The AUKUS Submarine Deal Sinks the Prospect of Long Term Non-proliferation

It is rare to be aware of a negotiation that marks a turning point in history. The new AUKUS deal signals a shift in the tectonic plates of foreign policy on non-proliferation: it threatens the capabilities of the IAEA to protect nuclear weapon development. The IAEA serves as the world’s international watchdog by putting safeguards in place to prohibit the development of nuclear weaponry; in other words, it is the organization that prevents the world from a full-fledged atomic disaster. The landmark Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) tasks the IAEA with evaluating each country’s nuclearization program, including the possibility of malpractice through nuclear militarization. The latest in the IAEA’s safekeeping of proliferation is the newly ratified treaty between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, also known as AUKUS, which marks a turning point in the management of nuclear proliferation. This agreement sets a dangerous precedent that will ultimately harm future de-proliferation efforts.  

The recently formed AUKUS treaty, short for the “Enhanced Trilateral Security Partnership,” provides Australia with naval nuclear weapon technology. This is the first time in history that a non-nuclear-weapon-owning country will receive technology with the precise isotope used to enrich uranium, offering new access to the technology used in atomic weapon construction. Most importantly, the treaty sets a new precedent in providing the opportunity to exploit a loophole to own nuclear technology, undermining the NPT treaty. This loophole can be exercised because the NPT does not ban non-nuclear states from building nuclear-powered naval ships, as it contains a specific exemption for the naval proposals. Therefore, countries would no longer be under the jurisdiction of IAEA inspection and could accumulate uranium for nuclear-powered technology. The larger concern is that countries will use the uranium, which would not require further modification, for nuclear weapons. In other words, world governments that don’t already own nuclear weaponry will actively be considering investing in naval technology as a cover-up for pursuing nuclear proliferation efforts relatively unchecked by the IAEA. 

While Australia’s history with nuclear weaponry is not one that raises international concern, the real issue is how this precedent allows other countries to abuse the law. Notably, the president of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, confirmed that the nuclear material used to fill submarines is now fully exempt from IAEA supervision; with this dangerous precedent in place, potential proliferators can use naval programs to cover up their nuclear militarization programs. Iran, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia have all considered expanding their naval programs, which would constitute a massive treaty to global safety considering these countries’ historical moves towards nuclear proliferation. 

Cold War-era reforms pertaining to nuclear proliferation produced a similar loophole, and the result was rapid nuclear militarization with similar obvious consequences. During the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, SALT I did not prohibit the development of multiple independent reentry vehicle missiles (MIRVs). The initial aim of SALT I was to contain the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. Despite this intention, the treaty did not control the arms race but effectively did the opposite, leading both the Soviet Union and the United States to develop MIRVs. Similarly, the AUKUS deal is dangerously concerning because it will likely yield the same dire outcome as SALT I, leading world governments to contribute to nuclear development due to its potential for exploitation. 

Another major ramification of this loophole is that the IAEA will be rendered largely ineffective. Currently, the due process of nuclear inspection requires the IAEA to submit its findings to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), prompting a vote as to whether or not the program in question warrants intervention or a possible shutdown. With this treaty, the IAEA will have no authority from the NPT to track naval reactors because countries can easily claim that nuclear material serves non-military purposes. While there are other ways to prohibit a country from obtaining a nuclear arsenal (i.e., sanctions), multiple safeguards are necessary to keep uranium enrichment contained. Thus, it is essential that the IAEA remains a player in preventing proliferation because, without the full supervision of the IAEA, the world is at risk of an uncontrolled arms race. 

Another harmful implication of the treaty is the appearance of a double standard between the United States and Australia, which would incentivize potential proliferators to use the AUKUS treaty as leverage. Iran, for example, developed a nuclear program in 2002 and asserted its “right to enrich” by comparing its program to Japan’s; ultimately, following intense international debate, the United States stated that Iran should “suspend” rather than abandon its nuclear program. In this case, Iran exploited this perceived double standard against the United States. With the United States and the United Kingdom giving Australia an exception to own naval weaponry, other countries could use the double standard argument to pursue development with their own nuclear programs. Even more importantly, Iran and the United States have been attempting to settle nuclear talks ever since the abandonment of the United States from the Iran Nuclear Framework Deal. The greater issue is that the United States was already on thin ice in trying to contain Iran’s nuclear development, and this treaty will enable Iran to use the AUKUS further to its advantage. 

Some argue that with this specific treaty, the military and strategic benefits outweigh the possible exploitation of naval submarine development. It is true that strategic benefits include a gateway to curtail the aggressive actions of China in the South Pacific. However, while this deal might be beneficial for Washington as an avenue to combat Beijing’s dominance in the South China Sea, the deal nevertheless invites exploitation. Now that there is heightened international interest in non-proliferation, countries should consider modifying the NPT agreement in order to circumvent nuclear material negligence. 

Lara Geiger (Barnard ‘25) is a Staff Writer at CPR and will likely pursue a joint major in Political Science and Economics.