Crisis and Carnage in Myanmar: What Does The Future Hold For The Rohingya People?
Tatmadaw propaganda outside a military barracks in Mandalay. Photo courtesy of Ilmari Hyvonen.
Democracy is burning in Myanmar.
On February 1st of this year, Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, seized power from the National League for Democracy and declared a state of emergency. The leaders of the electoral movement, Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint, were detained on supposed violations of campaign laws, and the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing emerged as the de-facto leader. As the military consolidates its vice-like grip on power, the country can only look on with fear at what recourse will befall the population. In the Rakhine state on the Western coast, the Rohingya people face an especially precarious future under the military junta.
The Rohingya people are a predominately Muslim, Indo-Aryan ethnic group who claim Myanmar as their home state. Though Myanmar claims to have no official state religion, it has demonstrated a strong preference towards Buddhist-practicing ethnic groups, with less than five percent of the population practicing Islam. These religious differences make it easier to label the Rohingya as alien to Myanmar, dismantling their political status as well. The Rohingya people maintain they are an indigenous group from the Rakhine state, whereas the Myanmar government’s official stance is that they are colonial era migrants from Bangladesh. As a former British province, the country maintains a paranoid outlook on groups relating to East Bengal or their colonial history.
This anti-colonial argument, as well as mass returns of Rohingya to the state in the 1980s, forms the basis of the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which does not recognize them as a national race and has effectively excluded them from acquiring citizenship. As a result of their non-citizen status, the Rohingya suffer from restrictions of interterritorial and extraterritorial movement, the former of which constitutes a direct violation of human rights. Alongside a number of other injustices, the Rohingya are also required to perform forced unpaid labor under local government authorities. Not only has the Myanmar government historically persecuted the Rohingya, but the Rohingya are also the target of an ongoing genocide that started in late 2016. The Tatmadaw coup threatens to exacerbate the political persecution of the Rohingya while closing pathways of response for the international community. In the face of the new military stratocracy, the already murky path to recourse for the Rohingya becomes even murkier. As if this historical persecution were not odious enough, conditions worsened considerably in 2016 as conflicts on the Rakhine State border led to military crackdowns on predominantly Rohingya villages. Security forces used extreme violence against these groups, ranging from the burning down 1,250 houses to killing villagers with helicopter gunships. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees fled the country, and those who remained have been subjected to conditions classified as genocide by numerous human rights commissions and tribunals.
Despite sometimes being supplemented by local forces and citizen militias that take this genocidal cause upon themselves, Myanmar’s military has been the main perpetrator of these crimes. The consolidation of power under Min Aung Hlaing will only increase the brutality and range of these persecutions and attacks. However, it should also be noted that the democratically-elected government took a surprisingly permissive attitude towards this genocide, not protecting or doing much to hinder the actions of the military on the Western coast. Aung San Suu Kyi was hailed as the spiritual successor of Gandhi and the nonviolent resisters of India. She has won nearly every award from the Nobel Peace Prize to the Sakharov. Her career was built upon the non-violent struggle for human rights.
Despite all of this, she has actually defended the military-led genocide on the international stage. When a case was submitted to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J) investigating this matter, she served as the head council defending the actions of the military. At an ICJ hearing, Aung San Suu Kyri routinely characterized the genocide as a domestic armed conflict stemming from the Rohingya attacking the military. On December 11th, 2019, she appeared in front of the Hague to explain away a whole host of human rights violations. The Myanmar government officially refers to Rohingya people as Bengali, refusing to recognize them as a distinct ethnic group. Aung San Suu Kyi, likewise, never used this term throughout her testimony, even as she wrote off claims of “genocidal intent”. Out of the hundreds of thousands of reported killings, there have only been two internal investigations. Defending the Rohingya genocide served as a rallying point for the National League for Democracy, which had begun to lose support as a result of burgeoning economic strife. The day she appeared in front of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), billboards and demonstrations sprung up both on the streets of the Hague and in the capital city, Naypyidaw. Unfortunately for the Rohingya, this coup represents a fairly lateral move. A state that refused to combat this persecution has been replaced by the persecutors themselves.
President Obama and Aung San Suu Kyi during a press conference in 2014. Photo courtesy of the Asia Pacific Media Hub.
A multilateral international response is imperative as the domestic conditions for Rohingya worsen. The main course for intervening in this humanitarian crisis would be the case in front of the International Court of Justice. The west African Islamic nation of the Gambia, on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, submitted an application claiming Myanmar violated the principles enshrined in the Geneva Convention. They submitted their memorial within the allotted time limit and Myanmar responded by filing objections against them on January 20, 2021. Though both parties had their deadlines to submit memorials extended as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the case proceeded normally. Under the best of circumstances, a decision cannot be expected until next year. However, the Rohingya received an early victory late last year, as the Court ordered Myanmar to take preventive measures and preserve all evidence of genocide. This order essentially puts Myanmar’s government under direct scrutiny of the court, requiring them to submit regular updates. While the final ruling will provide a more defined pathway to prosecuting the actions of Tatmadaw war criminals, this initial ruling affirmed the military committed war crimes and severe breaches of humanitarian law.
Though in theory the order should at least stop the Rohingya situation from deteriorating, it holds more weight as a condemnation than a practical solution. Both the democratically elected government and the Tatmadaw released statements rejecting the Court ruling, with General Myat Kyaw stating on behalf of the military that “What the Tatmadaw did was a just war”. When the order was upheld, it seemed clear that international pressure would be needed for the intended effects to be felt. The slim chance of implementation dropped even further after the coup. As a result of pressure from the court case, Myanmar’s government appointed an “Independent Commission of Enquiry '' to investigate whether war crimes with genocidal intent had taken place. While the committee found no evidence of any such intent, it shows the citizen government had an inclination to bend under international pressure. Those sentenced in military court martials have not been party to similar scrutiny. Those sentenced to ten years of hard labor for killings in the Inn Din Village were released after only a single year in prison. One can expect domestic investigations led by the Tatmadaw to be both less extensive and permanent than those overseen by international judicial bodies, and voluntary compliance with the court order seems very unlikely.
The Tatmadaw has made no indications up to this point as to whether they will continue in this case. As the former legal counsel is currently detained, it seems unlikely their legal strategy will remain the same. According to the court’s settled jurisprudence, merits of the case are judged based upon the time when the application was filed. Even if Myanmar were to pull all legal counsel and not submit a memorial, the court would still make a ruling on their jurisdiction, and subsequently the merits of the case. In Nicaragua v. United States, the latter state refused to participate in the proceedings, protesting the I.C.J’.s jurisdiction, yet the court still ruled against them. A ruling will be made in this case whether or not the Tatmadaw chooses to defend themselves.
There is still no assurance that the Court will rule in favor of Myanmar, despite their indication that war crimes took place. A similar application was filed by Bosnia against Serbia in 2006. In that instance, the standard set by Nicaragua v. United States applied. The United States was not found responsible for the actions of the Contras, and in a similar manner, the Myanmar government may not be held accountable for the actions of distinct actors even if they share a common goal. If the I.C.J. case continues, this would be the most likely outcome. In the case of Serbia, it mostly gave further leverage to the already ongoing International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Though a separate criminal tribunal is not a necessity to hold Myanmar responsible, without one, the I.C.J. ruling may not hold much significance. Human rights violations in Myanmar have been condemned several times with little effect, and international pressure that takes the form of sanctions or military action would have to go through the Security Council. This is not going to happen. Russia and China have historically allied themselves with Myanmar, and though the Rohingya Genocide has alienated them, they still maintained a neutral position on the coup and would likely veto direct action against the state. This leaves international tribunals for specific individuals as the only remaining form of viable international recourse, most likely through the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.). Despite Myanmar not being a State party to the Rome Statute, which established this court, the I.C.C. authorized an investigation into crimes against humanity on the Bangladeshi/Myanmar border. Still, this would only cover crimes that took place on Bangladeshi soil and would rely on cooperation from the Tatmadaw directly. Even if the I.C.J. ruled in favor of the Gambia, the increased leverage given to the I.C.C. still would not apply to crimes committed in Myanmar.
Thousands of displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh during the 2017 military lockdown. Photo courtesy of Seyyed Mahmoud Hosseini.
If reinstating the democratically elected government or recourse on the international stage seems unlikely, is there any path towards rescue for the Rohingya? The mass demonstrations against the Tatmadaw might present an opportunity for the Rohingya to gain ground in the realm of the public opinion. Rejecting the 2008 Constitution has long been a central demand for the Rohingya activists, and the state of emergency declared by the Tatmadaw was justified under Article 417 of the same document, which gives the President authority to declare an one year national state of emergency if the state is under threat of disintegration. Though it has been perceived as undemocratic among the international community for years, this view has increasingly been adopted in Myanmar as well. Whereas the former government had seen the opportunity to rally citizens against the Rohingya, the common enemy has become the military. Surprisingly, the Myanmar public has re statements made on the Tatmadaw coup by Rohingya community leaders have been. Yanghee Lee, the special rapporteur of the UN for the situation in Myanmar, tweeted support and solidarity against the Tatmadaw. At one point, she was vilified as exaggerating the Rohingya situation, but some showed gratitude and genuine regret in their former distrust. Advocates see this opportunity as a point to rally support behind the Rohingya and build solidarity between the Burmese people. Decades of state-run segregation could be brought to a close if the Tatmadaw falls from power.
Addressing the Rohingya crisis seems useless through international channels. Even if certain figures are tried through the International Criminal Court, the culture of hatred against the Rohingya will still persist. There is no solution to this problem that only relies on international bodies, as the voluntary nature of international law sabotages itself in this scenario. Hope for the Rohingya takes two forms: the coup creates domestic sympathy for their people and turns public opinion against the Tatmadaw, and increased international scrutiny on the crisis, amplifying the voices of activists. The end of this crisis may not be the result of prolonged legal battle mobilizing power on the behalf of the oppressed, but rather the result of the oppressors overplaying their hand and losing the control they had in the first place.
Ben Waltman is a first-year student at Columbia College studying History and Philosophy. When he is not outlining for a fourth time, he can be found practicing classical piano and playing frisbee on the South Lawn.