U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Somalia and The New Cold War in Africa
United Nation soldiers during UNOSOM II in 1993. Image by Staff SGT. Jeffrey T. Brady
Central to President Trump’s foreign policy platform is the withdrawal of troops from various foreign battlegrounds. From Afghanistan to Syria to Iraq, Trump upheld his promises from the 2016 election to oversee the removal of U.S. troops from “endless foreign wars.” Latest in this line of troop withdrawals is his announcement in early December, which ordered the removal of all American troops—of which there are approximately 700—from Somalia by January 15, 2021. The premature departure of U.S. troops from Mogadishu raises questions about the terrorist threat to Somalia and Africa’s increasing role as a battlefield for a power struggle between the major global powers.
In the latter half of the Cold War (the late 1970s), the Horn of Africa became a region of great interest to the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly because of its location, which provided key naval access. The U.S. sought to establish Somalia as a Cold War ally to solidify dominance in The Horn. To achieve this goal, the U.S. poured money and resources into a puppet government that would play out the American foreign policy agenda abroad. The chosen leader of this government was Mohamed Siad Barre, who led the state from 1978 until 1991. During Barre’s time in office, President Ronald Reagan invested $100 million USD in economic and military aid and personally met with Somali leaders to reimagine U.S.-Somali relations. Reagan even constructed a luxurious $50 million USD embassy in Mogadishu, equipped with three massive swimming pools and a maintenance staff surpassing 430 employees. But if American interference across Central America and the Middle East proved anything, it is that puppet governments tend to be a recipe for disaster. The inevitable outcome eventually arrived in 1991, when Barre’s opponents, namely the major rebel group United Somali Congress, toppled the government.
With a complete lack of centralized government, Somalia came to be known as a failed state as the devolution into sectarian violence, poverty, clan warfare, famine, dire human rights status, and economic destruction ensued. U.S. involvement in Somalia, however, did not conclude with the collapse of its puppet government under Barre. While the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu closed in 1991, the U.S. continued to intervene in the state’s affairs. In the following year, the U.S. embarked on a military intervention in Somalia to fight alongside the United Nations peacekeeping force.
The U.N. entered the conflict in Somalia on the grounds of humanitarian need, citing malnutrition, disease, and children in conflict zones as main priorities. What began as a strictly apolitical cause, however, later developed into an investment into the negotiation process for a new government. In other words, the U.N. implicated itself in the messy process of state-building: a tragic mistake. There are many reasons as to why both U.N. peacekeeping missions in Somalia—UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II—failed, but what matters is this: these missions are widely regarded as two of the most appalling failures of the U.N. since its inception. Most of the supplies and equipment shipments to U.N. troops and officials ended up in the hands of rebel organizations or terrorists like al-Shabab, only to be weaponized against innocent civilians. The pipeline of money and donations was not coupled with the necessary distribution strategies to successfully deliver aid to those in need. Instead, the ironic result was that the U.N. ended up providing extensive support to the very terrorist organizations it intended to counteract.
The cooperation of U.N. and U.S. forces characterized a period of intense foreign involvement in the civil war, which unfortunately yielded minimal progress. It also did not last long. Just a year later came the Battle of Mogadishu, otherwise known as Black Hawk Down. On October 3-4, 1993, Somali forces ambushed a U.S. ordered raid attack on militia leader Mohamed Farrah Aidid, resulting in some of the deadliest urban combat for U.S. troops since Vietnam. Ultimately, Somali forces shot down two American helicopters; civilians dragged the mutilated corpses of the pilots through the streets. The battle inflicted 18 American casualties and 73 injuries.
The Battle of Mogadishu marked a critical turning point for international intervention in Somalia. American foreign policy shifted dramatically as the Clinton administration responded to the public outcry. President Clinton addressed the nation on October 7, 1993, with a televised announcement that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994, including troops assigned to the U.S. peacekeeping force by the Department of Defense. Accordingly, just one year after the devastating Black Hawk Down incident, all but 90 American governmental officials moved from Mogadishu to Mombasa, Kenya, via ship, and subsequently airlifted to the U.S.. Clinton also enacted a significant cutback in humanitarian aid efforts in Somalia.
At the time of the 1994 troop withdrawal, the U.S. Department of Defense claimed to be “confident that UNOSOM II [would be] able to carry out its mandate at current troop levels,” but that “rapidly deteriorating security conditions[s] caused by inter-clan fighting could put the successful execution of the mandate beyond the reach of UNOSOM II.” Evidently, the American officials were right to second-guess the efficacy of U.N. forces acting alone: circumstances only worsened. Despite the numerous efforts to reach a settlement between stakeholders, including the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration, the bloodshed only continued.
Eventually, the U.N. arrived at the conclusion that “UNOSOM II’s goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive,” particularly in consideration of the high troop and equipment levels, which came at a great cost to the U.N. On November 4, 1994, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to pass Resolution 954, which effectively withdrew all forces.
International efforts to force an end to the Somali Civil War and guide a process of peace-building constituted a devastating and expensive failure. Despite this outcome, the decision to cease U.S. intervention in Somalia was not final. The aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001 entailed brand new American counterterrorism efforts in several countries. So, once again, American troops in growing numbers reentered Somali territory and joined with forces from neighboring countries like Uganda and Kenya. The central purpose for re-establishing a U.S. military presence in Somalia was to combat al-Shabab, a jihadist terrorist group that announced an affiliation with Al-Qaeda in 2012. Al-Shabab’s massive presence in the country presents the single most urgent threat to the livelihood of the collective Somali populace.
American strategic interest in Somalia originates with the Cold War of the 20th century; now, in the 21st century, we see the dawn of a new Cold War in Africa. The competitive nature of this geopolitical trend is identical to the bipolar world order that followed the conclusion of the Second World War; all that differs now is the motive. This time, the threat is not a communist insurgency but challenges to American dominance abroad from Beijing and Moscow. China’s Belt and Road Initiative aims to proliferate a global presence through infrastructural projects, which only cements the importance of Africa in Chinese foreign policy. Similarly, for Russia, strategic naval interest in The Port of Aden plays a key role in Putin’s foreign policy agenda. This is traceable through the uptick in Russian trade, arms deals, and military training programs across Africa over recent years. The politics between the United States, Russia, and China are deeply nuanced, but on the topic of Africa, the dynamic is quite clear. We are witnessing a race between the U.S. and its enemies to get in on the radical economic development observed across the African continent: one that can yield but one winner.
Ergo, President Trump’s announcement in December to remove all troops from Somalia does more than resurface a murky history of failed intervention and puppet governments; it evokes a major proxy war of the 21st century. A new Cold War plays out on Africa’s soil, and there is no path of action for Trump which will not be met with an equal reaction from China and Russia. Certainly, the presence of U.S. troops is no guarantor of peace nor stability: but the departure of al-Shabab’s greatest enemy from the battlefield can only fare poorly for those who lie in the crossfire. At stake in this proxy war for dominance in The Horn are the lives of innocent civilians already suffering from severe drought and a raging separatist movement.
Tread carefully, President Trump; Somalia is a powder keg. One wrong move risks not only a dramatic reshuffling of power between the U.S. and its enemies, but the national survival of Somalia, too.
Kaitlyn Saldanha is a freshman at Barnard College studying economics and international relations.