Under Biden, the U.S. Does Not Sit at the Head of the Table
The election of President Biden brought a renewed sense of hope and a sigh of relief after four years of held breath. Not long after the November win did observers begin to await a return to American exceptionalism and diplomacy––the belief being that, after a lengthy intermission, the U.S. could finally assume its place as an arbiter of human rights and restart its democracy promotion efforts. Even Biden himself recently declared that “America is back,” but it is important to understand the challenges that complicate such a statement.
While a sigh of relief at the return to liberal tradition is warranted, two assumptions underpin this newfound optimism. The first is that Biden, equipped with a magic wand, could erase the actions of the previous administration and start anew. The second is a lack of gradience in our perception of policy: the assumption that Biden was necessarily going to be everything that Trump was not.
The problem with the first assumption is evidenced by undertakings like Biden’s global democracy summit––an endeavor legitimated by the “power of America’s example.” Biden outlines three goals for his Summit for Democracy: to fight corruption, defend against authoritarianism, and advance human rights. In essence, these efforts seek to revive and repair democratic institutions worldwide. While this does not run counter to gestures typically promulgated by American presidents, it is brazen given the reality of the last four years and the more recent Capitol insurrection. From the lack of forbearance in the appointment of a new Supreme Court Justice to Trump’s refusal to concede the results of the election, the erosion of American democracy in recent years makes it increasingly challenging for the U.S. to anoint itself the leader of a global democratic project.
Consequently, the U.S. must strive to practice humility in its foreign policy. There is no question that the Biden administration needs to work to disengage from the previous one, but this cannot be done abruptly. The act of declaring a global democracy summit shortly after the Capitol Hill riot portrays American rhetoric as a farce to be used when politically convenient, not a legitimate attempt to strengthen democracy. Simply put, the U.S. is no longer in a position to adjudicate what countries qualify as democratic. In fact, doing so could pose a challenge to the creation of a summit guest list: who would get an invite, and on what basis?
The problem with the second assumption––that Biden’s policies will be markedly different from Trump’s––comes to light in the recent updates on the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In late February of this year, U.S. intelligence concluded that Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) had approved an operation for the murder of Khashoggi in 2018. Following the release of the intelligence report, Biden’s administration shrugged its shoulders and moved along in a manner similar to Trump’s inaction after the murder. While choosing to declassify the report was a step in the right direction, Biden knew better than to levy sanctions against a friendly regime: security interests prevailed as a determinant of foreign policy. Such decisions directly undermine and contradict efforts like the Summit for Democracy, making it unclear where the administration really stands on the promotion of democratic ideals.
On the anniversary of Khashoggi’s murder in October of 2020, Biden had released a statement acknowledging the need for accountability. He affirmed that a Biden-Harris administration would “reassess” its relationship with Saudi Arabia, maintaining that human rights would come first “even with our closest security partners.” This was also previously expressed in a 2019 Democratic debate where he vowed to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah.” Needless to say, the decision to look the other way makes clear that Biden has reneged on his campaign promises. This brings into question the sincerity of his commitment to human rights. By letting MBS walk, Biden is betraying the very democratic principles, like the freedom of the press, that Khashoggi himself was devoted to. Once again, the current administration is sending mixed signals about its values and indicating no clear departure from the previous administration as of yet.
Many people that are speculating about Biden’s Middle East foreign policy––particularly concerning Gulf countries––forecasted a balancing act between maintaining strategic interests and upholding human rights, or wearing different hats as both a friend and a global policeman. The failure to reprimand MBS should come as no surprise, then. Doing so would have carried a hefty price tag. Biden is no Trump, but that is not to say that his foreign policy will necessarily signal a shifting tide in US diplomatic relations, especially with strategically important countries.
Shortly after being declared the winner of the 2020 presidential election, Biden made a statement about America once again “sit[ting] at the head of the table.” While the U.S. has historically occupied that seat, it cannot assume ownership of it after a four-year-long hiatus and political turmoil in its own backyard. The country that Biden handed over as vice president is not the same country he is inheriting as president. This is a reality that needs to be acknowledged and addressed in foreign policy decision-making, in addition to ensuring that no contradictions arise between principle and practice. Biden must work to fulfill the promises that first sparked that renewed sense of hope among Americans, and focus his efforts on domestic challenges to democracy before exporting his agenda worldwide.
Raya Tarawneh is a Senior Editor at CPR and a junior at Columbia College studying Economics and Political Science.