W.H.O. is in Charge? The Neglect of Leadership by the World Health Organization
The World Health Organization’s headquarters in Geneva. Photo by Thorkild Tylleskar.
The World Health Organization cites accountability and transparency as necessary conditions for the efficacy of a coordinated response to global health concerns. But when the W.H.O.’s independence is questioned and W.H.O. administrators are suspected of allegiance to certain state actors, the responsibility of compiling credible data and allocating resources efficiently goes unattended. Skepticism and distrust of the W.H.O.'s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has forced intelligence agencies to expand the purview of their operations to fill the void of reliable information and accessible supplies.
Distrust in the autonomy of the W.H.O. arose from accusations that the organization was complicit in China’s misinformation campaign that deceived governments into underestimating the severity of the novel coronavirus. From refraining to declare a “public health emergency of international concern” until after cases of the virus were confirmed outside China to endorsing the infection statistics released by the Chinese government that were widely believed to be inaccurate, the W.H.O. appeared to many as partial to the agenda from Beijing. Further evidence of this bias includes the W.H.O. succumbing to Chinese pressure to exclude Taiwanese delegations from anti-virus conferences. Although Taiwan is not recognized as a United Nations member state, largely due to the objection of China, Taiwan was among the first locales outside of China to which the virus spread. Concern for an escalation of infections in Taiwan would have warranted a conditional invitation from the W.H.O. to participate in the global COVID-19 response for nearly any other state.
In light of bias and misinformation from the W.H.O., countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic have been forced to rely on their own intelligence communities for accurate information.
For example, the Central Intelligence Agency expanded its role after the W.H.O. failed to address intelligence that would have exposed China’s efforts to diminish the perceived scale of the virus. In February, the C.I.A. alerted officials of statistics that underreported the number of confirmed cases in China. But international institutions neglected to act on this new information for fears of violating Chinese sovereignty; member states’ participation in these institutions hinges on the distinction between cooperation and sovereignty. As such, the C.I.A. has had to pursue the task of finding accurate data without the assistance of an international coalition.
Even though the C.I.A. is among the most powerful intelligence agencies in the world, the W.H.O.’s crisis of credibility has been extremely consequential. Intervention from foreign governments into seemingly non-political matters relating to a global pandemic threatens collaboration and mutual security. Intelligence organizations must revert to clandestine operations when neither global institutions nor diplomatic partners act in good faith: it is speculated that both the C.I.A. and MI6 have begun considering using intelligence agents and clandestine assets to gather reliable information on outbreaks in other countries. Such organizations are also discussing coordination with technology companies to assist in intercepting communications and surveilling sites critical to identifying the scale of another country’s response to the virus that may be veiled by distorted reports.
The distrust of foreign governments created by the W.H.O.’s vacuum of accountability contributes to even greater barriers that obstruct countries’ responses to the coronavirus. Because deception attempts have already been identified by intelligence agencies, countries are more inclined to be skeptical of information reported by other governments that cannot be verified by the W.H.O. and the international community. This is counterproductive to the goal of a collaborative response to an international emergency. Countries are scrambling for essential resources like ventilators and personal protective equipment. Without accurate assessments of infection rates, though, suspicion of malintent leaves countries hesitant to commit scarce resources that sacrificed global health through deceptive reporting. Escalating tensions between Beijing and Washington have already yielded ideological propaganda directed against each other. The threat to an effectively coordinated response is no longer solely sourced in deceit; an existential danger to an unified front against COVID-19 exists from intentional affronts to the legitimacy of entire governments. Espionage is not only employed to acquire an authentic assessment of the infection rate abroad. Espionage is used as a defensive measure to rebuff implications that discredit a government’s approach to mitigating the virus.
Diplomatic fractures following the W.H.O.’s failure to ensure member states were acting in good faith when sharing information related to the COVID-19 pandemic do not just delay relief from the health crisis; suspicion also fuels political delegitimization. While suspicions of Moscow underreporting the extent of coronavirus exposure amongst Russians is concerning, the exploitation of the pandemic in pursuit of election interference is even more dangerous. There is a historical precedent for this, in that Soviet-era Russia strategically abused the fear and anxiety associated with a crisis in order to seed discord and weaken ideological enemies. The Soviet K.G.B. had already proven effective the tactic of misinformation campaigns during the H.I.V. epidemic. And during the height of the Cold War, the K.G.B. capitalized on anti-Semitism and racial conflicts to cultivate domestic hostilities and distract from foreign adversaries. S.V.R., the Russian intelligence agency equivalent to the K.G.B., is believed to have already begun sowing strife through social media with the intent of influencing voter preference in the November elections. The proximity of the pandemic to the culmination of the election cycle, the emotional uncertainty that stokes conspiracies of biological warfare, and wariness of government transparency present a fertile environment for breeding political acrimony.
Even when there is no malevolent intent, intelligence organizations have found novel roles typically outside their purview.
Because countries have reason to lack confidence in the W.H.O. to equitably and justly prioritize resource allocation, countries have assumed the responsibility of resource procurement. While most Western countries have delegated the task to health ministries and agencies, Israeli intelligence officers in the Mossad have sought medical supplies to support the country’s Coronavirus response.
In the absence of an impartial centralized body, countries have become more self-reliant and have taken more care of prioritizing their individual interests. The failures of the W.H.O. have impelled intelligence agencies to expand their functions that include advances against misinformation and ineptitude for impartiality.
President Trump listens to American officials in a White House Situation Room briefing on the coronavirus in January. Photo by Joyce Boghosian.
The United States has already begun to separate itself from the international response to COVID-19. President Trump rescinded American funding for the W.H.O. because the organization failed to hold China accountable for its delayed notification about the coronavirus and for its misreported data about the spread of the virus. While President Trump’s decision to halt funds serves a punitive purpose, a more effective approach by the United States could both penalize the W.H.O. and reform the W.H.O.’s conduct. Withholding American funding for the W.H.O. whilst providing provisions that must be met prior to reinstating such funding would allow the United States to restore the W.H.O.’s collaborative spirit. The United States National Institutes of Health provides over 70% of W.H.O. funding. The threat of such a large sum being withheld would provide a significant incentive for the W.H.O. to enact objective, fair policy rather than give preference to the interests of China over the shared interests of the international community.
Whether the W.H.O.’s decision to affirm China’s underreporting originated in preference or complacency, the appearance of bias has rendered the W.H.O. incapable of marshaling cooperation. Collectively turning inward to intelligence organizations designed to prioritize national security over international cooperation may worsen the danger of a virus that does not respect national borders—it will become a virus that constitutes a threat to global security.
Zachary Becker is a staff writer at CPR and a sophomore in Columbia College studying Political Science. He grew up in Texas and Florida but has most recently lived in Newport Beach, California.