Business as Usual? The Coronavirus and the Persistence of Political Normality

White House coronavirus update briefing on April 18, 2020. Photo from White House.

The coronavirus pandemic has spawned a whole genre of essays arguing that the crisis will precipitate radical change. One Politico article featuring a selection of authors argues that the coronavirus could revive trust in institutions, rejuvenate patriotism, or even catalyze a new political uprising. In Foreign Affairs, various thinkers argue that the virus will result in either globalization’s end or its expansion. 

It’s easy to fit the coronavirus into whatever political theory one happens to believe. Proponents of an expansive national government see a country crippled by the inability to coordinate a national response, and predict a new era of active government to forestall future hardships. On the other hand, supporters of strong state governments see a country crippled by the inability to circumvent an inept federal government, and foresee a restructuring of the federalist system. The belief that the virus will foundationally change society is not limited to the United States; the virus has been called a death knell for China’s authoritarian state, and a crisis that could end the EU’s cherished freedom of movement. I’m not convinced of this; while the virus will alter politics, it is hard to see how the change will truly be radical.

Seeking to revise an existing social and political order in the face of a pandemic may be a universal impulse. The plague that accompanied the Peloponnesian War would eventually cause Athens to lose the war and abandon democracy. The Byzantine historian Procopius criticized the Emperor Justinian’s inaction and corruption in his response to a plague. The Black Death led to the fall of the Mongol Empire in China. In England, the Black Death was followed by a peasant revolt which threatened to topple the whole social order. Walter Scheidel, in his book The Great Leveller, has argued that together with war and revolution, plagues have been responsible for most reductions in inequality throughout human history. So it might seem reasonable to argue that a pandemic will alter society.

Globally, almost no country has been successful in managing the coronavirus response. Britain adopted a “herd immunity” strategy and now finds itself reeling. Swedes tout a relaxed voluntary response to the coronavirus even as the country now has a higher death rate per capita than the United States. France’s centralized public administration has been both a boon and an enormous hindrance to public health efforts, as their citizens find themselves largely without masks available because of an administrative choice to import masks rather than stockpiling ones made in France. In each of these countries, citizens have expressed frustration with their government’s failure to keep them safe. 

Even in authoritarian states where no such dissent is allowed, the coronavirus response reflects the nature of their government system. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has used the pandemic as an excuse to concentrate power and rule by decree. In Russia, the Kremlin first denied that the virus was extant in the country, and then proceeded to implement a heavy-handed response. China’s flexible but authoritarian state was beneficial in coordinating a massive and effective response, but also harmful to the world’s efforts to contain the virus. Officials in Wuhan concealed news of the virus for weeks, even detaining a doctor who spread the news of the new illness. Muzzling dissent for local political purposes is a common characteristic of the Chinese government: local officials concealed the size of the SARS epidemic in 2003. Indeed, low-level bureaucrats in China are probably still concealing the extent of the epidemic, as the Party’s political needs still drive coronavirus case reporting. One study estimated that had interventions in China been conducted just three weeks earlier, the number of cases could have been reduced by 95%.

Every country that has faced the coronavirus, not just America, has been criticized for the inadequacy of its response. In Britain, senior members of the Prime Minister’s party have roundly criticized the Conservative government’s “herd immunity” strategy. In Sweden, 2,000 doctors petitioned the government to implement more stringent social distancing measures. Even an ordinarily quiescent Chinese public media has been stirred into action, with Xi Jinping's nascent cult of personality vanishing from the scenes.

Clearly, in both liberal democracies and authoritarian states, the coronavirus has exposed the flaws of governmental systems and brought about a desire for change. But will the coronavirus result in a complete revision of our governance, or of government policies anywhere? Not quite. 

It’s wrongheaded to assume that the coronavirus will completely reshape our politics. Everywhere, the virus has revealed stresses already inherent in the system but has thus far failed to ease them. In the United States, the virus was supposed to increase trust in experts and lead to partisan unity. We have already seen this effect dissipate. Like everything else, the coronavirus has swiftly seen the development of a partisan divide, with Democrats significantly more concerned about the virus than Republicans. After an initial surge in bipartisanship, coronavirus relief bills are already being blocked in the Senate by partisan bickering. Many Americans have developed a conspiratorial mindset; lose to a third of Americans believe that the virus was created in a lab.  

The coronavirus has not fundamentally altered the political game anywhere. In China, a critic who called Xi Jinping a “clown” has disappeared, and organs of the party-state are now crowing that the virus displays the failures of the US model and the successes of China’s. It’s hard to see signs that China is addressing the knee-jerk reflexes of authoritarian control that were largely responsible for the pandemic’s initial uncontrolled spread. Europe is still divided along the same fault lines that were dividing it in 2008. Four wealthy Northern European countries, including Germany and the Netherlands, have refused to issue “Coronabonds” to cushion the impact of the virus on Southern Europe, with the Dutch prime minister comparing the proposal to “crossing the Rubicon.” 

This is not to say that the coronavirus will not have short-term political consequences, even major ones. In the wake of the virus, President Trump has seen both a short term boost in his approval ratings and widespread condemnation, with one author calling him worse than James Buchanan, the president who sat on his hands as the Confederacy seceded. The virus may very well cost the President the election. It is, however, too early to tell whether the virus will substantially disrupt voting for the November election––in which case, anything goes. 

In essence, the coronavirus is a mirror—it may reveal the flaws in our institutions, but it is unlikely to ultimately change them. The more things change, the more they will stay the same.

John David Cobb is a staff writer at CPR and a first-year studying History and Political Science in Columbia College. He is from Knoxville, Tennessee, and also works with the Columbia Undergraduate Law Review and Matriculate, an organization that aims to help lower-income students get into college.