The U.S. Extradition Policy Against Maduro Risks the Lives of Venezuelans
Venezuela’s newly elected President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas, Venezuela on April 19, 2013. Photo by Xavier Granja Cedeño.
On March 26, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on charges of drug trafficking and “narco-terrorism.” The U.S. Department of State has also offered $15 million for information leading to the arrest of fourteen high-ranking Venezuelan officials that are alleged members of the Cartel of the Suns.
The Trump administration claims that Maduro colluded with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (F.A.R.C.) to use cocaine “as a Weapon to ‘Flood’ the United States.” Attorney General William Barr stated that the Trump administration plans to adopt an extradition policy that would grant U.S. federal courts the jurisdiction to charge these Venezuelan officials.
This extradition policy will likely increase violence in Venezuela and lead to the deaths of innocent citizens. U.S. extradition policies with Latin American states have a history of incentivizing cartels to wage additional harm against civilians to make a political statement. Trump’s announcement is not a direct attempt to address the issue of drug-related violence but instead represents the apex of an ongoing contentious relationship between the two countries.
Since the election of former President Hugo Chávez in 1998, the U.S. has challenged the socialist government of Venezuela. During his presidency, Chávez nationalized foreign oil projects and used the revenue to fund populist, autonomous economic policies, presenting an ideological threat to the U.S. Although Chávez maintained electoral legitimacy, he consolidated state power by filling the Supreme Court with his political allies and prosecuting Venezuelans that opposed him. His expansion of social welfare reduced the Venezuelan unemployment rate by half and decreased poverty by 15%. However, these programs were dependent on the booming oil revenue, which started dramatically declining in 2002.
After Chávez died in 2013, his successor Nicolás Maduro continued these policies amid an economic collapse resulting from the declining oil prices. Venezuela’s dependence on diminishing oil revenue has produced one of the Western Hemisphere’s worst humanitarian crises with skyrocketing poverty and shortages of basic necessities like food and toilet paper. The crisis has been attributed to Maduro’s mismanagement and corruption, sparking ongoing protests by the Venezuelan people to oust the authoritarian leader. The Venezuelan National Assembly elected Juan Guaidó as the new president but Maduro has used the military to block his entrance into power. Having an economic and political stake in Venezuela’s outcome, the Trump administration has supported Guaidó and unleashed a “maximum pressure” campaign against Maduro. The U.S. has imposed heavy sanctions on oil exports to target his regime and companies that support him. The administration’s indictment of Maduro is a continuation of the political battle to remove him from office.
Maduro should by no means remain the leader of Venezuela. He has committed human rights violations against Venezuelan citizens and perpetuated the country’s economic collapse. However, a U.S. extradition policy against him and the alleged members of the Cartel of the Suns will most likely cause armed backlash, exacerbating the state’s humanitarian crisis. By indicting Maduro, the Trump administration’s intention is not to create constructive drug policies but to use extradition for political gain. Throughout the past century, U.S. extradition treaties signed with Latin American states have proved to be largely ineffective in curbing the drug trade. In Mexico and Colombia, the war waged against drug trafficking organizations has failed to address the underlying issue of the demand for drugs in the U.S. while catalyzing violence in Latin America.
In 1979, the U.S. signed an extradition treaty with the Colombian government in an effort to impede the drug production and the political influence of drug cartels. During the late 20th century, Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel controlled 80% of the cocaine and 60% of the marijuana flows in the U.S. The cartel built cooperative relationships with state officials through bribery and intimidation to strengthen their foothold in the illicit market. However, without the ability to create policies in formal state institutions, the Medellín Cartel engaged in violent lobbying for political power. Violent lobbying is the use of violence waged against government officials, rival gangs, and the public to deter the government from enacting policies that harm the cartel’s profits.
In response to the U.S.-Colombia extradition treaty, Escobar increased violent lobbying to evoke national backlash against the policy. He murdered judges, law enforcement, and citizens to pressure the Colombian government and convince the public to abandon the agreement. Most significantly, 15,000 people were killed in the crossfire of the crackdown. The extradition policy that was intended to increase state security had the inverse consequence of strengthening the cartel’s systemic influence over the government. Drug trafficking organizations are incentivized to increase their political activity when their market share is at risk. After experiencing the trauma of Escobar’s violent retaliation, Colombia abandoned efforts to enforce the treaty.
In the 1980s, the U.S. enacted a similar extradition treaty with Mexico, but this agreement granted both countries discretion over whether to exercise these powers. Initially, the Mexican government evaded the agreement, leading the U.S. to authorize a unilateral abduction of three drug cartel members. U.S.-Mexico relations grew strained as the U.S. labeled Mexico a “narco-state” and Mexico contended the abductions had violated international law and national sovereignty. However, after the 2006 presidential election of Felipe Calderón, the Mexican government began taking a more explicit, combative stance against the drug trafficking organizations, reconciling relations between the two countries. Calderón restructured the police force, expanded the use of the military, and coordinated with the U.S. to take a more hardline, militarized approach against the cartels.
Similar to Colombia, the joint armed retaliation against the cartels in Mexico has been counterproductive, causing the political influence and popularity of these groups to grow. The hardline policies that Mexican presidents have taken against these cartels have caused the homicide rate to soar. Calderón’s administration, despite leading the war against drugs, has been charged with accepting bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel, and the former Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, is also claimed to have colluded with these criminal actors. Today, on a local level, the cartels’ violent lobbying increases in the months leading up to elections to dissuade local politicians from interfering in their illicit operations. Mexican criminal groups are notorious for using “narco-messaging,” the public display of banners and deceased victims, as a political tactic to threaten government officials, rival gangs, and the public. They set the political agenda by engaging in voter intimidation and executing local politicians that take a stance against them. Most significantly, innocent people are caught in the crossfire of drug-related violence. People face violence for participating in the political process, posing a threat to democracy.
Extradition policies incentivize cartel members to execute additional violence because they face greater costs for accepting defeat. Criminal actors make the rational choice to commit a crime only if the potential benefits outweigh the expected costs. An extradition policy is often assumed to deter drug trafficking organizations from future criminal activities by increasing the severity of the punishment. However, extradition is unconditional on their future violence. They will be deported and tried under U.S. courts regardless if they wage additional harm. As a result, cartels are incentivized to increase violent lobbying to prevent their extradition, as University of Chicago professor Ben Lessing outlines in his book.
Northwestern University professor Daniel Krcmaric’s research on the extradition of oppressive leaders has drawn a similar conclusion. When the head of a state is faced with the decision to either maintain power or accept defeat, the leader is more likely to settle if they are given an “exit guarantee,” a safe place to retreat after they step down from office. Krcmaric found that after 1998, leaders deemed culpable were six times less likely than non-culpable leaders to go into exile. Policies like extradition that offer a jail cell or death incentivize leaders to maintain power while the promise of a protected exile can lead to a bargain.
Lessing argues for a similar potential solution to decreasing drug-related violence: the “conditional repression” approach. By changing the structure of the costs imposed on them, cartels can be convinced to limit their violence. A conditional policy that implies “forgiveness for past violence conditional on nonviolence going forward” could deter cartels from engaging in violent lobbying. This policy is controversial because cartels are allowed to carry on their operations, albeit peacefully, preventing future violence.
The international community faces a dilemma: state actors and non-state actors alike should be held accountable for their human rights abuses, but the people of that state should also be protected from additional harm. With an unconditional, negative outcome, Maduro is incentivized to fight the extradition policy instead of accepting a bargain. Extradition could likely lead members of the Cartel of the Suns to use indiscriminate violence against the public as a form of violent lobbying. This policy also has bad timing amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Venezuela does not have a healthcare system equipped to treat patients facing injuries from drug-violence on top of treating patients affected by the virus.
Attorney General Barr’s statement also recycles a longstanding focus on the supply of drugs from Latin America that completely ignores how the U.S. demand for the drug has caused violence in the region. From the U.S. side, a more effective approach to decreasing drug trafficking is to address the high rate of drug consumption in the U.S. and the incentives that lead young people to join cartels. Funding education, providing drug treatment, and preventing access to guns are more effective ways to reduce violence through policy. The Trump administration should not take advantage of this issue in its political battle with Maduro, especially when the lives of Venezuelans are at risk.
Rachel Barkin is a managing editor at CPR and a sophomore at Barnard College studying political science and psychology. She aspires to reform the criminal justice system, or, at least, be a guest star on the comedy game show Billy on the Street.