for Israel, especially given its relatively vulnerable status as a tiny Jewish state surrounded by many countries that have gone to war against it at some point in its short history. In fact, some feel that Israel gained the most in the agreement without making any concessions. Israel’s only formal concession was to promise not to directly annex any new parts of the West Bank, but Israel did not have permission from America to do this beforehand, and if Trump did not concede this, it is highly unlikely that Biden would have. The Accords certainly benefit Israel’s prime minister, Netanyahu. After facing several rounds of elections in the last few months due to the country’s party list electoral system, Netanyahu wants to seem like a powerful international negotiator and divert attention from his recent scandals, including accusations of corruption and criticism for his pandemic response. Further, the agreement reduces the number of public allies the Palestinians have for their cause, which could minimize the pressure on Israel to resolve the crisis. Additionally, Israelis have more than doubled the number of places they can travel to in their region.
Yet Israel is certainly not the only player to benefit from the agreement, and the Accords were highly advantageous for the Arab signatories as well. The government of the United Arab Emirates is suffering from a PR crisis, in which a repressive authoritarian leadership style is seen to clash with, and potentially threaten, the ideals of American democracy. This agreement helps the UAE’s image and solidifies its loyalty to the U.S. For similar reasons, experts predict that Saudi Arabia may soon sign the Accords as well. Mohamad bin Salman, has been in the hot seat since it was revealed that Saudi government officials murdered Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and dissident, in Istanbul. Signing the Accords could be similarly beneficial for Sadui Arabia’s international image and relationship with America.
America recently sold F-35 fighter jets to the UAE after denying their attempts to do so for over five years. Leaders of America, Israel, and the UAE have all denied the relation of this change to the peace agreements. However, before this agreement, Israel was staunchly opposed to the UAE gaining these weapons, which effectively equalized the arsenals of Israel and the UAE. Israel retracted their protests after signing the Accords.
Sudan is the most symbolically significant country to join the agreement. In 1967, the Arab League formalized its boycott of Israel in Khartoum, Sudan, and dubbed the “three no’s”: no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace. Sudan was likely influenced by an implicit ultimatum that signing was necessary for America to remove it from its list of state sponsers of terrorism. Sudan stands to gain a great deal from this agreement, as its starved economy will benefit enormously from increased trade and international aid.
Morocco and Israel had some of the smallest hurdles to overcome in order to reach peace, as they have been engaging in strong relations since the 1990s. Many Israelis feel fondness for the Moroccan people and their King Mohammed V. However, the Moroccan government appeared to want to hold out on formalizing relations until it could get something tangible out of the deal. The move was celebrated on the streets of both Israel and Morocco.
In many ways, this agreement is a PR move more than an actual change in stance, but it's about as powerful as a PR move could get. However, it is important to keep in mind that arguably the biggest winners here are the various political leaders in America and the Middle East, who are highly motivated to maintain their power and to show that they are creating change to seemingly intractable relations.
Claire Schweitzer (CC ‘24) is studying Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies. At CPR, she is a staff writer and enjoys writing about domestic and foreign policy issues.