How Tariff NIMBYism Imperils an American Industrial Renaissance

This photograph, taken in 1959, showcases the Gary Mills at their height. After decades of decline, the Gary Mills are hiring again, thanks to steel tariffs. Photo courtesy of Steve Shook. 

At first glance, public opinion seems to favor a trade agenda that safeguards domestic industry. Recent polling has found that “protecting U.S. jobs” is a foreign policy priority for most Americans, with a large majority considering tariffs to be important to our trade agenda. Protectionist policies have garnered bipartisan support, with leaders on both sides of the aisle advocating tariffs on the import of select foreign goods. Upon further inspection, however, Americans seem only to support tariffs in principle, not in practice. When President Donald Trump imposed duties on steel and aluminum imports in a bid to protect the teetering steel industry from unfair competition, voters opposed the measure by 19 points. This margin widened to 30 points as President Joe Biden opted to keep the tariffs, citing national security concerns. But why, amidst swelling protectionist sentiments, would the public so overwhelmingly reject a tariff protecting a core industry?

One answer lies in fears over rising consumer prices. In the poll cited above, support for the “Trump tariff” first played out along partisan lines, with 58% of Republicans supporting and 73% of Democrats opposing the measure. But, when asked if they supported the tariff even if it meant a higher cost of goods, opposition quickly became bipartisan. Here, simply suggesting that prices would rise at all was enough to turn an additional 7% of respondents against the tariffs. Though there is consensus that our core industries ought to be insulated from low-cost foreign competition, voters quickly sour on tariffs when they begin to feel them in their pocketbooks.

This phenomenon can be described as NIMBYism—the desire to reap a policy’s rewards but reluctance to shoulder its costs. An acronym for “not in my backyard,” the term “NIMBY” was initially coined to describe those who oppose a necessary development in their neighborhood (think: landfills, power plants, public housing) but would support it were it located elsewhere. But the term is also apt for those who support tariffing, but only insofar as its social benefits—job creation, national security, or self-reliance—come without personal costs: higher prices and fewer choices in the checkout aisle. Tariff NIMBYism is often rationalized by the claim: “I want tariffs, but not this tariff.” Such critics call for more “nuanced” or “targeted” tariffs. But even President Barack Obama’s tariffs, which only targeted illegally dumped steel, prompted similar complaints of price hikes, only to be circumvented with ease by foreign competitors. If tariffs are expected to accomplish their stated goals without cost to consumers, no tariff will meet the NIMBY standard. 

These concerns are not entirely unfounded, as tariffs do yield higher consumer prices: steel and aluminum tariffs cost American families an average of $20 annually. But this figure pales in comparison to the cost of a declining steel sector. In the 1950s, America produced half the world’s steel and employed more than 700,000 workers. Mills were the economic backbone of hundreds of steel towns and cities across the industrial heartland. But in the 1970s, foreign industries began producing steel at a capacity that far exceeded market demand, artificially lowering its price. As cheap steel flooded the American market, domestic producers could not compete. By 1980, domestic steel production reached an all-time low, and its workforce was cut in half. As American steel declined, so too did the communities that grew around its mills and foundries. Many deindustrialized areas fell into economic and social decay, with generational poverty and opioid abuse rampant in America’s former “steel belt.” Today, American steel employs a meager 83,000, while China produces half the world’s supply, often under unsafe and exploitative labor conditions. 

When America outsourced its steel production, the rewards were instantaneous, as automobiles and appliances could suddenly be produced for a fraction of their usual price. But the costs built slowly over time, as the social symptoms of deindustrialization manifested over decades. However, if we are to heed our civic imperative to reshore American industry through tariffing, this equation will be reversed. Costs will be immediate, as consumers are cut off from the artificially cheapened goods they have become accustomed to. But the rewards will take time, as the domestic supply chains crippled by globalization will take decades to rebuild. Some have found the 3,200 jobs created by steel and aluminum tariffs unimpressive given their cost to consumers. But this figure is likely to multiply, as the tariffs also triggered tens of billions in facility investments and plant acquisitions, which will house many more workers once constructed. While tariff-induced price hikes are immediate, steel mills can take over a decade to design and construct, leading many to prematurely label the tariffs unsuccessful. Similarly, the national security benefits of domestic steel, obvious during the world wars, may not be apparent to voters in a time of relative peace. 

Tariff NIMBYism operates through instant gratification, as the public remains unwilling to sacrifice cheap goods in the short term to secure industry and opportunity in the long term. This ideology is not so much the fault of NIMBYism as it is the natural outgrowth of a supply-side market that values cost reduction over job creation, national security, and self-reliance. But the ramifications of tariff NIMBYism are too great to be left unchallenged. Reversing decades of industrial atrophy will require a paradigm shift that places long-term policy goals over short-term personal gains. This shift will not be easy, as Americans have every right to be suspicious of a government that demands their sacrifice to remediate a crisis for which they bear no responsibility. To ease these concerns, the government should reimburse low-income Americans for tariff-induced price hikes, much like Trump’s subsidy for farmers who faced retaliatory tariffs. 

But above all else, an effective tariffing agenda will require a chief executive who can unite citizens behind an affirmative vision of American industry. Though his steel tariffs put us on the right path, Trump was clearly the wrong messenger, packaging industrial policy in a divisive nationalism. Trump’s rhetoric elevated the experience of the white working class at the expense of Black and brown communities who have suffered outsourcing to the same, if not greater extent than their white counterparts. An affirmative industrial agenda would pursue middle-class manufacturing jobs in both inner-city Pittsburgh and small-town Pennsylvania, lifting the prospects not of one particular voter base but of a trans-racial working class. If Biden can articulate an inclusive future for American manufacturing, he may succeed in overcoming tariff NIMBYism and spurring the industrial renaissance we so desperately need. 

Micah Weese (CC ‘22) is a staff writer at CPR and an Urban Studies major. His interests include urban politics, industrial policy, and labor law.